

~~SECRET~~ (When Filled In)



DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

# Intelligence Information Cable

● ROUTINE

WARNING NOTICE  
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

IN 561046

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Classification is assigned Reporting Officer. Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652 Exemption Category 38 (1),(2) Impossible to Determine Date of Automatic Declassification.

[Redacted] 3.5(c)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

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CITE [Redacted] 3.5(c)

DIST 23 APRIL 1975

COUNTRY ARGENTINA

[Redacted]

3.3(b)(1)

SUBJECT DECISION BY THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP)  
TO REFOCUS ON URBAN TERRORISM; INTERNAL ERP ORGAN-  
IZATION AND ERP VIEWS ON THE MONTONEROS

[Redacted]

3.3(b)(1)

3.3(b)(1)

[Redacted]

3.3(b)(1)

SUMMARY, [Redacted]

3.3(b)(1)

3.3(b)(1)

A DECISION

HAD BEEN REACHED TO REFOCUS THE ATTENTION OF THE PEOPLE'S  
REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP), THE MILITARY ARM OF THE PRT, ON URBAN  
TERRORISM IN AN ATTEMPT TO RECAPTURE THE IMAGE OF THE ERP AS  
A VIBRANT REVOLUTIONARY FORCE. THE PAST ERP CONCENTRATION ON

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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RURAL GUERRILLA ACTION IN THE PROVINCE OF TUCUMAN WAS JUDGED TO HAVE CAUSED A SIGNIFICANT DETERIORATION OF ERP POLITICAL STRENGTH AND CAPABILITIES IN THE CITIES, PARTICULARLY BUENOS AIRES, AND EFFORTS ARE NOW TO BE MADE TO CORRECT THIS DEFICIENCY, ALTHOUGH THE GUERRILLA FRONT IS TO CONTINUE TO BE SUPPORTED.

[Redacted]

CURRENT COMBATANT STRENGTH OF THE

3.3(b)(1)

ERP CONSISTS OF SIX COMPANIES OPERATING IN TUCUMAN

[Redacted]

3.3(b)(1)

3.3(b)(1)

[Redacted]

CRITICALLY OF

3.3(b)(1)

MONTONERO POLICIES AND ACTIONS AND

[Redacted]

THE REVOLU-

3.3(b)(1)

TIONARY COORDINATING JUNTA (JCR) HAS CEASED TO EXIST FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES BEACUSE OF LOSSES SUFFERED BY CHILEAN AND URUGUAYAN REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS. END SUMMARY.

1.

[Redacted]

3.3(b)(1)

[Redacted]

MARIO ROBERTO S A N T U C H O, SECRETARY GENERAL

3.3(b)(1)

OF THE PRT AND MILITARY COMMANDER OF THE ERP, HAS DECIDED THAT THE ORIGINAL DECISION OF THE PRT/ERP TO CONCENTRATE ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF RURAL GUERRILLA WARFARE, A DECISION WHICH WAS REACHED IN EARLY 1974, HAD NOT PRODUCED

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3.5(c)

THE RESULTS ANTICIPATED AND HAD ACTUALLY CREATED SERIOUS POLITICAL PROBLEMS FOR THE PRT/ERP.

2. [REDACTED] SANTUCHO'S ORIGINAL THESIS ON THIS SUBJECT WAS THAT SUCCESSFUL GUERRILLA WARFARE ACTIONS WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO POLITICAL ACTION EFFORTS IN URBAN AREAS AND, THEREBY, IMPROVE PRT/ERP CONTACT AND SUPPORT AMONG THE ARGENTINE MASSES. THIS, IN SANTUCHO'S JUDGMENT, HAS NOT BEEN THE CASE. PRT/ERP POLITICAL ACTION IN THE PRINCIPAL CITIES, PARTICULARLY BUENOS AIRES, HAS BEEN NEGLECTED, AND THE IMAGE OF THE ERP AS A REVOLUTIONARY FORCE HAS DETERIORATED SUBSTANTIALLY SINCE 1973. [REDACTED]

3.3(b)(1)

SANTUCHO BELIVES THAT ERP CONCENTRATION WITH TUCUMAN DURING THE PAST YEAR HAS BEEN DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE RECENT LOSSES SUFFERED BY THE ORGANIZATION IN BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE AND FOR MISSED OPPORTUNITIES IN THE POLITICAL FIELD, SUCH AS THE METAL WORKERS' STRIKE IN VILLA CONSTITUCION, WHERE THE ERP IS NOT PLAYING A SIGNIFICANT ROLE AT THE PRESENT TIME. [REDACTED]

3.3(b)(1)

COMMENT: THE RECENT ERP LOSSES REFER TO POLICE RAIDS IN MID-MARCH 1975 AGAINST THE REGIONAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE PRT/ERP IN BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE, DURING WHICH MEMBERSHIP

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(class/location)

[Redacted]

3.5(c)

LISTS, SAFE SITE LOCATIONS AND IMPORTANT PRT/ERP INTERNAL DOCUMENTS WERE CONFISCATED. THE TERRORISTS ALSO LOST A NATIONAL PRINTING AND DISTRIBUTION MECHANISM IN A POLICE RAID IN LATE JANUARY 1975.)

3.

[Redacted]

3.3(b)(1)

[Redacted]

3.3(b)(1)

[Redacted]

THE URBAN FRONT IN CORDOBA IS

3.3(b)(1)

CONSIDERED TO BE IN EXCELLENT CONDITION, ALTHOUGH IT HAS BEEN RELATIVELY INACTIVE RECENTLY BECAUSE OF GOVERNMENT REPRESSION IN THE PROVINCE.

4.

[Redacted]

3.3(b)(1)

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[Redacted]

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[Large Redacted Area]

3.3(b)(1)

5,

[Redacted]

CONFIDENCE

3.3(b)(1)

IN THE CAPABILITY OF THE ERP TO BECOME ONCE AGAIN A DOMINANT

TERRORIST FORCE IN THE CITIES,

[Redacted]

THE RECENT

3.3(b)(1)

LOSSES SUFFERED BY THE ERP PRIMARILY RELATED TO MATERIAL GOODS,

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WHICH CAN BE REPLACED, AS AN EXAMPLE, [REDACTED] THE PRT/ERP 3.3(b)(1)  
 LOST ITS BEST PRINTING AND DISTRIBUTION MECHANISM AND NOW ONLY  
 HAS TWO OTHER FACILITIES TO HANDLE THIS TASK, NONETHELESS,  
 THE ERP RETAINS ITS MOST IMPORTANT ASSET, I.E., THE ERP CADRE,  
 AND PRT/ERP LEADERS EXPECT THE URBAN FRONTS TO BE REORGANIZED  
 WITHIN A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME, [REDACTED] ONLY ABOUT 3.3(b)(1)  
 200 ERP MEMBERS ARE NOW BEING HELD IN DIFFERENT PRISONS  
 THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, [REDACTED] 3.3(b)(1)  
 1,000 OR MORE ERP MEMBERS WHO WERE IN DETENTION DURING THE  
 1970-1973 PERIOD OF URBAN TERRORIST OPERATIONS.

6. [REDACTED] AN AGREEMENT IN LATE 1974 3.3(b)(1)  
 BETWEEN [REDACTED] AND THE MONTONEROS TO OPERATE JOINTLY AGAINST 3.3(b)(1)  
 THE ARGENTINE FORCES OF REPRESSION, SPECIFICALLY THE RIGHT-WING

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

3.5(c)

COUNTERTERROR UNITS WHICH UNDERTOOK ACTIONS IN THE NAME OF THE ARGENTINE ANTI-COMMUNIST ALLIANCE (AAA); [Redacted] THIS AGREEMENT WAS NEVER IMPLEMENTED AND THAT IT WAS PRIMARILY THE FAULT OF THE PRT/ERP THAT THIS WAS THE CASE, [Redacted] THE PRT/ERP DID NOT LIVE UP TO ITS END OF THE BARGAIN BECAUSE OF PREOCCUPATION WITH THE GUERRILLA STRUGGLE IN TUCUMAN, HOWEVER, WITH THE RENEWED INTEREST BY THE PRT/ERP IN URBAN TERRORISM, [Redacted] EFFORTS TO OPERATE AGAINST THE AAA AND THE SPONSORS OF THE AAA WOULD NOW BECOME A PRIORITY OBJECTIVE.

3.3(b)(1)

3.3(b)(1)

3.3(b)(1)

7. [Redacted]

3.3(b)(1)

[Redacted] THE MONTONEROS HAD BECOME AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONALISTIC, PETIT BOURGEOIS INTERESTS AND ARE, IN EFFECT, AN ANTI-REVOLUTIONARY FORCE IN THE COUNTRY. [Redacted] THE MONTONEROS ARE MISUSING AND MISUNDERSTAND THE CONCEPT OF ARMED STRUGGLE AND REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE. [Redacted] INSTEAD OF EMPLOYING MILITARY UNITS AS AN INSTRUMENT TO ATTAIN POLITICAL OBJECTIVES, THE MONTONEROS ARE USING VIOLENCE AS A DEFENSIVE MECHANISM, I.E., ATTEMPTING TO REPRESS COUNTERTERROR WITH THEIR OWN VIOLENCE. THIS, [Redacted] [Redacted] WOULD ULTIMATELY BE SELF-DEFEATING, SINCE IT INVOLVES

3.3(b)(1)

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[Redacted]

3.5(c)

(classification)

THE MONTONEROS IN A WAR OF ATTRITION WHICH THEY ARE CERTAIN TO LOSE. ADDITIONALLY, SUCH POLICY IS POLITICALLY COUNTERPRODUCTIVE IN THAT THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE WILL EVENTUALLY BECOME DISGUSTED OVER WHAT WILL BE REGARDED AS INDISCRIMINATE USE OF VIOLENCE, [Redacted] COMMENT: THE FOREGOING IS VERY SIMILAR TO CRITICISMS VOICED BY THE MONTONEROS AGAINST THE ERP DURING THE LATTER'S ASSASSINATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARGENTINE ARMY OFFICERS DURING LATE 1974.)

3.3(b)(1)

8. [Redacted] THE 13 APRIL ELECTIONS IN MISIONES PROVINCE, [Redacted] THE PARTICIPATION BY THE MONTONEROS IN THOSE ELECTIONS FULLY DEMONSTRATED THE BOURGEOIS NATURE OF THAT ORGANIZATION. [Redacted] BY PARTICIPATING IN THE ELECTIONS THROUGH THE PARTICO AUTENTICO, THE MONTONEROS STRENGTHENED THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT AND PROVIDED IT WITH AN OPPORTUNITY TO GAIN A MORAL AND POLITICAL VICTORY AT A TIME WHEN THE ECONOMY AND POLITICAL INFIGHTING HAD CAUSED A SEVERE DETERIORATION OF THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION AND STRENGTH. [Redacted]

3.3(b)(1)

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[Redacted] THE ERP REALIZES THE MONTONEROS REMAIN A VERY STRONG ORGANIZATION, BUT [Redacted] THE OPPORTUNISTIC AND SELFISH POLITICAL TACTICS THEY ARE FOLLOWING HAD DISPARAGED THE ENTIRE

3.3(b)(1)

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

3.5(c)

REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT IN ARGENTINA.

[Redacted]

COMMENT:

[Redacted]

3.3(b)(1)

[Redacted]

3.3(b)(1)

[Redacted]

IT APPEARS DOUBTFUL THAT THE

3.3(b)(1)

PRT/ERP WOULD BE WILLING TO COOPERATE CLOSELY WITH THE MONTONEROS  
IN ITS EFFORTS TO REGAIN THE INITIATIVE IN URBAN TERRORISM.)

[Redacted]

3.3(b)(1)

[Redacted]

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REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~

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