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NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES

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
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Governmental Affairs

The New York Times Magazine/September 12, 1976

The trial of the



Church.

Colby.

Pike.

Not all its covert actions have succeeded, but the agency did manage to outfox Congressional investigators.

By Taylor Branch

There have been enough revelations about the Central Intelligence Agency over the past two years to keep diplomats, prosecutors, reporters and philosophers busy for entire careers. Three separate investigations not only stretched the imagination with show-biz material about cobra venom and deadly skindiving suits but twisted the lens on the American self-image in foreign affairs. The investigations rewrote history—the history, for example, of the relationship between the United States and the Castro Government in Cuba. They showed that the C.I.A., in some 900 foreign interventions over the past two decades, has run secret wars around the globe and has clandestinely dominated foreign governments so thoroughly as to make them virtual client states. In contrast to Watergate, the C.I.A. investigations proved that abuses of power have not been limited to one particular Administration or one political party. They also established facts that few people were prepared to believe—such as that distinguished gentlemen from the C.I.A. hatched assassination plots with Mafia gangsters.

With all these surprises percolating, the most interesting surprise has been largely ignored. And that is how the C.I.A. investigations ceased. The topic faded away so quickly as to make the whole episode look like a fad. Unlike the F.B.I. issue, which has moved to the prosecutors' offices and stayed on the front page, the vaunted trial of the C.I.A. has already become a memory. And the agency itself has survived the scandals with its covert operations intact, if not strengthened.

The collapse of the C.I.A. investigations has been due largely to ineptitude, poor judgment and lack of will on the part of the Congressional committees. But the agency also played a role. Its strategy was flawless. "Those guys really knew what they were doing," says a staff member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence chaired by Frank Church. "I think they defended themselves just like any other agency would, except they're better. They had a whole office set up to deal with us, and I sometimes had the feeling that they ran operations against us like they run them against foreign governments. It was like the C.I.A. station for the Congress instead of for Greece or Vietnam." The story of how they came out ahead of their investigators says a great deal about both the Congress and the agency, and about the problem of reconciling the demands of the superspy with the democracy he is supposed to protect.

In the spring of 1975, the Church committee had been spinning its wheels for several months without much success. Charged with the task of investigating more than a dozen intelligence agencies, any one of which was an enormous challenge, the Senators became ensnared in debate over how to proceed. The agencies were stalling, hoping to deflect attention elsewhere. Then the committee got a break.

The Presidential commission set up

under Vice President Rockefeller that January, to inquire into charges of illegal domestic spying by the C.I.A., announced that it had received evidence of C.I.A. involvement in attempts to kill foreign leaders. The news created an instant sensation. Rockefeller said his commission, which was completing its work, had neither the time nor the mandate to pursue the matter, and he turned the evidence over to President Ford, who quickly passed it along to the Church committee. Suddenly, the Senators found themselves with a large batch of classified documents and with responsibility for the hottest issue since Watergate.

For five months last year, the Church committee focused its energy on assassinations. Other investigations lapsed. Staff members were pulled from other projects. While it is no mean feat in the Senate to obtain sustained, personal effort from Senators on any single subject, the members of the Church committee went to C.I.A. briefings day after day to be introduced to the agency's arcane methods. In November 1975, the committee published an interim report on this one aspect, and Senators and staff alike were proud of it. As an exploration of the Machiavellian underside of American foreign policy, it was, in fact, a tour de force. Yet it failed to build public support for investigating or controlling the C.I.A.

Press and TV coverage was intense but shortlived, focusing on certain salacious details: the gangster plots, the titillating reports of an affair between President Kennedy and the mistress of one of the gangsters, and a few exotic spy plans worthy of a television serial. In this last category, the report featured a C.I.A. plan to treat Prime Minister Fidel Castro's boots with a chemical that would make his beard fall out and thereby destroy his charisma. The rest of the material was extremely complicated, conclusions were tentative, and the assassination plans fell short of the dramatic expectations that had grown up.

The committee did not claim to have found a "smoking gun," in the form of a kill order ringing down from the Oval Office, through the C.I.A. chain of command and out to some mysterious trigger man in a foreign capital. Quite the contrary. Where the American efforts to kill were most direct and persistent—in the case of Castro—they were unsuccessful. And where the foreign leaders were actually killed—Lumumba in the Congo, Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, Diem in South Vietnam, Schneider in Chile—there was no hard proof that C.I.A. operatives actually took part in the murders. In some cases, the agency seemed to withdraw at the last moment. In other cases, someone else got there first. Of the Diem assassination the committee could only say that the C.I.A. had sanctioned and encouraged a coup against his Government when there was a reasonable chance the plotters would kill him. But no direct orders to assassinate. Everything was a little blurred. Even the most direct written communications, as in the Lumumba case, were couched in opaque C.I.A. language: "Hunting good here when lights right."

Smoking guns are considered thoroughly unprofessional in clandestine operations, where secrecy is paramount and it is a mark of skill to channel existing forces subtly. The assassination report, on the other hand, was publicly judged by

standards built for palpable and exotic murders. Because no foreign leaders were killed outright by American initiative, planning and execution, the C.I.A. benefited from a general impression that it came out of the assassination inquiry with clean hands. This impression is false.

Certainly many thousands of people have died as a result of secret C.I.A. paramilitary interventions in countries ranging from Laos to Cuba to the Congo. (The Church committee obtained some casualty figures but did not publish them at the agency's request.) And, in the case of selected killings detailed in the report, the line between involvement and actual murder is often shadowy. For example, the Church committee reported extensively on the maneuvering that preceded the assassination of Rafael Trujillo in 1961. It showed how American policy turned against the

Dominican strongman, how the agency provided assurances of support to those who plotted against him, how C.I.A. officials smuggled weapons into the country and exchanged cryptic messages on the likelihood of a successful assassination. In keeping with its courtroom definition of assassination, however, the committee exonerated the agency of Trujillo's murder on the ground that the weapons it smuggled in were probably not the ones used in the killing.

"By the time we finished the assassination report," recalls the leader of one of the committee's task forces, "we had lost three things—the public's attention, much of our own energy and will power, and our leadership. Quite candidly, we had lost Frank Church." The Senator, according to this investigator, had given up hope of achieving major reforms in the pre-

terest was down. Assassinations proved peripheral to the main business of C.I.A. covert action, and the investigation of that unknown realm had scarcely begun. With investigations of the other intelligence agencies, including the F.B.I., still ahead of them, five crucial months had been lost—along with much of the committee's momentum. The Senate's February 1976 deadline for the completion of all work loomed large. And Church wanted to wrap up his investigative chores in order to begin his own Presidential campaign.

The Church committee had gambled heavily on the assassination report. And lost.

According to Mitchell Rogovin, the C.I.A.'s special counsel during the investigation, the crux of the inquiry from the agency's point of view was covert action—secret interventions abroad by means of propaganda, bribes, manipulation of foreign agents and, in some cases, paramilitary force—as distinct from gathering and analyzing intelligence. The promotion system for C.I.A. case officers has been built around operations, and C.I.A. leadership has been drawn from the operators—Allen Dulles, Richard Helms, William Colby—instead of intelligence analysts. Veteran agency operatives often say that without covert action the C.I.A. would be nothing but a collection of sophisticated professors with mounds of intelligence, and the agency itself would be only a more specialized version of the State Department.

The C.I.A. approached the Congressional investigations with one central objective: to protect the means and practice of covert action. It was in line with this strategy that Colby and Rogovin gave ground on the marginal issue of assassination, cooperating with the Church committee, turning over more information than the committee could digest, helping the committee use itself up. Then, when the assassination report was completed, Rogovin became tough about information to be granted for the remainder of the investigation—especially in regard to covert action. The committee was floundering; Rogovin pressed his advantage. "We agreed with the committee that they could have access to information for six case studies in covert action," he says, "provided they would go public with only one of them. They swore all kinds

of secrecy oaths that they would not even let the names of the other five countries leak." The case study he chose was Chile—a selection favorable to the agency, since a lot of material on the C.I.A.'s intervention in Chile had already leaked to the press.

"It was a bad deal," says F.A.O. Schwarz, the committee's chief counsel. Many of the principal staff members opposed the settlement. What little they had learned about covert action in the course of the assassination investigation had made them realize it was one of the hardest but also one of the most important issues to deal with. "That is why we went so heavily into Mongoose in the assassination report," Schwarz explains.

Operation Mongoose was a covert action designed to weaken and destroy the Castro regime through an orchestrated program of economic sabotage, commando raids and paramilitary harassment. It was the heart of the agency's effort to overthrow Castro; simultaneous assassination attempts complemented Mongoose rather than vice versa. Although the campaign failed, it was kept so secret that the American public was left with a fundamentally distorted view of United States-Cuba relations for more than a decade.

Before the committee's report, it was generally accepted that the Kennedy Administration ceased hostilities against Castro after the Bay of Pigs, until forced to act defensively by the unprovoked introduction of Russian missiles on Cuban soil. The Church committee revealed that not only were there repeated attempts on Castro's life before and after the missile crisis but covert Mongoose raids were being intensified throughout the period. The assassination report quotes the minutes of high-level meetings, less than two weeks before the missile crisis, at which Attorney General Robert Kennedy spurred the C.I.A. on to hit Castro harder.

The assassination report, outside sources generally agree, was the high point of the committee's investigation. After that, the staff divided into two groups, one known informally as "the lawyers"—a group of attorneys drawn together largely by Schwarz—and the other as "the professors," who were generally foreign-policy experts with academic roots or Capitol Hill experience. Under task-force leader William

Bader, the "professors" became responsible for the C.I.A. investigation, while the "lawyers" went off after the F.B.I. Frictions developed between the two groups, the Bader group tending to criticize the lawyers as too prosecutorial and "Watergate-minded," and the Schwarz team hinting that the Bader group was too soft in its handling of the C.I.A.'s pros. In any event, discouraged by the covert-action compromise, the "professors" never recovered the initiative.

In the House, the Select Committee on Intelligence chaired by Otis Pike—the counterpart of the Church committee—pursued an arduous and independent course. Created only after a long internecine squabble over its leadership, its mandate weakened by continuing feuds in the House, the committee struggled through the summer of 1975 to breathe life into itself—seeking, on one occasion, to justify its existence by leaking the sensational but unverified story that Nixon aide Alexander Butterfield had been a C.I.A. "plant" in the White House. The story was refuted, leaving the committee with less credibility than ever. By fall, the traditional jealousy between the House and the Senate had flared up behind the scenes, and Mitchell Rogovin, negotiating with both committees, was finding them competitive. "Church," says Rogovin, "held his 'toxin hearings' because he was afraid Pike would do it if he didn't."

By December, the House and Senate committees were set on opposite courses. Pike wanted to impale the C.I.A. for its abuses. Church wanted to show that a Senate committee could handle national secrets responsibly. The Ford Administration played the committees against each other. When Pike demanded information and denounced "delaying tactics," Administration spokesmen would point to the exemplary behavior of the Church committee and appeal for a more cooperative spirit. When the Church committee cooperated, the Administration tended to see it as a sign of weakness and feel freer to hold back on information. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and C.I.A. director William E. Colby simply boycotted all the covert-action hearings, and the committee accepted the rebuff instead of subpoenaing them.

"The object of the exercise," says a Church committee staff member, "was to prove that

we were not Pike. We were not going to move the Congress or the public by more exposé. What was going to carry us was the kind of editorial we finally got in The Washington Post: 'An Intelligent Approach to Intelligence.' The committee evidenced an increasing awareness of its public image, of its ability to keep secrets, avoid leaks and work in some semblance of public harmony with the C.I.A. Many on the committee staff endorsed this approach as the path toward "establishing a relationship" that would serve the Congressional committee that was to be set up to exercise oversight—supervision of the intelligence agencies. Some of these investigators have, in fact, moved on to jobs with the oversight committee, now in business. Their attitude was infectious: Even today, many former Church committee staff members are more reticent in discussing C.I.A. matters than C.I.A. officials themselves.

On Dec. 24, a band of unknown terrorists assassinated Richard Welch, the C.I.A. chief of station in Greece. Welch had been identified as a C.I.A. official by a small anti-C.I.A. magazine, and a furor immediately arose over whether the revelation had anything to do with his death. The Senators on the Church committee received a flood of letters denouncing its work on the grounds that exposure of C.I.A. secrets is an invitation to the killing of C.I.A. officials.

Sources on both sides of the C.I.A. investigation now agree that neither the magazine nor the Church committee is likely to have caused Welch's death. He was a relatively well-known figure in Athens, certainly to the kind of organized political groups likely to have killed him. These probabilities were overwhelmed, however, by the emotional power of the tragedy, and the C.I.A. encouraged the idea that C.I.A. critics might have contributed indirectly to the murder. Rogovin would only tell the Church committee that its own investigations were not "directly" responsible. Colby lashed out in public at those who revealed C.I.A. secrets as being more sinister than the secrets themselves. Ford made public statements to the effect that inquiries into C.I.A. methods were unpatriotic.

No single event did more to turn public opinion against the investigations than the

Welch affair. As 1975 ended, the press was shying away from the C.I.A. issue, and hostility toward the inquiry was building up in Congress itself. As to the C.I.A.'s private thoughts on whether naming senior officials makes them more vulnerable to "the other side," a move that escaped public attention may provide some insight: Welch was replaced in Athens by a man who had been identified as a C.I.A. official by Greek newspapers and an American magazine.

On Jan. 29, 1976, Representative John Young, Democrat of Texas, offered a motion on the House floor to suppress the final report of the Pike committee. The ensuing debate was not distinguished. Some speakers argued that the report—which they admitted they had not read—would endanger national security and align the House with the murderers of Richard Welch. Others, like Wayne Hays, argued for suppression on the grounds that the report would be boring: "I suspect . . . that when this report comes out it is going to be the biggest nonevent since Brigitte Bardot, after 40 years and four husbands and numerous lovers, held a press conference to announce that she was no longer a virgin." Views like these prevailed, and the House, by a vote of 246 to 124, ordered its own report to be locked away in the clerk's safe.

The document did not remain suppressed very long. It was leaked to CBS correspondent Daniel Schorr, who in turn leaked it to The Village Voice through a series of intermediaries. When The Voice published the report in two special supplements under banner headlines, it became the most spectacular leak of the C.I.A. investigations.

Pike developed two thematic criticisms of the C.I.A. First, he amassed evidence of repeated intelligence failures, showing how the agency had failed to anticipate such major world events as the 1968 Tet offensive in Vietnam, the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia the same year, and the 1973 Yom Kippur war in the Middle East. Citing various bureaucratic entanglements and preoccupations as the cause of poor performance, Pike took the agency to task for bungling the one function—gathering intelligence—against which there is no audible dissent. Pike's second line of criticism was more substantive: He attacked covert action by revealing a few

of the more startling case studies. His most poignant example involved the Kurdish minority in Iraq.

Like many of the world's mountain peoples—the Tibetans, the Meo in Laos, the Montagnards of Vietnam, the Indians of South America—the Kurds have always seemed destined for a hard time. They have been struggling against the Iraqi Government for years. For years they have been losing. In 1972, when the Kurdish campaign for autonomy was in a brief period of dormancy, the Shah of Iran asked the United States to help him in one of his perpetual feuds with neighboring Iraq. This time it was a border dispute. The Shah wanted the United States to channel clandestine military aid to the Kurds, reasoning that American support would inspire the Kurds for another military offensive against the Iraqi Government, thus weakening Iraq and aiding the Shah.

Secretary of the Treasury John Connally, acting on behalf of Henry Kissinger and President Nixon, informed the Shah that the United States would go along. A \$16 million covert-action project went into effect. According to Pike's documents, the deal was made in a convivial spirit—a favor to the Shah as one of the fellows. (He himself had been returned to power by the C.I.A. in a 1953 coup.) Even the C.I.A. opposed the scheme, but was overruled.

The agency funneled arms and money to the Kurds for more than two years, and the Kurds once again rose up in rebellion. Their leader was so moved by American support for the Kurdish cause that he sent Kissinger a gold and pearl necklace for his new bride. He also sent word to Kissinger that the Kurds were ready "to become the 51st state" after achieving liberation.

In March 1975, the bloodied Iraqi Government came to terms with the Shah. The very next day, Iran and the United States cut off all aid to the Kurds, and the Iraqi Army mounted a full-scale offensive against them. The Kurdish leader, who could not bring himself to believe the United States had reversed itself so cynically, wrote desperate, pitiful appeals for help to Kissinger. Kissinger did not reply.

An estimated 5,000 Kurdish refugees died fleeing the Iraqi onslaught. The Shah, pragmatic to the last, forcibly

repatriated 40,000 Kurdish refugees to Iraq, where their fate, while unknown, has presumably been sad. The United States declined to provide any relief assistance to the remaining refugees and refused to accept a single Kurdish application for asylum.

This covert action remained secret, of course, until the Pike committee learned about it and leaked it to the press. To say the very least, the disclosure raised large questions about the compatibility of such covert actions with principles of any kind, as well as questions about how such decisions should be made. Yet no public debate arose, and except for a one-man crusade by The New York Times's columnist William Safire, the Kurdish undertaking was widely ignored in the press. The reason is simple: The substance of the Pike report was completely overshadowed by the controversy over how it was leaked.

Daniel Schorr first denied, and then admitted, being the intermediary source. His behavior helped draw attention to his own conduct and away from the conduct of the C.I.A. Leaks became the issue. President Ford pledged the full resources of the executive branch to the search for the culprit on the Pike committee. The House of Representatives rose up mightily against the leak and authorized a \$150,000 investigation by its ethics committee. A team of investigators began grilling the Pike committee staff, many of whose members left Washington in fear. Schorr, three other journalists and 18 committee staff members have been subpoenaed to appear before the ethics committee this Wednesday.

□

As the Pike committee sputtered to disaster, the Church committee released its report on Chile—the one case study on covert action it was permitted to make public under the terms of its deal with the C.I.A. "We negotiated with the agency people on the wording of that report, line by line," says one of the principal authors. The agency, for instance, permitted publication of the fact that the I.T.T. had funneled \$350,000 into the 1970 Chilean elections, but refused to allow identification of other companies that, among them, had furnished an equivalent sum. Still, while abstract and incomplete, the report is the most comprehensive account

of a C.I.A. covert action yet written.

From 1963 to 1973, the report reveals, the C.I.A. spent more than \$13 million to influence Chilean politics, apart from what it spent on gathering intelligence in that country. It lavished about \$3 million on the 1964 Chilean elections alone; on a per capita basis, this was twice as much as Lyndon Johnson and Barry Goldwater together spent on their Presidential campaigns that year. In 1970, President Nixon ordered the C.I.A. to encourage the Chilean military to stage a coup rather than let President Salvador Allende take power, and the agency tried unsuccessfully to do so through its agents in the military. When the commander in chief of the Chilean Army, René Schneider, opposed a coup, C.I.A. officials entered into talks with groups planning to kill him.

General Schneider was assassinated by one of these groups, but the elected Marxist President took office, and during the three years of his regime, the C.I.A. channelled \$7 million in covert-action funds to a variety of Chilean unions, business groups and political parties opposed to Allende. It also spent \$1.5 million supporting El Mercurio, Chile's largest newspaper, in its campaign against Allende's policies. Several of the newspaper's key employees were paid C.I.A. agents, committing espionage. The agency produced several national magazines and "a large number of books," according to the report. It had agents in most of the important sectors of Chilean society, including, at times, the Chilean Cabinet. This covert activity, plus continued liaison with the military, supplemented a slightly more overt program of constricting Chile's position in the international credit market.

Whether or not this covert action "caused" Allende's downfall and death—and official American spokesmen had been denying as late as 1973 that there had been any United States attempts to interfere with the Chilean elections—the Chile report did not make much news, nor spark much debate. C.I.A. spokesmen studiously avoided comment. They had the upper hand, and did not want to say anything that could somehow rekindle interest in covert action. That, early in 1976, could have raised the sensitive question of whether the United States

was, or should be, intervening in the Italian election campaign. The issue did not come to the fore. Press reports that the agency was channeling \$6 million to anti-Communist parties in Italy died out without resolution amidst the Welch and Schorr controversies.

By the time the Church committee drafted its recommendations on covert action, the political base for reforming the C.I.A. had disintegrated. The committee itself was badly divided on the issue. Accordingly, the Senators decided not to take a firm position for or against covert action, or even to push for a national political debate over its proper use. In its concluding recommendations, the committee declared that covert action "must be seen as an exceptional act," which "must in no case be a vehicle for clandestinely undertaking actions incompatible with American principles." To these vague mandates, the committee added some rather foamy standards in keeping with the professorial tenor of the staff approach: "Covert operations must be based on a careful and systematic analysis of a given situation, possible alternative outcomes, the threat to American interests of these possible outcomes, and, above all, the likely consequences of an attempt to intervene." These major conclusions were supplemented by the customary demand for more effective oversight by the Congress. "We tended to say that most of the hard questions should be studied," observed a task-force leader.

These recommendations amounted to a clear, though tortured, endorsement of the C.I.A.'s covert-action program. Moreover, they gave the agency enormous bargaining leverage in its efforts to keep information secret. "The problem with the C.I.A.," says F.A.O. Schwarz, "is that once you accept the kinds of things they do, it's hard to argue that they shouldn't disguise it better." Once the need for some form of covert action is conceded, it follows that the necessary apparatus should be maintained and exercised. And once it is accepted that the apparatus cannot possibly function solely under the mantle of the C.I.A., as Colby argued in a recent interview, then something else follows: Private American institutions should be enlisted in the cause.

This chain of reasoning matches the historical process

by which the C.I.A. enlarged itself over the past three decades. At its creation in 1947, the C.I.A. was strictly an intelligence agency, with no authority or capability for covert action. The need for secret feats of derring-do and manipulation arose in the cold war, and quickly became the vehicle for the agency's spectacular growth. By the late 1950's, security requirements were so pressing that the C.I.A. was spinning off thousands of front companies at home and abroad. Inevitably, this led to a rationale for intrusion into domestic institutions. Even though the agency's legal charter expressly forbids it from engaging in domestic activities, the C.I.A. began making arrangements for cover with American groups, ranging from missionaries to publishing houses to some of the best-known corporations.

In pressing secrecy on the Church committee, C.I.A. officials developed the argument from the basic logic of covert action, until it applied even to justifying continuation of domestic activities. The committee gave in on point after point. Thus, the C.I.A. escaped not only serious challenge to the practice of covert action but also the risk of scandal from exposure of operations attendant to covert actions. No one knows just how much material remains buried in the Church committee files or how much the agency held back, but a brief investigation revealed an impressive list of subjects which the committee either deleted or consciously failed to explore. The numerous sources within the committee staff and the C.I.A. who described these subjects requested anonymity.

(1) Two draft sections of the report—"Techniques of Covert Action" and "Covert Action Projects: Initiation, Review, and Approval"—remain classified.

(2) So do the five covert-action case studies the committee agreed to keep secret. According to committee sources, the five countries are the Congo (now Zaire), Greece, Indonesia, Laos and Vietnam. The committee report says these studies show a pattern of covert action and penetration not unlike the one in Chile. In the Congo, covert actions began before the attempts to assassinate Patrice Lumumba and continued through the chaotic period following independence in 1960. The agency, according to C.I.A. sources, helped estab-

lish Gen. Joseph Mobutu (now President Mobutu Sese Seko) and has maintained a covert relationship with him and other key officials ever since. The relationship illustrates a C.I.A. pattern of developing ties to promising foreign politicians early in their careers and then "sponsoring" them. In Greece, covert actions spanned some of the agency's proudest achievements in helping to prevent Communist domination after World War II. Today, the agency's ties to the Greek Army and secret police remain pervasive—so much so that both Colby and Rogovin, interviewed separately, expressed fears for the stability of the present Greek Government if those ties were revealed. In Indonesia, covert action against the regime of President Sukarno persisted through the 1965 coup, in which more than one million civilians died.

(3) The committee's investigation into the use of classical espionage—obtaining information and using it to influence foreign governments—remains classified.

(4) The committee broke no new ground on the agency's use of American corporations for intelligence work, cover, or covert action. Staff director William Miller terms this a "failure." There was no exploration, for example, of the agency's work with the corporate interests of the late Howard Hughes—in spite of confirmed reports of the \$300 million Glomar Explorer project for raising a sunken Soviet submarine. Senator Barry Goldwater, a member of the Church committee, states that corporations "are the third most important source of foreign intelligence, after foreign agents and satellites." Committee sources say the agency was particularly reticent about corporations because the issue opens the door to questions of domestic impact.

(5) The committee is silent on the issue of the C.I.A.'s use of American labor unions abroad, even though former agency employees, such as columnist Tom Braden, have written on the subject. One committee source says "no committee in a Democratic Congress is going after labor unions in an election year." Other sources say it was more a question of time and resources, or an unwillingness to investigate labor after deciding not to look into corporations.

(6) The committee learned of, but did not investigate, the

extensive network of American professionals who have secretly assisted the C.I.A. Lawyers, for example, perform functions ranging from liaison work with other Government agencies to legal representation of C.I.A. proprietaries, or "front" organizations. One of former White House counsel John Dean's lawyers worked for a C.I.A. front, as did the chief counsel for Jeb Stuart Magruder. Paul O'Brien, attorney for the 1972 Committee to Re-elect the President, was a former C.I.A. case officer and, according to John Dean, offered the services of a C.I.A. front, a law firm in Greece, to help launder money for the Watergate cover-up. These C.I.A. ties to the Watergate case alone suggest that C.I.A. relationships, with all their political and professional implications, are not unusual among prominent Washington lawyers.

(7) The committee agreed to a C.I.A. request that it classify the details of a report on the clandestine use of American academic institutions. After noting that C.I.A. assets are employed by more than 100 colleges and universities, the report states only that its purpose is "to alert these institutions that there is a problem."

(8) After the C.I.A. issued new, restrictive guidelines for the use of American news personnel, the committee submitted to a request that it classify the details of a report on the question. Moreover, the agency refused to supply the committee with the titles of several hundred books—many of them published abroad, in English, to be sold in the United States—that it has subsidized. "We could have held hearings on the C.I.A.'s relationship to the press that would have blown the lid off," blurted a task-force leader who worked on the media study.

The Church committee's C.I.A. reports are impressive on the surface—full of bureaucratic history and weighty essays on subjects like "command and control." But the tepid conclusions and the omissions cited render the work incomplete, if not irresponsible. The contrast with the thoroughgoing investigation of the F.B.I. is striking. The main reason for this is that F.B.I. wrongdoing involved deviation from generally accepted standards for the bureau, whereas the C.I.A.'s covert actions are integral to the agency's practices. The C.I.A. investigation

was more difficult because it cut much closer to the bone.

"The alternative to covert action," declares Senator Goldwater, "is war." Arguments about covert action resemble arguments about war. If the Senator's interpretation is correct, the United States has engaged in some 900 alternatives to war in the last generation, and the Congressional committees have partially unveiled a much harsher international reality than most citizens know about.

The C.I.A. operates in a world that is, in fact, hostile and cynical. The agency's environment is full of plots, betrayals and people who are less noble than they seem, and the agency is built around the notion that it can only operate under cover. Secrecy makes it more effective against ruthless enemies. Secrecy masks an element of hypocrisy necessary in a Machiavellian world. It also protects the American people from grisly facts at variance with their self-image. In this sense, the C.I.A. veterans consider themselves a true professional elite, capable of immersing themselves in a ruthless environment without losing their bearings, and of shouldering burdens for the American people that the people would not want to bear or even hear about.

A combination of events enabled the C.I.A. to prevent a debate on whether covert action—secret wars and secret alternatives to war—is justified or necessary. The C.I.A. bowled over the Pike committee and seduced the Church committee. Several sources on the Church committee assert that the outcome was the result of a strategic decision—to duck the issue, under the adverse political conditions that developed this year, so as to be able to take it up again under the authority of the new oversight committee, and perhaps with the assistance of a new Democratic Administration. There is also the hope in some quarters that these last two years of investigation and revelation have had some effect on the political climate, once so congenial to the unrestrained use of covert action, and even on the way the C.I.A. itself thinks of its role.

The record thus far, however, is not one to make for much optimism. No oversight committee is likely to have a better opportunity to control the C.I.A. than the Church and Pike committees, whose records speak for themselves, and

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Stephen S. Rosenfeld

Covert Operations: Things Are Not the Same

In claiming that the CIA's covert operations have survived scandal and investigation "intact, if not strengthened," journalist Taylor Branch, writing in last Sunday's New York Times Magazine, dignifies a gathering Washington myth. Citizens worried about the official abuse of secret power should know it's not so. The myth, not simply his article, needs to be knocked down.

Now, it's true that dirty tricks, previously conducted without statutory or explicit legislative sanction, have now gotten official congressional license. To those who believe that there should be no dirty tricks, or that the Congress by sanctioning them legitimizes an illegitimate practice, this may be enough to damn the whole process.

It's true, too, that not all the CIA's myriad operations were investigated by the Senate or House intelligence committees and that, of those investigated, not all the findings were released or leaked. Again, to those who look at this matter just in terms of investigation and disclosure, there's little more to say.

I find it inadequate, however, to accept either of these propositions.

As authentic and extensive a national debate as can be imagined was waged on the question of whether the U.S. ought to be ready to conduct certain operations under certain conditions. Plainly, the national answer was yes. Congress, which reflects the full spectrum of public opinion on this issue, is moving to implement that public verdict. It is not by the CIA's self-serving manipulations or by the Congress being "outfoxed" that this is happening, but by popular demand. Personally, I buy it.

Further, the purposes and limitations of investigation and disclosure must be understood. These can build care into a rampant bureaucracy and a negligent executive, and they can fuel a demand for reform in the Congress and public. But is it necessary or wise to investigate or disclose everything? Apart from the deference due endangered persons and apart from the limits of time and staff, there is the real and valid political limit, which the Senate observed and the House did not, of acting in a way to build a political consensus.

As Frank Church, chairman of the Senate inquiry, puts it, "We did not want to end up on the cutting room floor. We wanted to keep the confidence of the Senate and write our recommendations into law."

the C.I.A. has shown itself to be quite adept at managing the political climate. The agency began these searching investigations hanging on the ropes, and clearly emerged the winner. Its powers, so unique and still largely hidden, remain essentially unchallenged.

The Church committee achieved this—it forced the President into reforms meant to be preemptive, and launched the Senate on its own reforms. These are "institutional" rather than "journalistic," and it is instructive to run down the list.

A permanent intelligence oversight committee, of representative membership, was set up in place of the old system of informal review by CIA-co-opted legislators. Its chairman, Daniel Inouye, says he's proceeding with all deliberate speed, building staff, and savvy, and gaining executive cooperation: "If they lie to us, there'll be hell to pay."

A charter, or statement of missions and prohibitions, is being drafted by this panel to cover the whole intelligence community. It will go on top of the charter decreed by President Ford last February. Previously a broad range of secret intelligence activities had no legislative sanction and, in some cases, not even recorded executive sanction.

An overall budget for the entire intelligence community is being drafted (for fiscal 1978) to replace the fragmented and concealed agency budgets of the past. The budget will be authorized line by line for content as well as money in the regular fashion, not just appropriated without authorization review by a few congressional pals of the intelligence agencies.

The Ford executive order gave potential substance to the old form of an intelligence "community," a concept that the Senate is recognizing, too. The necessary difficult internal exercise to rationalize missions and assets and divvy up a single budget pie is said to be moving ahead.

A procedure is being worked out by which the Senate accepts no prior restraints on what information it can request from the executive branch or release to the public, and by which it can bargain out differences over the disclosure—

sure—even the disclosure of "covert" operations.

The Senate's new requirement that the President certify in writing the need for each covert operation has forced accountability upon the President—no more mumbles in the Rose Garden. This assures the Congress of notification early enough to raise meaningful objections, Inouye insists. The procedure appears to improve upon the 1974 Hughes-Ryan amendment under which the executive could wait until late in the day to notify, in a cursory way, six congressional committees, none of them with fixed responsibility or readily available staff.

One should add that, institutional considerations aside, the public climate imposes its own restrictions on covert operations. Look at how congressional and public reaction aborted the administration's Angola operation, once the shape of it became clear. Fear of leaks is bound to further slow any administration's covert hand.

My main point, though, lies here: You can say that CIA dirty tricks survived "intact if not strengthened" only by overlooking the institutional innovations—oversight committee, charter, budget, intelligence community formation, information rules, notification of operations, presidential accountability, plus executive reorganization—by which covert operations are now guided.

These innovations do not make absorbing reading, as do tales of the politics and "bureaucracies" of the intelligence inquiries. But they do seem a lot more important. And although no final verdict can yet be rendered, they make it reasonable for citizens to hope that, in so far as the conduct and control of covert operations is concerned, things have indeed changed.

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
10 SEPTEMBER 1976

LIZ
SMITH

EXCEDRIN HEADACHES:

The CIA requested a print of "General Idi Amin Dada" sent down to Washington for their personnel to view. Intelligence doesn't like to have to go around to the box office and dig up \$3.50. The producers of the extraordinary documentary on the African big mouth dictator naturally obliged.

RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.

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PROGRAM The Tomorrow Show

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DATE September 16, 1976 1:00 AM

CITY Washington, D. C.

SUBJECT Full Text

TOM SNYDER: Best seat in the house, and not a packed house at that in Studio 6 in New York City. Good morning, everybody. We're on the air tonight with Mr. George Bush, who at the present time is the Director of the CIA, the Central Intelligence Agency. George Bush has done all kinds of things during the past five years. He has been the United States Ambassador to the United Nations. He has been Chairman of the Republican National Committee. He has been the chief representative of the United States to the People's Republic of China, and he has been, and is now, the Director of the CIA. And he'll join us here in just a couple of seconds.

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SNYDER: But as I say, tonight we have the Director of the CIA, Dr. George -- or Mr. George Bush with us. And we'll begin with Mr. Bush after these announcements, and I hope all of you will stay tuned.

SNYDER: And now here is George Bush, the Director of the CIA, which I want to talk about tonight. But I would like to ask you about the importance of the death of Chairman Mao and the effect you think it might have on relations between this country and Mainland China, based upon the fact that you were our representative there until just recently.

DIRECTOR GEORGE BUSH: I would say that nobody is going to replace Chairman Mao. You really have to be in China for a while to see the pervasive nature of his presence and of his impact on China. He gave the People's Republic -- well, he gave birth to the People's Republic of China and he gave China a certain unity and destiny, sense of destiny that it hadn't had in many, many decades. And so I think it's fair to say, certainly it's my judgment, and I guess what's more important to your many listeners, Tom, the judgment of many in the intelligence community that Chairman Mao is so special that we don't look for a single replacement to him. And I think it's going to take time to sort out what China does in terms of leadership. Hua Kuo-feng, who is now the number one man there, is a strong leader, but he lacks the following that the Chairman had. He's kind of moderating between extremes, or two factions, you might say. And I think that China will move forward in terms of kind of a collegial government for a while, sort out its new direction as it goes along.

I don't see anything in the death of Chairman Mao, who indeed, along with President Nixon, made the opening: I don't see anything to reverse that. And I don't -- I don't think, and it's not my judgment, that China will move precipitously towards a rapprochement with the Soviet Union.

So....

SNYDER: Excuse me....

DIRECTOR BUSH: No, go ahead.

SNYDER: ...Is there another faction within China which would sooner have China not become too friendly with the United States?

DIRECTOR BUSH: Sure. There're people there that feel that way. There're probably some there that would like to see them closer to the Soviet Union. But their line has been established, and we don't see any radical shifts either towards the Soviet Union or away from the United States.

Now, there're some -- are relationships, the United States and China. I don't want to get into policy, because I'm in the intelligence business now, although I was involved, as you pointed out, in the highest levels of our China policy.

SNYDER: And you were the first person that we have sent there at that level in some time.

DIRECTOR BUSH: Second. David Bruce....

SNYDER: Oh, excuse me.

DIRECTOR BUSH: ...my most illustrious predecessor....

SNYDER: Correct. Correct.

DIRECTOR BUSH: ...opened the thing. And I was just honored to follow in his distinguished footsteps. But nevertheless, I should stay away from policy considerations in our chatting here tonight.

But I would say that we don't look for anything drastic on all this. And I think that there will be a difficulty before the United States can establish full relations with China. But we seek to fulfill the Shanghai Communique, which was the basic doctrine between our countries. We aspire to that. China, in my opinion, aspires to that.

So the death of Chairman Mao, traumatic, enormously important, not only in terms of China, but in terms of the world, in my view will not adversely affect the relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China.

SNYDER: You've said twice in the preceding paragraph or two that now that you're in the intelligence business, you shouldn't talk about policy. Why not? You're a man with some political experience....

DIRECTOR BUSH: Sure.

SNYDER: ...some policy experience, foreign policy as

DIRECTOR BUSH: That's right.

SNYDER: Ambassador to the United Nations. Why now must you switch that off?

DIRECTOR BUSH: I've got to not only stay out of policy. Now if you say to me, how would you handle whether we ought to formalize our relations with China, I'd duck the question. And if you said to me, you know, who are you for for President, I'd duck that question. Because the Director of Central Intelligence must, one, stay out of partisan politics, clearly. And secondly, he must present to the President intelligence, finished intelligence,

his judgment. Under the law it's my judgment that goes to the President, fortunately for the country, tempered and seasoned by enormous professional competence. But in the final analysis, under the law, it's my judgment. And that judgment has to go forward unfettered by policy considerations.

So we....

SNYDER: But can you not still speculate, based upon your broad experience....

DIRECTOR BUSH: Well, I could....

SNYDER: ...as a private citizen?

DIRECTOR BUSH: I mean I have the liberty of doing it. Well, certainly if you turn those red lights off, I'll do it with you. But I'm not going to do it because the Director of Central Intelligence and the CIA must not get into politics.

SNYDER: Turn the red lights off, but leave the camera on.

DIRECTOR BUSH: All of them are on.

[Laughter.]

DIRECTOR BUSH: No, but we -- we've got to -- we've got to -- we've got to let the policymakers set policy and let the intelligence go forward unfettered by policy constraints.

Say there's a policy that says country "a" and country "b," we must improve relations with them. And then the President embarks on a course of action that says let's go forward and give aid and improve it. And then we find certain intelligence that indicates that if we do, it'll cost us the support of countries "c" and "d." We shouldn't be saying, whoops, the President's committed to this policy that's going to support "a" and "b"; therefore don't you people bring me that bad news about "c" and "d." We've got to go forward with the way we see it. Call them as you see them, you know.

And so if I start speculating about what I would do to formalize relations between China and the United States, that's not my job. And I couldn't separate out George Bush from the role of the Director of Central Intelligence or the head of the CIA, both of which hats I wear, you see.

SNYDER: Not with the foreign policy for the United States.

DIRECTOR BUSH: Yeah, you can't do it. And I sit in on the National Security Council meetings. I go to the cabinet meetings that are related to foreign affairs. I have direct access to the President. My access should be used to give finished intelligence, and let the policymakers, whoever is President, set the policy. And that's the way it should be, and that's the way it will be as long as I'm Director.

SNYDER: Can you tell me the difference between the kind of arrangement we now have with the People's Republic and how that differs from what will be when we have diplomatic relations.....

DIRECTOR BUSH: Formal?

SNYDER: ...established with them formally?

DIRECTOR BUSH: You know, that's a tough and very fair question, and I will try to answer it.

Right now we are less than -- I was less than a full ambassador.

SNYDER: Well, okay. That really is the question. What was the difference between yourself and a full ambassador?

DIRECTOR BUSH: Well, we didn't go to the airport to greet foreign dignitaries. We didn't go to the Great Hall of the People on state occasions when a visiting foreign chief of state would come. There are certain protocolary differences that made our rank, our status something less than full. Until we have full diplomatic relations, our trade will not be -- not be enhanced. We won't have the best levels of trade, because certain problems that could accompany, could go along with full relations, such as the claims and assets question -- it could be solved before we have full relations; it might not be. But full relations kind of imply a solution to tough problems like that, you see.

So we -- but beyond that and beyond the protocol question, there are not too many substantive things.

SNYDER: Very subtle differences.

DIRECTOR BUSH: They're subtle differences. And yet formal relations -- there're certain consular things that go with it. And it would be better. I mean the United States seeks friendly relations with almost all countries. And certainly we seek friendly relations with the People's Republic of China.

Now you're getting me into policy. But I say this in confidence because of our adherence to the Shanghai Communiqué. But there are certain very difficult problems that remain before full relations can be established.

SNYDER: Without asking you about the policy problems, how long a period of time would you estimate, again based upon the work that you did there and the work that you did to make more peaceful, I guess is the word I'm looking for, or more quiet, the entrance of Mainland China into the United Nations when you were there? How long would it take for this to come about where we would have full, formal relations with the People's Republic?

DIRECTOR BUSH: I couldn't speculate. I can't, because there are certain major problems that exist that the President and the chief of state in China must wrestle with and that the secretary of State, in our instance, and the foreign minister, in theirs, must wrestle with. And so really speculation -- even if you asked me on a pure intelligence basis, not leaving out my judgment as the former chief of the U. S. liaison office in Peking, any answer I gave you would be pure speculation. And I really want to duck that one because I can't give you an honest, useful answer.

SNYDER: I understand that, sir. Now when that time comes, though, would we expect the President of the United States to make that announcement in concert, probably, with the Chinese Premier at that time?

DIRECTOR BUSH: Well, I think if full diplomatic relations were established with the country that has a fourth of the world's population, you would look for both chiefs of states....

SNYDER: Major. Major.

DIRECTOR BUSH: That's right, Tom. I mean this would be a major step forward. It would be a major thing, and it would be considered -- certainly considered and probably announced at the highest level.

SNYDER: All right, sir. I must pause for these words from our sponsors. We'll continue after these messages.

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SNYDER: Why do you think it is that Richard Nixon was liked so apparently by Chairman Mao, to the point where he would invite him to come back even after Mr. Nixon left the White House?

DIRECTOR BUSH: President Nixon went to China, and he said, "Look, I'm here in the self-interest of the United States." There was no phoniness. The differences that he had articulated all his political life were still very much in his mind. He laid them right out on the table. Chairman Mao understood that. The reason the Chairman wanted to talk to President Nixon, in my view, is that he felt it was in the national interest of China, just as Nixon felt it was in the national interest of the United States. And there was a certain directness. There was a certain mutual respect. I think Chairman Mao thought President Nixon knew a lot about world affairs, and I think -- I know that President Nixon felt that Chairman Mao did. And so there was this kind of pragmatic understanding and self-respect -- mutual respect that gave President Nixon this special standing.

And when President Nixon went back, there was all this kind of hogwash in the United States that the Chinese were trying to intervene in the New Hampshire Primary. I don't know if you remember that....

SNYDER: Surely. Yes, I do.

DIRECTOR BUSH: And it couldn't have been further from the truth. This was the fourth anniversary of the Shanghai Communique. There was this mutual respect, even though they have very vigorous differences. And the Chinese understood that President Nixon had kind of taken a gamble and had opened this relationship, and they were honoring him for that, not to intervene in some primary.

So I really think that's the reason that the President was there and what he said was the national interest of the United States -- "I'm here in our own self-interest." And the Chairman sat down and said "I'm here in the self-interest of China; now let's talk." And they seemed to get along and understand each other.

SNYDER: Do you think that the meetings could have gone a different direction in 1972 between Nixon and Mao Tse-tung, that it could not have come off as well as it did with the Communique of Shanghai at the end?

DIRECTOR BUSH: Well, I....

SNYDER: You know, you label it as a gamble, that Nixon and Mao both took a gamble.

DIRECTOR BUSH: Sure. And I think when they -- I think obviously Dr. Kissinger and others -- well, Dr. Kissinger did a lot of preliminary work. And I'm sure that they ironed out some of the more obvious hurdles, or smoothed those things out before

the meeting took place, the meetings in Peking took place.

But, yes, I think up till the last minute there were some difficult negotiations and some problems that were unresolved before our then President went there. And so, yes, there was a gamble involved.

But I think once they decided to meet, there was enough at stake on both sides that some kind of agreement was destined to be forthcoming. And sure enough, it was.

SNYDER: Uh-huh. The papers quoted you back in the 1960s when you were, I believe, in political life as saying that you felt that the admission of Mainland China to the United Nations would destroy that organization. Yet ironically, you were the United States Ambassador to the United Nations when Mainland China was coming in. And though you fought long and well for Nationalist China to remain with Mainland China, it didn't work out that way.

What changed your mind? Was it -- was it....

DIRECTOR BUSH: Well, there were changed circumstances. You see, in the early '60s -- and that was a rather accurate quote -- there were some demands on the part of the People's Republic of China for admission to the U. N. that were unacceptable and remained unacceptable, not only to the United States, but to the majority. For example, they wanted to go back -- and just one of the ones -- go back and say that the U. S. was the aggressor in Korea. Now that was a quid pro quo or a sine qua non; without that we won't come to the United Nations. That was the early '60s. Now that was unacceptable. To me, politician or fledgling interested individual in foreign affairs, I was saying to myself and to my potential constituents, "Look, I don't think that that should be; that the United States ought to go back...."

SNYDER: That we ought to take a rap for that.

DIRECTOR BUSH: "...and take that kind of rap." And we didn't. And so there were changed circumstances.

And then when I was at the United Nations, why, we had the policy of dual representation, because we felt at that particular juncture in history -- and we articulated it as best we could, and we fought for it -- that though there's one China, there is indeed two governments at this juncture, that each claimed to be China. And we didn't feel that the Republic of China, or Taiwan, should be thrown out of the United Nations. The United Nations voted differently. And I was Ambassador at the time. I worked that side of the question. The People's Republic of China representatives that I later got to know very well in Peking and at the U. N. as well understood this. And we were on opposite sides of that. The decision was made. And then I determined, as U. S. Ambassador, to work as compatibly as possible with the will of the majority. And we did. And I think that's the proper way to conduct oneself. And I fought for what I believed, but people don't always do it the way the United States wants.

SNYDER: If we leave aside the glamour names in China, Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai and others, can you tell me something about the kind of people that are running that country at the bureaucratic level, people that might correspond to our cabinet officers in this country or to heads of intelligence, such as yourself? What kind of men and women are running that country in terms of their competence and their understanding of the world and China's place?

DIRECTOR BUSH: Oh, Tom, that's a tough one, because I mean it would be like saying what kind of men and women are running this country. I mean some people would say dedicated. Others would say too bureaucratic. Some would say aggressive, self-seeking. Others would say lazy and not -- not stimulated by their surroundings.

So I think -- I think it's pretty much the way it is the whole world over. But there is a dedication to Maoism. There is a central -- with the people in these government positions, a strong adherence to central doctrine. In fact, there's very little deviation, if any, from doctrine, particularly in foreign affairs. And I think there's a certain lack of individual freedom to move away from a line in foreign affairs. We have it; not too much, but we have some of that, of course.

But really, when you get down to the individuals, charming, able, well versed in languages....

SNYDER: Competent.

DIRECTOR BUSH: ...competent, good grasp of history. Their Foreign Minister, Ch'iao Kuan-hua, educated in Germany, philosopher, tremendously capable. If you can get him on your show, you'll be doing very well. Now you and he probably would come at it from different philosophical points of view. But capable. You're saying, "Are they able? Are they good?" Yes, they're strong.

SNYDER: The reason I ask that question is that there are many people in this country who so abhor all kinds of communist governments that they believe that the people running them are really wild-eyed revolutionaries who used to be in guerrilla armies and now, all of a sudden, are occupying places of power -- well, not all of a sudden any more in the instance of China -- who really are not competent politically and who really are not competent in terms of administering to a country that has one-quarter of the world's population.

Yet I would just have to think that they must have some very bright people there and some very able people who are more than foot soldiers who came out of the mountains in 1949 to govern a country.

DIRECTOR BUSH: If a guy was a foot soldier who came out of the mountains in 1949 to govern a country, that doesn't mean he's a dumb-dumb. But they get dumb guys; they get bright guys. They get fat ones; they get thin ones. They've got happy ones; they've got sour guys. They've got forthcoming people, and they've got recalcitrant, withdrawn people. And it's kind of like Washington, D. C. or Disneyland East. I mean it's the same the whole world over.

[Laughter.]

SNYDER: It's no secret that if China wanted to, it could reclaim Quemoy, Matsu and Formosa tomorrow morning, militarily, if they wished to do that.

DIRECTOR BUSH: Tom, you're going to get me in a lot of policy. Go on; what's your question?

SNYDER: No, I'm not. No, it's not going to be....

DIRECTOR BUSH: That's your statement; not mine. Go ahead.

SNYDER: I think they could if they wanted to. And I

think that if they wished, for example, in 1999 or whenever the treaties on the new territories, the leases run out in Hong Kong, they could reclaim those militarily with absolutely no problem.

The question is, will they? Now, if that's a policy question, then you can duck it. But I just have to think to myself that if they really were a vengeful nation bent upon gaining revenge for all of the wrongs they believe have been committed against them over the last twenty-five or thirty years, they would go after Formosa, and they would go after Hong Kong and seize that rich port and its economic treasures. But they don't do that.

DIRECTOR BUSH: You make a good point. But I would only add, because it will get me closer to policy than I want to get, they would be contemplating how will others respond. And we have a mutual defense treaty at this point in our history with the Republic of China. And anybody in Peking making that kind of decision will obviously be thinking about that. Beyond that, I don't want to go. But it certainly would be an inhibition to adventure. And I think that the people in Peking understand this. On the other hand, that doesn't mean -- I'm not trying to predict what they will or won't do.

SNYDER: Yes, sir. We will continue and get into the business of how Mr. Bush runs the CIA. That we are allowed to talk about, I assume.

DIRECTOR BUSH: Yes, fully.

SNYDER: We can talk about intelligence policy, can't we?

DIRECTOR BUSH: Fully.

SNYDER: Fully. Right after these announcements from our sponsors.

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SNYDER: What kind of a job is being the Director of the CIA? Is that a political job? You were appointed to that by the President. You are a Republican. You have run for office. You have worked for the Republican presidency for some time.

DIRECTOR BUSH: No, it's not a political job in the sense of partisan. In fact, when I went into the job, I properly forswore all partisan political activity. Now when I was nominated for the job by President Ford, there was some debate, rather heated debate in the United States Senate as to whether I should be in the job because I'd been Chairman of the Republican National Committee, I'd been a Republican member of the United States Congress.

I convinced the senators, an overwhelming majority of them, that an American citizen can participate in partisan politics with partisanship and with fervor, and when out of that can do a nonpartisan job, as I think I did as Ambassador to the United Nations, as chief of the liaison office in China in nonpartisan fashion.

And so I went down there and said, "Look, I -- I think I can do this job. It's an administrative job; it's a coordinative job; it's a job where the Director must have the confidence of the President and he must have some confidence in the Congress, and I'm not going to be involved in partisan politics. And if I did, I ought to be thrown out, because the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence community must be free of partisanship." And I hope I've conducted myself in that manner. And I think I have. And certainly I've tried to. And fortunately for me,

because I like the job and I am enthralled with the mission and I'm impressed with the people I work with in terms of their dedication and their competence -- fortunately the United States Senate agreed and I was confirmed. And there were some doubters, and I understand that.

SNYDER: I was going to ask you, do you think the debate over your nomination and your qualifications was a proper debate for the representatives of the people...?

DIRECTOR BUSH: Of course it was. Of course it was proper. And, you know, I'm human, and I didn't like it, and some of the senators said things that I wish they hadn't said. But my goal the minute I was confirmed is not to go back and show a vendetta, but to try to earn the confidence and the respect of those who voted against me for understandable reasons. And only history will tell if I can do that.

SNYDER: How effective have you been in at least gaining some kind of rapprochement with those senators who did not want you to have the job? Did you actively seek them out on a personal basis afterwards or just let your work speak for itself?

DIRECTOR BUSH: No. I tried to say, look, from this moment on I'm going to do what I said I'd do; butt out of partisan politics, lay aside -- saying to myself, lay aside the debate; bury my own strong feelings about "Why wasn't this guy for me or not," and earn his confidence. And I don't know how it's working. You should ask some of those senators.

But you know, I'm kind of goal oriented. And I'm going to convince them through performance, not through a lot of PR, that the majority was correct. But much more important than any personal thing is, you know, how is the intelligence community running? Good God, these people were subjected to some excessive abuse. I'm not saying everything was perfect in the past, and I'll be glad to discuss that with you. But there has been a piling on....

SNYDER: Well, I want you to know. I might as well say this for the benefit of the people who are watching too. I don't think the purpose of this hour should be to go over all of the charges, proved and disproved, of the last five or ten years and try to hold you accountable for you [sic] and say "Now, what are you going to do about that?" I think that....

DIRECTOR BUSH: Thank God.

SNYDER: Well, I think committees of the Congress have done their job properly. I think that the reports have all come out. The record is there for people to see. And obviously you were appointed or chosen by President Ford as Director of the CIA to go forward from the bad old days, if that's....

DIRECTOR BUSH: That's what I want to do.

SNYDER: Which I'm sure my detractors will say, well, I'm letting you off easy. But I don't think....

DIRECTOR BUSH: Well, but -- yes, some will say that. The sensationalists will say that. But look, intelligence, foreign intelligence is vital to the national security in these troubled times. We know what we're up against. We don't know all about it, but we know enough about it to have just totally convinced me, not only when I was a consumer of intelligence in China, in the United Nations, but now when we produce it and I'm responsible for this -- to absolutely convince me that an intelligence capability second to

none is vital to legitimate national security.

So I do want to look ahead. And yet I continually have to look over my shoulder. And I'm delighted. You know, if you get some flak out of it, too bad, and you probably will, because there're people who want to still criticize us.

SNYDER: Well, we'll refer those people back to about five programs we've done on this series with, for example, Mr. Hirsch of the New York Times and other reporters and writers and members of organizations which are anti-CIA. They've all had their say on many occasions, and we've heard it all before. I would like to see what's coming tomorrow rather than worry about what's going on -- or what went on yesterday.

But just one question in that area. When you say you want an intelligence establishment second to none, fine. But there is a feeling I think created by the investigations and by the probings of Congress that we have far too many people working in intelligence in this country, that almost every other person might be a CIA agent or might be an FBI undercover man, or might be with the local police department in plain clothes, and that we have too many people checking on those of us who are not doing any investigating.

DIRECTOR BUSH: Yes, that's a myth. I'm absolutely convinced it's a myth. Our personnel levels are subject to minute scrutiny by the proper oversight committees in the Congress. And if they felt that -- and believe me, they go over every budget figure, personnel ceilings that you mention now, with a fine tooth comb. And if they thought there was excessive staffing, that would have come out in these Senate -- in the Senate report or in the House committee report, or in one of the thirty-seven appearances, official appearances before Congress that I've made in nine months of being Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

And so I'm not saying we can't be more efficient. I'm not saying we can't cut back here or there. But this concept that you accurately portray that Americans feel the CIA has excessive people spying is nonsense. It's wrong.

SNYDER: I had a man on this program who said that there's a very good probability that there could be an employee or two somewhere at RCA or NBC. I don't know how many people this company employs; too many in some areas. That this man might also be working for the CIA. Well, now, if I found out that there was a co-worker of mine here who was working for your company and was taking notes on what me and my colleagues did or people who came on this show or any other and sent them down to your office in Langley, Virginia, I'd be highly upset about that....

DIRECTOR BUSH: Sure you would.

SNYDER: I don't think your agency has any business in this building.

DIRECTOR SYNDER: And we're not in it. And the very fact that he gets credibility by saying that on this show, with no proof, not being compelled to come forward with the facts, gets me -- I can't use the phrase I used to use in the Navy. I'm upset about it, because it's not true. And it's been investigated.

SNYDER: It starts with "T" and it rhymes with teed-off. Okay?

DIRECTOR BUSH: No, it starts -- yes. I've got to be careful. I don't want to get people calling in. But no, it's not right. And if it were true, it'd be all over every headline. And yet we are living with that kind of myth. Movies come out. Robert Redford and "Seven Days of the Condor," with CIA guys gunning down each other in the United States. Nobody ever alleged that. The sensationalism, the excesses of the investigation. We're kind of propelled into this kind of nonsense, and we have to live with it. But we're professionals. We're patient. We know our mission is important. We know we're living within -- properly now within the constitutional constraints, and we're determined so to do. We're subjected to proper oversight by the President on the executive side, by seven committees of the Congress. And I am very comfortable, as one who prides himself on some sensitivity for the rights of American citizens, with the way the intelligence community is conducting itself.

SNYDER: And isn't it just too bad that the former President really bastardized the CIA through the whole Watergate thing, or it was alleged that he did that to the CIA?

DIRECTOR BUSH: There have been allegations against several former Presidents. People look back at the Bay of Pigs and say, using ninety/ninety hindsight, this was wrong. But my view -- and I do appreciate your not dwelling on the past, though I'll glad to respond to any question you ask about it to the best of my ability....

SNYDER: I believe it.

DIRECTOR BUSH: But there have been errors, and there have been, using 1976 moral judgments, some condemnations of things in the past. But Tom, we're in a tough ball game, and we better be prepared, we better produce the best intelligence we can; we better have the best analysts, Ph. D.s, MAs; we better have the best security for the premises here and aboard; we better have dedicated people willing to sacrifice. And we've got these things.

SNYDER: And still people who have a little humaneness, a little compassion, a little sensitivity....

DIRECTOR BUSH: We need that, sure.

SNYDER: ...and a little romance in their approach to life.

DIRECTOR BUSH: That's right. It's not a James Bond life that we're in. And yet covert action is a small percentage....

SNYDER: Don't you have a car that shoots -- don't you have a car that shoots noxious gases out the back?

DIRECTOR BUSH: No. And I've not yet met Pussy Galore either.

[Laughter.]

SNYDER: I can help you there.

DIRECTOR BUSH: I don't want any of that. Listen, I've got enough problems running the CIA and the intelligence community.

SNYDER: We will continue with Director Bush after these announcements. I hope you'll stay tuned.

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SNYDER: ...nonpolitical nature of your job for a second here. If somebody from the Committee to Re-Elect President Ford were to call and say the President would like you to make a campaign speech, you would say no.

DIRECTOR BUSH: Not only would I say no. I'm a former Chairman of the Republican National Committee. I didn't go to the convention, didn't go near it; stay away from any political gathering; feel constrained to not even support the candidate of my choice as an American citizen; insist that we -- upon presidential instruction, but that we fully and properly, as we should, brief Governor Carter, the contender, the major contender to the President for the presidency. And if you or anyone else point to anything that I do that smacks of partisanship, I shouldn't be in it. The agency's been under enough fire. And the process -- much more important, the impartiality from politics of the process is so important that a Director ought not to be political.

Now, I think I can be a good Director of CIA.

SNYDER: If Jerry Ford called you on the phone tomorrow, which I'm sure he would not do, but if he did and he said "George, I'd like you to go out to Oswego, Michigan and make a little talk," you would say "Mr. President, I'm not going."

DIRECTOR BUSH: No, I wouldn't, and I'll make....

SNYDER: What would you say?

DIRECTOR BUSH: ...the differentiation for you. I'll make the differentiation for you. He's the President. I'm the head of one of many executive agencies. I serve at the pleasure of the President. Now if he said -- I'd say, "Mr. President, what is the purpose, or what do you want me to do in Oswego, Michigan?" If he says "I want you to go out and make me look good politically," I'd say "I won't do it." But if he said "There's a group out there that's long been interested in intelligence, and as the President of the United States, they're interested in the executive order that's reformed the intelligence community, and each year the Director of CIA has done this and I'd like you to do it," I'm going to do it.

SNYDER: Such as at the University of Michigan. Okay. I understand.

DIRECTOR BUSH: And so we've got to draw the line between, you know, the concern people have that a President might tell the CIA Director to do something improper, and the other line is that there's one President, and he deserves the loyalty and the best judgment of his Director of CIA, just as he does of Interior, HUD, Defense, or whatever it is.

So I don't want to be a free-floating spirit. The CIA must be under the control of the President. And the President should be able to fire the Director of CIA or tell him what to do. But he shouldn't be able to tell him to do something that's improper.

Your question connoted political impropriety, and that I wouldn't do and, without injecting a partisan note in it, this President wouldn't ask me to do, you see. And so I -- I -- I don't think we've got a conflict on this one, Tom.

SNYDER: What if Jimmy Carter is elected in November? What happens to your job?

DIRECTOR BUSH: I serve at the pleasure of the President. And I would not make it difficult for a new President to get rid

of me. And I'll tell you why. I don't believe the agency or the Director of CIA, Director of Central Intelligence or the head of CIA should be partisan. But I do believe strongly that whoever heads the intelligence community, the Director of Central Intelligence, must have the confidence of the President. He can't serve intelligence well if he doesn't. And the President is ill-served if he can't have confidence in what the Director is telling him.

And so there is a certain compatibility separate and apart from politics that is in the national interest. And so what happens, I don't know. And I really think it's far less important than whether this community stays strong, the intelligence community. And so I would say "Mr. President, any time you want to get a new man in here, please proceed so to do." And I don't think that is making partisan a nonpartisan job. It's simply my conception of how government ought to operate.

SNYDER: I don't have historicity in my head as to what happens when a President of a different party comes into office. Do you remember what happened....

DIRECTOR BUSH: Vis-a-vis CIA?

SNYDER: Yes. When Johnson came in, or when Johnson left and Nixon came in.

DIRECTOR BUSH: Well, Dulles -- Dulles was eventually replaced by Kennedy. There was a little period of time. I mean President Kennedy replaced....

SNYDER: Replaced Allen Dulles.

DIRECTOR BUSH: ...Allen Dulles. I can't -- I'll be honest; I haven't looked back.

SNYDER: Who was in when -- does anybody in the room know when Johnson and Nixon....

DIRECTOR BUSH: Well, Dick Helms.

SNYDER: Well, he remained.

DIRECTOR BUSH: But I don't remember. I thought you were talking about turnovers. I can't....

SNYDER: No, I'm just wondering. The minute Kennedy took office from a Republican, Eisenhower, did you fire the CIA Director?

DIRECTOR BUSH: No, no.

SNYDER: I don't think so.

DIRECTOR BUSH: No, no, no, no.

SNYDER: And when Nixon took it from the Democrat, Mr. Johnson, did he fire the CIA Director?

DIRECTOR BUSH: No. But in fairness....

SNYDER: And I'm not trying to dictate....

DIRECTOR BUSH: No, but in fairness, Tom, there has never been a Director who has had as active a political past as I have. And so just as I understood the debate on my nomination before the Senate, I would understand a review of my position, if for no other reason than because I had been actively involved on the

other side of the political spectrum, you know, should your hypothesis work out.

But again I come back, not trying to sound holier than thou, but that's inconsequential. What really is essential is that the proper relationship be established. And we've got it now. It's working well. The Director of Central Intelligence is given access to a President that supports the concept of a strong foreign intelligence community. And that's what's essential, whoever is President. And my future, my getting a job really is coincidental.

SNYDER: We will continue after these announcements. I hope you'll stay tuned.

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SNYDER: You mentioned that you feel it's proper that Mr. Carter, the Democratic nominee, be briefed on certain items. Who decides how much he will be told?

DIRECTOR BUSH: Well, in the final analysis, the President. The President's instructions to me, as head of the intelligence community, is the determining factor. But the President took a very broad view. He said I think that it's most important that the -- that Governor Carter be given intelligence briefings. But then I worked out, as the designee of the President, with Governor Carter the parameters of the briefings. And we decided that they should be on intelligence, that they should stay away from policy and that they should stay away from sources and methods, which is a certain code for the things I am to protect under the law. Governor Carter recognized that he didn't need to know at this juncture the sources and methods of the intelligence. And so our briefings have consisted of finished intelligence. I've attended the two briefings on intelligence, and fortunately for him with me went some of our very top experts in the areas that he was interested in. And we're not holding back. The President has made clear to me he wants Governor Carter fully briefed, and this is what we're doing. And the beneficiary is the United States of America.

SNYDER: Now in the briefings -- and if you can't say, you will just say "I can't say." I understand because I'm a neophyte and I don't want to get into areas of great sensitivity. But do you brief the opposition candidate on methodology, personnel, location, or do you brief him on things that are happening currently in countries where we operate intelligence installations?

DIRECTOR BUSH: It's the latter. We don't go into methodology. Sources and methods of intelligence we don't go into.

SNYDER: Like in country "X," Mr. "A" is doing such and such to make sure that political Mr. "B" will not advance. That kind of thing?

DIRECTOR BUSH: No. We don't go into the source or method. What we go into is here's the way one conceives the strength of the Soviet Union, for example, where it's up against NATO, you know. Or, here's what we think that might happen in China after Chairman Mao passes on. Or, here's a current intelligence briefing. Here's the status of what might be going on in some area, maybe the Middle East or Africa, or wherever it is.

SNYDER: I understand.

DIRECTOR BUSH: We stay out of policy. We give him intelligence. We respond to questions. And I hope it's working

to his satisfaction. The people at the CIA, the professionals with whom I work, feel that the briefings have gone reasonably well.

SNYDER: Will there be more before the election?

DIRECTOR BUSH: That depends on what Governor Carter feels he requires.

SNYDER: I see. Now what....

DIRECTOR BUSH: The President has authorized me to give him what he needs in terms of intelligence briefings.

SNYDER: Has he asked for anything you wouldn't tell him?

DIRECTOR BUSH: Now, Tom, you're getting into....

SNYDER: I understand.

DIRECTOR BUSH: No, I don't think so. I don't think he has. No. And I don't think we had any differences with the Governor.

SNYDER: What arrangement is there, though, and I'm certain there must be some, between the President and Governor Carter in terms of using information supplied by yourself and your associates as campaign issue or campaign speechmaking source?

DIRECTOR BUSH: Well, I don't -- I don't -- if there is some arrangement that they've discussed, something between them of that nature -- certainly I've not been any intermediary on that kind of an arrangement. I don't expect that kind of an arrangement exists. I think that any recipient of highly classified intelligence in the position of Governor and certainly the President recognizes he's dealing with sensitive information. And I don't expect there will be an abuse of this information.

But should that have been discussed, it hasn't been discussed with me, nor should it be. That would be an arrangement, a policy kind of a thing that would be worked out elsewhere. But I don't believe there's such an arrangement.

SNYDER: Do you know how good you are at doing this kind of television?

DIRECTOR BUSH: No, I'm trying to....

SNYDER: But you really are good. I'm out of time. But you really are good at this, and you should do it more often. It would help you, and it would help your company.

Thank you for being here this morning.

DIRECTOR BUSH: Thank you, Tom.

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
16 SEPTEMBER 1976

The Scene

Quotable: A matter of choice

"I don't lie; I just choose what I say."

—Former CIA director William Colby, speaking to students at the University of Pennsylvania Tuesday night

WASHINGTON POST

16 SEP 1976

Intelligence Adviser and 'The Green Book Affair'

By Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writer

Leo Cherne, one of President Ford's chief intelligence advisers, is a central figure in a Justice Department national security investigation that is being described by federal officials as "the green book affair."

The green book is a government note pad in which a staff aide to Cherne recorded briefings with diplomatic and intelligence officers during a trip to Europe in March, 1975.

Cherne is chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and a member of the newly formed three-member Intelligence Oversight Board.

The notebook, officially described as having contained "classified information . . . injurious to the national security of the United States," disappeared immediately after Cherne and his aide, Cmdr. Lionel H. Olmer, returned from the European trip.

Here the plot thickens. Olmer, an intelligence officer during his entire 19-year naval career, says he has no idea how the little green notebook got out of his possession. He is described by associates as an extremely meticulous professional experienced in the handling of classified material.

Within several hours after his arrival at his Rockville, Md., home, he called Wheaton Byers, executive secretary of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and advised him of the notebook's disappearance, he said yesterday. An investigation was conducted and the notebook was presumed lost when the aircraft cabin was cleaned.

The mystery was solved—to the greater consternation of Cherne and Olmer—on July 24, 1975, when the intelligence adviser received a telephone call from Michael James Casey of Los Angeles.

"He said, 'I have your notebook,'" Cherne recounted yesterday in describing what he called a "14-month ordeal."

It was during this and subsequent telephone conversations that Cherne learned that Casey had served two years at Solidad prison near San Francisco. Casey further explained that he had recovered the notebook from sympathizers of Patricia Hearst, who was then at large.

Casey contended that the finders of the notebook had hoped that it "might be exchanged for considerations in their behalf and I told him that I wouldn't do it even if I could," Cherne said.

Casey, in a telephone interview from Omaha, where he was acquitted yesterday of a "felonious entry" charge, insisted: "I was not trying to burn Cherne. I told him how I got the book and the interest of the people who had found it."

Casey is a 32-year-old Californian who prides himself on his work in resettlement of Vietnamese refugees, who sought to appear as a witness in behalf of Hearst at her trial on

charges of bank robbery, and who wound up, in an ironic turn of the story, working briefly for the International Rescue Committee of which Cherne was chairman of the board.

Early last year Casey persuaded the Los Angeles Times to send him and two staff reporters to Hong Kong at a reported cost of \$15,000 for a promised rendezvous with Hearst. The newspaper subsequently described the episode as a hoax. Casey acknowledged that the Hearst trip "bummed out."

Casey's career also encompassed a nine-month period as director of special projects for Boys Town, the Nebraska community started by Father Flanagan, from which he was fired in a dispute with the administration over the alleged theft of 31 files for an MGM television production. ("One of my jobs," he said, "was to get them publicity.")

When Cherne found out who had turned up with his notebook, he notified the intelligence staff and was advised "to play it down and not make it appear to be important." The initial judgment was that the loss was not of great security significance.

Cherne maintains that he first learned that Casey was employed in the Los Angeles office of the International Rescue Committee as a consultant during an Aug. 22, 1975, phone conversation with him. "I said, 'I don't think terribly much about your association with IRC and when I decide finally, I'll ask for your resignation.'"

The green notebook was returned on Aug. 26, 1975, and Cherne turned it over to the intelligence staff. Three weeks later he called Casey and asked for his resignation. "He submitted cheerfully, always cheerfully," Cherne reminisced.

On Sept. 22 Casey sent a Mailgram to the presiding judge in the Hearst case, Oliver J. Carter, in the name of the IRC.

"We prayfully request that Patricia Hearst be admitted to bail," the telegram read. "Please consider that Patty Hearst was directly and indirectly responsible for the safe evacuation of 399 men, women and children without regard to her own safety during the last week of April, 1975, at Saigon, South Vietnam."

The telegram was immediately repudiated by the IRC on Cherne's instructions.

In February of this year Cherne was appointed to the Intelligence Oversight Board by President Ford and also named chairman of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, of which he was a member at the time of his European trip. His offices here are in the Executive Office Building, and he commutes from New York an average of twice a week.

In March, a reporter for the San Diego Evening Tribune, Robert Dietrich, called Cherne, explaining that Casey had showed him the contents of the notebook.

The notebook, according to informed sources, contained notes on briefings with embassy and Central Intelligence Agency officials about a number of issues, including reactions to news stories about the CIA, the impact of the massive flow of petrodollars from the West to the Arab states, as well as "unprecedented unemployment and catastrophic inflation" in European countries.

There was an early reference in the notebook, both Cherne and Casey acknowledge, to New York Times reporter Terry Robards. Casey located Robards in New York, he said, and it was the Times reporter who speculated that the initials "L.C." in the notebook must have referred to Cherne. This, said Casey, is how he concluded that the notebook belonged to Cherne.

Dietrich wrote a story in the Tribune last April 14 charging that he had tried to alert the FBI to his discovery of documents "containing the names of 100 or more CIA agents" and that the details "were in the hands of an ex-convict with ties to the American underground."

Dietrich also charged he had been intimidated by mysterious phone calls and an armed visitor who "asked about Cherne and about copies of Casey's papers in this reporter's possession."

Dietrich's story raised more questions at the time than it answered. Word of the report also leaked to New Times magazine and was the subject of a column by its West Coast editor, Robert Scheer.

Cherne said that reports were being circulated that the notebook had been found "in a Paris whorehouse—an outrageous lie. I visited no whorehouses in any European city or elsewhere."

In the course of these events the security priority of the notebook was substantially upgraded by the CIA's Office of Security, and a Justice Department investigation was launched to determine how it was lost and who found it. The CIA declined comment on the inquiry and the Justice Department only confirmed that an investigation was under way.

Cherne said he initiated the request for an investigation of the entire episode. In the course of yesterday's interview his desk was covered with documents that detailed the developments in the extraordinary case.

One of the curiosities is that Olmer, who took the notes in "cryptic shorthand," was never asked to help decode them by CIA security officials. He is still baffled at the disappearance. "Even when I went to the men's room during the trip I took the notebook out of my attache case and carried it with me," he said.

Cherne, who lamented that he had successfully stopped smoking for several years, had three packs of cigarettes on his desk yesterday, which he shared with a reporter.

WASHINGTON POST

15 SEP 1976

FBI Inquiry On Leftist Party Halted

Long Probe Finds No Wrongdoing by Socialist Workers

By John M. Goshko

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Justice Department revealed yesterday that it has ordered the FBI to halt its 38-year investigation of the Socialist Workers Party—a small left-wing political group whose counterattack helped to plunge the FBI into crisis.

The bureau had been pursuing the SWP since 1938 without producing any evidence of wrongdoing by the party or its members.

The FBI's activities caused the SWP in 1973 to file what has become a \$40 million lawsuit against the bureau and other federal law enforcement agencies, charging them with illegal harassment and intimidation.

As a result of evidence uncovered by the lawsuit, the Justice Department has been conducting a seven-month investigation into allegations that the FBI carried out widespread illegal burglaries against suspected "extremists" during the past five years.

Justice Department spokesmen confirmed that the FBI had been ordered to stop investigating the SWP after it was learned yesterday that the department had sent letters to the SWP and to Judge Thomas P. Griesa, who is hearing the suit in U.S. District Court in New York, notifying them of the action.

The spokesmen said Attorney General Edward H. Levi had issued the order following a "systematic review" of how recently issued guidelines covering domestic security investigations apply to the SWP and its youth affiliate, the Young Socialist Alliance.

The spokesmen insisted that Levi's decision came in the course of reviewing the cases of all political groups under investigation by the FBI and had no connection with the still pending lawsuit.

Levi's guidelines stipulate that the FBI can investigate an organization or individual only if it has evidence that they have been engaged in some specific illegal act. The guidelines bar the FBI from maintaining surveillance of a group solely for the purposes of gathering intelligence or because it suspects that the members might do something illegal.

FBI Director Clarence M. Kelley also released a statement last night, saying that the bureau had participated with Levi in the review. Kelley added, "We agree it is now necessary to discontinue such investigations."

In New York, Cathy Perkus, a spokeswoman for the Political Rights Defense Fund, which is financing the SWP suit, said:

"We don't believe that this was

done routinely. It's no coincidence that they picked the one organization that has been laying bare all the FBI's abuses and illegalities. We think they did it in hopes that we would end our lawsuit and put a stop to the revelations about what the FBI has done."

Perkus said the SWP plans to continue prosecuting its suit. She added that the SWP will ask Judge Griesa to issue a permanent injunction barring any further FBI activity against the SWP and to order the bureau to turn over immediately the names of all present and past informers infiltrated into the party.

The SWP, whose national membership is believed not to exceed 2,000, has its ideological roots in Trotskyism, a revisionist Marxist ideology based on the theory that permanent, worldwide revolution is needed to maintain economic systems beneficial to the working classes.

The party has insisted for years that it has no connection with the Communist Party or movement and does not advocate violence as a means of overthrowing the U. S. capitalist system.

In its suit, which originally asked damages of \$37 million, the SWP charged that its pursuit of legitimate political activities had been seriously undermined by an FBI "dirty tricks" campaign. The FBI activities included the use of paid informers, wiretapping, interception and opening of mail and burglaries of SWP offices and the homes of its members, the party alleged.

Also named as defendants in the suit were other federal agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency and the Internal Revenue Service.

The suit is still a long way from resolution. But it already has triggered a number of sensational disclosures that include:

- An unprecedented admission by an FBI agent, George P. Baxtrum Jr., that, prior to 1965, he participated in at least 50 burglaries of SWP offices in New York at the direction of his superiors.

- Use by another FBI agent, Joseph Furrer, of his Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination — the first known instance of an FBI official taking the Fifth — when ques-

tioned about his knowledge of burglaries against the SWP.

- Disclosure that an FBI informer, Timothy J. Redfearn, committed three burglaries against the SWP — the most recent in July — and turned documents taken in these break-ins over to the bureau's Denver field office.

- A charge by a Portland, Oreg., man, Alan H. Selling, that the FBI had paid him to join the SWP and act as an informer against the party. Selling also contended that he was induced by FBI officials to commit an illegal burglary, but he said that was directed against an organization not connected with the SWP.

- Revelation that the bureau, over the years, had used approximately 1,600 persons as informers against the SWP and still retains 66 informers posing as members of the party.

The lawsuit also has had repercussions that go far beyond the FBI's involvement with the SWP. Earlier this year, Judge Griesa ordered the bureau to search the files in all its offices and turn over to the SWP all documents relating to the party.

The resulting documents search turned up a previously secret file in the New York field office indicating that the FBI had committed burglaries in the course of domestic security investigations during 1972 and 1973.

Previously, the bureau had said it ceased such so-called "black bag jobs" in 1966.

This information prompted the Justice Department to launch an investigation that has spread across the country to a number of cities. It has resulted in the empaneling of a federal grand jury in New York to probe the break-ins there and consider whether the FBI officials involved should be indicted on criminal charges.

Sources familiar with this investigation said yesterday that the grand jury should complete the first phase of its inquiry by the end of this week or early next week.

In this initial phase, the sources added, Justice Department lawyers have concentrated on presenting to the grand jury testimony or information from FBI agents who, during 1972 and 1973, were assigned to the New York field office's squad investigating the radical Weather Underground.

BALTIMORE SUN

11 Sept. 1976

Ex-chief Colby defends CIA's worth to nation

by DAVID ZIELENZIGER

Speaking dispassionately and almost as if he had never been fired as director of the Central Intelligence Agency 10 months ago, William E. Colby last night defended the intelligence community's ability to cope with threats to national security in the future.

While he spent most of his 35-minute lecture at Towson State University describing the rationale for intelligence operations, Mr. Colby also admitted "we did do things wrong in the past, but now we have corrected them."

The former CIA executive refused to comment, however, on the merits of a le-

gal case initiated by the Socialist Workers party over government spying on domestic dissidents and insisted, in the face of a hostile questioner, "The CIA does not train people to torture."

Mr. Colby, under whose direction the intelligence community made public many of its past controversial activities, insisted that under new presidential directives and with adequate congressional oversight previous abuses will not have a chance to be repeated.

"It may be again necessary for the CIA to assist decent local people suffering under a racist despot," Mr. Colby said, "but from our mistakes in Vietnam we have learned that we don't use military assistance to solve a political problem."

"One doesn't discuss disbanding the army or the police because of mistakes that were made in handling a case," asserted the 56-year-old attorney, "and that same lesson must be applied to intelligence."

About 500 persons attended the lecture.

WASHINGTON POST
12 SEP 1976

Alton Frye

The JFK Assassination: Curiosity in Havana

An inquisitive American learns many things on a visit to Cuba. One of the most surprising is that high officials in Havana seem genuinely hopeful that the investigation of the Kennedy assassination will be reopened. They are convinced that there was a Cuban factor in the murder.

Conversations with senior officials of the Cuban government, including Deputy Prime Minister Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, make clear that they have followed closely the disclosures by the Senate Intelligence Committee casting doubt upon the Warren Commission investigation: The Cubans are well aware that the doubts center on the failure of the CIA and the FBI to inform the Warren Commission of the several plots mounted by the CIA to kill Fidel Castro. Knowledge of these plots appears to have been withheld even from the FBI and CIA officials who were responsible for investigating the President's murder and for supporting the work of the Warren Commission. As a result, there was no special effort to explore the possible involvement of either the Cuban government or Cuban exiles in the assassination. Evidence developed by the Senate committee makes both hypotheses plausible—and a new inquiry imperative.

The situation is murkier and more perplexing than ever. Those who are resistant to conspiracy theories and who have been prepared—even eager—to believe that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone can no longer rely on the Warren Commission report as an

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adequate prop for their predilections. The commission did not know that on Nov. 22, 1963, at about the very hour Oswald struck in Dallas, an agent of the Central Intelligence Agency was meeting with a ranking Cuban official (code-named AMLASH and recently identified as Rolando Cubela) to plan the murder of Castro. Simultaneously, in Cuba, a French reporter, Jean Daniel, was spending the day with Castro, conveying to the Cuban leader views expressed by President Kennedy in a brief interview at the White House on Oct. 24, persuading Castro that Kennedy wanted to explore ways to normalize relations. Thus, at the moment the President was killed, U.S. policy toward Cuba appeared to be moving not only on two tracks but in opposite directions, and movement on either track could have provoked violent response by one or another Cuban faction.

Perceptions inside the Cuban government responded to both tendencies in U.S. policy. There is good reason to suspect that the AMLASH operation involved a double agent, or at least a singularly inept one. Castro almost certainly knew of it. The CIA eventually concluded that the AMLASH activity was "insecure" and terminated it. Among other discoveries, within two days of the assassination it was known (but not, to the Warren Commission) that AMLASH had been in contact with Soviet personnel in Mexico City, where Oswald had gone in September 1963 to visit both the Cuban and Soviet consulates. Whether these facts are significant or merely coincidental, one cannot tell. In retrospect, Cuban authorities note with some relief that Oswald was denied permission to visit

Cuba, implying that, had his request been granted, the finger of suspicion would surely have pointed at Havana.

Perhaps more suggestive of a direct leak from AMLASH to Castro was the sequence of events on Sept. 7, 1963, when the CIA re-established contact with the Cuban conspirator for the first time since the preceding year. Late that evening, Prime Minister Castro called in Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker for an unexpected interview. Only three Western reporters were based in Havana at the time and their contact with Castro was quite limited. Evidently, the Cuban leader had a message he wished to get on the record through Harker. He charged that the United States was aiding terrorist plots in Cuba and warned U.S. leaders that "if they are aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders, they themselves will not be safe."

This threat of reprisals seems less inflammatory and more understandable now that we know what Castro knew at the time, namely, that the United States was in fact stepping up its covert operations against Cuba during the summer and fall of 1963. Yet it seems an exception to the main lines of Cuban policy as it was then evolving.

For months after the missile crisis of 1962, Castro had been displeased with the Soviets, and there are signs that he was interested in an opening to Washington. On Sept. 5, the Cubans quietly proposed talks with the Americans at the United Nations, and Kennedy soon responded with interest. Also, in early September the Time magazine bureau chief in Buenos Aires, Gavin Scott, travelling on a Canadian passport, spent two weeks in Cuba. Although key U.S. officials have no recollection of consulting with Scott on that occasion, the Cubans recall his questions and comments as hinting of American interest in a possible accommodation, much as they were later to interpret the discussions between Jean Daniel and Castro.

Then and now the Cubans' attitude toward Kennedy has been a compound of political antipathy and personal admiration. While critical of Kennedy's role in various counter-revolutionary efforts, Castro and his associates voice a warm, almost affectionate regard for the President's courage and realism. They profess to have seen his death as a grave setback to more hopeful relations between the two countries. The John Kennedy of 1963 was not, in their judgment, the same man who was inaugurated in 1961, but a more mature, poised and forward-looking leader with whom they could have done business.

With this frame of reference, Cuban officials speculate that the real origin of the assassination lies in anti-Castro circles, with which Oswald also was in touch. They emphasize that assassination is incompatible with their own revolutionary doctrine and that they never contemplated it even against Batista, the previous Cuban ruler. And they volunteer the suspicion that the recent murders of Sam Giancana and Johnny Rosselli, the Mafia figures who consorted with the CIA to kill Castro, surely have some connection with Cuban exile politics and the Kennedy murder.

Castro has said publicly that he has no proof "counter-revolutionary elements" planned the assassination, but that is clearly the consensus in Havana. Further investigation may still be inconclusive, but, far from seeing it as an impediment to Cuban-American relations, the Castro regime welcomes such an inquiry. Their curiosity seems greater than their complicity.

U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
13 SEPTEMBER 1976

One result of widespread attacks on the Central Intelligence Agency: Covert operations by the Agency, insiders say, now account for only 2 per cent of the CIA's work.

GENERALWASHINGTON STAR
13 SEP 1976

U.S. Studies Soviets On Civil Defense

By Henry S. Bradsher

Washington Star Staff Writer

The Ford administration has become concerned about the extensive Soviet program for civil defense and the lack of any comparable effort to protect the American people in case of intercontinental nuclear war.

The first comprehensive official study of the large Soviet civil defense program to be made in many years is now under way at the CIA and elsewhere around town. A National Security Study Memorandum is being coordinated at the Pentagon examining U.S. civil defense needs.

The NSSM, pulling together different agencies' views in order to arrive at a top-level recommendation to the President, is due to be completed by Sept. 30. It will provide the basis for a presidential decision whether to fit an expansion of civil defense work into the 1978 fiscal year budget.

But so far the interagency material focused on CIA work has not produced a clear picture of the Soviet program. There is disagreement on whether the preparations to protect the Soviet people from nuclear war by shelters or evacuation to the countryside which are described in Russian manuals are being carried out.

THE SOVIET PROGRAM and U.S. needs are connected by apprehensions of some American military analysts that an imbalance in civil defense programs would make this country vulnerable. In a crisis situation, the Kremlin could threaten the American people with destruction while sheltering its own people, thus reducing the U.S. ability to negotiate from equal strength, these analysts warn.

But this contention that the mutual deterrence "balance of terror" has been eroded is questioned by other analysts on two grounds.

One is that a protected population could not long survive if its cities were destroyed and its air and crops poisoned by fallout, so that protection from nuclear explosions might be meaningless in the medium or long term. The other involves whether the Soviet Union really can, or on the basis of present intentions will become able to, protect its people from nuclear attack.

U.S. policy during the 1950s was to try to protect cities against bomber attack, and the advent of intercontinental missiles led to the backyard air raid shelter boom in the early 1960s. But by the middle '60s official doctrine switched under Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara to an assumption that cities were indefensible in the missile era, and therefore

the best defense was the assured ability to retaliate.

THIS ADOPTION of the mutual deterrence doctrine led to the 1972 Soviet-American treaty banning antiballistic missile systems for the defense of cities. Populations were to be left exposed, hostages to the other side's retaliatory power.

Although the treaty permits research, the United States has cut back on ABM efforts. There are indications that the Soviet Union is continuing an extensive, expensive research program seeking a technical breakthrough to a reliable ABM system. This causes worries in some official quarters here that the Kremlin might some day suddenly face this country with an ability to shield Soviet cities from missile attack which the United States could not quickly match.

"If that happens, they can pick up all the marbles and go home, because we would be at their mercy," one defense expert commented.

The more immediate concern, which the administration has come to feel might be more real, however, is over civil defense. The United States has virtually abandoned any effort. But since the 1972 ABM treaty the Soviets have vastly expanded theirs — on paper, definitely, and possibly in shelters, evacuation schemes and training, too.

A LEADING AMERICAN EXPERT on the Soviet "war-survival program," Dr. Leon Goure of the University of Miami, says that "the Soviet leadership has come to view civil defense as a critical 'strategic factor' which, in a large measure, can determine the course and outcome of a nuclear war." Goure sees in recent years "a new sense of urgency and of realism" in the Soviet program, as well as an awareness of U.S. vulnerability to attack.

A special panel of the House Armed Services Committee held hearings in February and March on the two superpowers' civil defense efforts. Goure and other specialists described a very real Soviet program. The hearings resulted in a token increase in money for the standby Defense Civil Preparedness Agency in the Pentagon.

The evidence that Goure and others have amassed of Soviet preparations has contributed to warnings of a dangerous imbalance. One administration critic, Paul H. Nitze, a former deputy secretary of defense, thinks these preparations have had the same destabilizing effects as ABMs would have.

BUT SOME ANALYSTS QUES-

TION the findings of people like Goure on which such warnings are based. A recent study by John M. Collins of the Library of Congress's Congressional Research Service said Soviet plans "are impressive on paper (but) how practical they would be in practice is problematical." Collins thought "no U.S. authority as yet has satisfactorily answered hard questions" about the Soviet program.

One senior administration official handling arms control negotiations says U. S. Embassy personnel in the Soviet Union and travelers have failed to see the kind of evidence that would be expectable if the paper program really existed as workable civil defense protection. A government expert on Soviet affairs reports a widespread suspicion that little more has been done than earmark resources.

The main realization which had developed in the administration by last spring as a result of publicity like the House hearings was that not enough was known about Soviet civil defense efforts. The CIA had not taken a serious look at the subject for more than five years — since before the post-ABM treaty program expansion that Goure detected.

SO A MULTIAGENCY STUDY was commissioned. It should have been finished two months ago. Instead, each draft report had produced new doubts about the reliability of available material.

"The basic problem is that we just haven't been putting enough resources on this," an informed observer commented. "It should be possible for the U.S. intelligence community to determine whether Soviet shelters and evacuation plans and all that really do exist, but the subject hasn't been getting enough attention so far."

The National Security Study Memorandum was ordered by the White House after the study of Soviet efforts had begun. It is being coordinated in the office of Donald R. Cotter, an assistant to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld for atomic energy affairs.

An administration official said the NSSM was the result of accumulating concern about the U.S. civil defense posture rather than any specific alarm over what the Soviets might be doing.

But even if a gap is found and a threatening imbalance discerned, the chances of organizing an effective civil defense program in this country in anything less than an all-out war situation are considered small by some informed officials. Therefore, the realistic options open to Cotter's study team stop somewhere short of the kind of program which Soviet literature describes.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 1976

The United States, contrary to popular mythology, has never been an isolationist country. Almost as soon as we became a nation we became interventionist.

The United States used its armed forces abroad 159 times between 1798 and 1945; of these, 73 were initiated under prior legislative authority, without a declaration of war. Even between World Wars I and II—said to be the heyday of isolationism—we engaged in 19 military actions outside the Western Hemisphere. Since World War II we have used military forces in Korea, Indochina, Lebanon, the Dominican Republic and the Congo.

What all this indicates is that since its inception the United States has been unafraid to exercise power in world affairs.

There is every reason to believe that military intervention will continue, and, indeed, that it may even intensify. There are a number of indications that we may find ourselves committed to policies that go beyond the diplomatic, economic or covert forms of intervention we have practiced in the distant and near past. One indicator is a poll recently taken by Potomac Associates that points to a growing tendency for Americans to think in unilateral terms.

The very fact that United States control of the Panama Canal should have been a major issue in the Presidential primaries this year demonstrates that nationalistic impulses have by no means been quelled. Thus, if there is a disposition to intervene, the reasons are not likely to be those we are most familiar with, such as a desire to contain the expansion of Communism on a global scale. In this respect, Vietnam may well have proved an end game—the cold war is already history. Our responses will be different because the international system is different. What we appear to be entering is a period of relative disorder, with a greater degree of interdependence among nations; this could lead to greater tensions and more, rather than less, interference by one nation into the affairs of another.

From an American perspective, military intervention might be most readily occasioned by our fears of resource scarcity. As regards our dependence on foreign oil, for example, in 1975

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL,
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American Intervention

By James Chace

net petroleum imports for the United States were 36 percent of its total consumption. In 1970 they were 22 percent and by 1980, according to estimates of the United States Bureau of Mines, the United States will probably be buying up to 41 percent of its petroleum abroad. In a situation of perceived resource scarcity, intervention could easily become a demand by the Congress rather than an assertion of executive will.

Another reason for intervention could be to preserve America's sphere of influence in the Caribbean. Cuba remains resistant to United States dominance, as was most recently evident in the Cuban military presence in Angola directed against the United States-backed liberation movements. Mexico has already demonstrated its solidarity with third-world blocs unsympathetic to United States policy. Panama will not be satisfied with the status quo. In the Caribbean and Central America — deemed by most Americans as essential to United States security — the possibility of intervention is never far from mind.

A third reason for American intervention would be to affect regional balances of power. In Northeast Asia, for example, an embryonic regional balance comprising Japan, China, the Soviet Union, the two Koreas and the United States is already in place. The very concept of regional balances of power also demands a willingness of the great powers to intervene to prevent the balance from being upset. It is for this reason among others that any outbreak in hostilities between the two Koreas is threatening. There are also at least hints of a balance in South Asia. Unwilling to put itself in the position of being a Soviet client, India wants recognition as a power in its own right. Moscow and Peking seem

disposed to grant India its wish. And the United States, far from abandoning the region, is planning an increased naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

In other areas no such balances as yet exist. However, nations such as Brazil and Iran have already shown a drive for dominance in their regions. Should such nations embark on an aggressive course, the very fabric of interdependencies being created both in the region and globally could be ripped apart. In such a situation, the United States might find intervention — either alone or in concert with others — desirable in order to tame the dangerously expanding power.

Finally, there is often a felt need for great powers to demonstrate their global concerns. For the United States, these would probably include a concern for human rights and the espousal of liberal, pluralistic democracies. Realizing that the United States is a worldwide power with social, economic and ideological interests, Americans may accept intervention in the manner of other great powers of the past by pursuing activist policies. The evidence is on the side of the activists. A recent Harris poll showed that support for an activist foreign policy has hardly changed since 1947.

Does global power, then, lead to intervention? History suggests that it does. An anarchic world with shifting coalitions and overlapping alliances certainly does not diminish the likelihood. And if wars of attrition and massive nuclear exchanges are improbable, the so-called decisive stroke of intervention could seem most appealing. Such interventionism will often be wrong and almost always will be dangerous. Yet there seems to be a certain inevitability to it. The 17th-century philosopher Thomas Hobbes was right when he perceived as "a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetually and restless desire of Power after power that ceaseth only in death."

James Chace is managing editor of the journal *Foreign Affairs* and author of "A World Elsewhere: The New American Foreign Policy."

America's Colonial Headaches

By B. BRUCE-BRIGGS

The charge that America has imperialistic ambitions is hard to believe these days, but the truth of the matter is that the U.S. does have a colonial problem, and not just in Panama and Puerto Rico either.

We don't like to think of ourselves as a colonial power and since we led the way by granting independence to the Philippines in 1946 we have actively promoted decolonization. But as the tide of European empire has receded, the American empire has remained intact. With the exception of the ending of U.S. occupation of the Japanese Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, the Stars and Stripes are planted as widely now as they were 30 years ago.

Most of the inhabitants of our overseas

possessions share our dislike for the term "colony," so the official designation is "outlying territory." But euphemism cannot modify the fact that three million people live on 5,000 square miles of American territory, governed by U.S. laws and with no say in the making of these laws either through voting for the President or members of Congress. What to do with these people is a continuing annoyance both to Congress and the Executive Branch.

Not that the colonies want to be free. Far from it. Most of them wish to retain the status and rights of American nationality, not to mention the protection of the U.S. military. They want U.S. government programs but don't want to pay U.S. taxes. In short, they share the great American

dream of something for nothing.

Take our largest and most important colony—Puerto Rico, the only one which could conceivably be a real independent country. It has a minuscule independent movement, so lacking in popular support that it must resort to terrorism to be noticed. The principal issue on the island is whether to join the union or to continue the "Free Associated State" status evolved over the years. Puerto Ricans are U.S. citizens, the island is internally self-governing (by an act of the U.S. Congress), islanders pay no U.S. income taxes ("no taxation without representation") but are subject to U.S. laws.

The U.S. denies that Puerto Rico is a colony and refuses to let the United Nations Select Committee on Decolonization

meddle in its affairs. But it is continually harassed on the issue by Cuba, backed by the socialist dictatorships of Syria, Iraq, Mali and Congo (Brazzaville). Several times Puerto Rico has voted overwhelmingly in plebiscites to continue the existing status. Presidents and Congressmen have indicated American willingness to let the island go any time it so desires, yet technically the Cubans are right: Puerto Rico is not a self-governing nation.

The Economic Benefits

Not that the Puerto Ricans particularly care. The recent Ad Hoc Advisory Group on the Status of Puerto Rico slighted constitutional issues and decided to concentrate on preparing a menu of economic benefits for approval by the U.S. Congress. Two of the status revisions—changing the nominal designation (in Spanish) of Puerto Rico from a "Commonwealth" to a "Free Associated State" and the admission of a non-voting resident commissioner to the U.S. Senate—seem reasonable, but the suggestion that federal courts use the Spanish language is impractical. Puerto Rico's desire to have some say in controlling immigration—to keep out those aggressive, successful Cuban refugees, for one thing—hasn't a chance of approval by Congress. And even Puerto Rico's staunchest friends are appalled by the recommendations that the island be exempt from U.S. minimum wage and labor relations laws, not to mention the idea that the island government have the right to decide which federal legislation will apply to Puerto Rico.

Of course, the Puerto Ricans want full federal welfare benefits. Although the commonwealth is one of the richest countries in the Western Hemisphere, its per capita income is less than half that of the mainland, so federal eligibility standards entitle much of the population to benefits. Fifty-five percent are on food stamps.

Guam, Samoa and the Virgin Islands are held by the U.S. to be "non self-governing territories" liable to supervision by the UN. Each is evolving in the Puerto Rican direction, but not without considerable potholes. Guam and the Virgins have recently obtained the privilege of electing their governors and non-voting delegates to the House. Samoa also was apparently pressured by the Interior Department into electing its own governor. Bills are before Congress to allow Guam and the Virgins to have conventions to write territorial constitutions. Because of the collapse of Virgin Islands tourism, its only major business, during the recent recession, that territory is asking for an outright grant of \$8.5 million and the pledge of the "full faith and credit" of the U.S. in support of a \$60 million bond issue.

Apart from the tourism in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, none of the above colonies is of much economic benefit to the U.S. But the Panama Canal Zone is another matter. The economic value of the canal, especially with a toll schedule unchanged since 1914, is enormous. But we are more accustomed to think of the canal in military terms.

Even though it cannot handle super-carriers, the strategic utility of the canal continues to be so immense that the United States is understandably loath to knuckle under to demands by the Panamanian Republic for the liquidation of the Canal Zone and eventual transfer of the U.S. government-owned Panama Canal Co. to Panamanian ownership. The Hay-Varilla Treaty of 1903 provided that the U.S. shall hold "in perpetuity the use, occupancy and control" of the zone "as if it were sovereign." The U.S. is not sovereign, but how its rights differ from sovereignty is a matter perhaps better left to theologians.

As the tide of European empire has receded, the American empire has remained intact. But not without a continuous stream of problems.

The present Panamanian regime is relatively responsible and pro-American by Central American standards, but given the vagaries of Caribbean politics, we would be foolish to take continued stability and friendship for granted. The Panama Canal is precious and we have every right in law to possess it forever, so what's the problem? First, continued occupation of the zone hurts our relations with Latin American nations who see it as evidence of Yankee imperialism. For example, the president of Venezuela took the occasion of an otherwise affectionate Bicentennial message to knock our "colonial enclave."

Complaints by Latin American countries we can easily bear, but advocates of substantial concessions to Panama have an uglier scenario in mind—that the present Panamanian regime will be replaced with one that will tolerate or promote terrorism or guerrilla warfare against the zone. So the Panama issue boils down to these questions: Is continued possession of the zone worth the risk of "another Vietnam"? Can the U.S. stand up to such a threat? The reader is as qualified to answer as any body.

Our other colonial enclave in the Caribbean is quiet. The Naval base at Cuba's Guantanamo Bay is nice to have, but hardly necessary to national defense. But giving it up would be seen as knuckling under to Castro. Fortunately, Cuba is making no effort to pressure us out, perhaps because of the rumored secret treaty which ended the missile crisis of 1962.

No foreign nations are meddling with our Pacific possessions. Our oldest colonies are a miscellaneous collection of islands gathered in consequence of the Guano Act of 1856; the miners scooped up the guano faster than the birds could lay it down and now these islands are unoccupied and worthless. Midway and Wake are military bases with no indigenous population and are no problem. Guam is also primarily a military base and its inhabitants are firmly connected to the U.S. But there is turmoil elsewhere in the Central Pacific. The U.S. controls something called "Micronesia," the last remaining United Nations trust territory. Its 100,000 inhabitants are not U.S. nationals and are subject to direct U.S. rule, supervised by the UN.

We have been trying to develop Micronesia as a unit, but the natives who live on 100 islands scattered over an expanse of ocean larger than the United States have nothing in common save a history of being ruled successively by Spain, Germany, Japan and the U.S. Micronesia is coming apart. The Northern Marianas have already indicated their intention of becoming a "commonwealth," with U.S. citizenship, but separatist movements against continued membership in Micronesia are afoot in other island groups. For the U.S. it's hardly worth the bother. We have a missile station at Kwajalein; Japanese interests are investigating possibilities of an oil port at Palau, and there is a little copra production and fishing—and that's all.

The Pentagon's Attitude

Obviously, very few Americans are

aware of the extent of our possessions. The Pentagon is concerned with those few spots that are of strategic importance, taking the position that the interests of the indigenous peoples are to be subordinated to the military requirements of the U.S. Where the military rules directly—as on Wake, Midway, Guantanamo and the Canal Zone—the milieu is that of a military base, benign but total control. The cavalier attitude toward the natives is best exemplified by Guam where the Navy grabbed up much of the best land on the eve of the granting of U.S. citizenship and rights to the islanders. This is a continuing grievance to the Guamanians.

Surprisingly, the major civilian players in the colonial game are a tiny band of old-style liberals. Micronesia has been represented by Clark Clifford's law firm and former Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas has a continuing involvement with Puerto Rico. The maritime lobby is also active. Its principal interest is maintenance of the Jones Act, requiring that shipping between U.S. ports be in U.S. registry bottoms. This is very costly for our overseas possessions, especially Guam, which has one of the highest costs of living in the world.

Also on the scene is a tiny band of anti-colonialists whose views are shaped by the "new politics" of the 1960s. They dislike the military and strategic arguments mean nothing to them. In every overseas commitment they see another potential Vietnam. And they are hostile to the indigenous peoples who wish to be Americans, characterizing them as suckers or tools of U.S. interests. Apparently this small group of researchers, politicians and editorial writers is unable to comprehend what a precious boon U.S. citizenship is to the ordinary people of the world.

Should the rest of us care about our colonies? Excepting the Panama Canal, they are of little economic value and require a continual drain on the U.S. Treasury to provide them with government services. But the shuffle of history has dealt these poor and weak peoples into our hands. We are responsible for them. The optimum policy probably should be to accede to any reasonable demand they make on us.

If they wish to be independent, godspeed. If Puerto Rico desires statehood, welcome. For the rest, we will have to continue to work toward some intermediate status of internal self-government under U.S. national law that unfriendly critics will always be able to label "colonialism."

Mr. Bruce-Briggs is a member of the Journal's editorial page staff.

NEW YORK TIMES
7 Sept. 1976

Taiwan's A-bomb. . .

The American intelligence report that Taiwan clandestinely has built a reprocessing facility that is extracting weapons-grade plutonium explosive from spent nuclear reactor fuel rods demands immediate investigation by the appropriate Congressional committees. Taiwan's denials have not impressed Washington insiders.

If the Chinese Nationalists have set out to make atomic bombs in the first known violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)—and have succeeded in deceiving the inspection system of the International Atomic Energy Agency—a profound reappraisal will be needed for Washington's China policy, its nonproliferation strategy and its nuclear export controls.

Under the 100-nation NPT, Taiwan and other non-nuclear weapons states renounced atomic explosives and committed themselves to place all their nuclear facilities and materials under I.A.E.A. "safeguards"—a system of international inspection. The main supplier countries, in addition, later agreed that the export of fissionable materials or key nuclear facility components would be indicated to the I.A.E.A. to trigger safeguards.

If this system has been circumvented by Taiwan or ignored by some supplier countries, may not other NPT parties be evading controls as well? Speedy action to beef up and improve I.A.E.A. inspection and supplier controls clearly is vital.

The effort to avoid nuclear spread has focused recently on tightened up export controls by the main supplier countries, but the United States has failed in the most important task: to obtain the agreement of West Germany and France to an embargo on export of reprocessing plants in the wake of their sales of such plants to Brazil and Pakistan last year, claiming that I.A.E.A. safeguards make such sales "safe."

The Taiwan fiasco blows up that French-German thesis. It reinforces Congressional arguments for legislation that would call on the President to deny American nuclear materials ultimately to supplier as well as recipient nations that could not be prevailed upon to cooperate in halting the spread of plutonium reprocessing.

That vital legislation is currently bogged down in the Joint Atomic Energy Committee. A belated White House study of the problem, due for release this week, will be an exercise in futility unless it helps break this log-jam.

THE WASHINGTON POST
2 September 1976

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Chinese Denial

Recent press allegations that the Republic of China has been secretly reprocessing spent nuclear fuel for weaponry are totally groundless.

1. The Republic of China is a faithful party to the non-proliferation treaty guarding against the spread of nuclear weapons. Besides, Premier Chiang Ching-Kuo has repeatedly made it known that the Republic of China develops nuclear energy and conducts nu-

clear researches solely for peaceful uses.

2. The Republic of China's nuclear reactors and all related facilities and materials are subject to regular inspection and surveillance of the International Atomic Energy Agency for safeguard. In addition to the semi-annual reports submitted to the IAEA in which every bit of imported uranium, including tiny scraps, is accounted for, on-the-spot inspections are frequently made by IAEA experts. As lately as mid-July this year, an inspection team consisting of IAEA experts from Great Britain, France, Portugal, Italy and Norway came to the country to take a thorough inventory and found everything in good order. They even brought along a gamma-spectroscopy to measure the radiation of

Meanwhile, the Congress ought to find out why the Administration, after refusing since 1969 to sell Taiwan a reprocessing plant, did not react more vigorously against Taiwan's open importation and assembly of the components for a "hot cell" for small-scale plutonium reprocessing. That so-called "laboratory project," which Taipei put under I.A.E.A. inspection, may simply have been a cover for the assembly of a clandestine facility.

. . . American Guarantee

Taiwan's presumed nuclear violation brings into question the American security guarantee. That guarantee, as in the case of Japan and South Korea, is designed to provide an American nuclear umbrella in place of national acquisition of atomic weapons.

The United States unfortunately has undermined its security guarantee by talk in Washington and among China experts of "normalization" of relations with Peking—without first solving the problem of the security of Taiwan. Normalization, Peking insists, requires the United States to terminate its security treaty as well as its diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

But normalization of relations with Peking is inconceivable without stabilization of the Taiwan situation by, at the least, a replacement of the mutual security treaty with a unilateral American guarantee of Taiwan's autonomy and continued supply of arms for Taiwan's defense forces. Renunciation of nuclear weapons is the irreducible condition for that guarantee.

This Taiwan-American transaction is in Peking's interest. Although Communist China has denounced the Nonproliferation Treaty as an imperialist device, Peking's interest in a nonnuclear Taiwan is great.

Taiwan has continued to remain a legal party to the Nonproliferation Treaty and to accept I.A.E.A. inspection, despite its unfortunate expulsion by third world vendetta from the I.A.E.A. in 1972. That expulsion does not justify Taiwan's clandestine evasion of its commitments—to the I.A.E.A., to the United States and to 98 other NPT countries—to refrain from nuclear explosives. But the partial responsibility of Peking and the third world for the present situation should give Washington some moral leverage in working out a reasonable solution, one that makes the security of an autonomous non-nuclear Taiwan the inescapable condition for normalization of relations with Peking.

spent fuel.

3. There are surveillance cameras taking pictures of the reactor top and the surface of the storage pool which reveal all operations taking place and make records on a log book.

4. All operations of the reactors are computerized.

In view of the aforementioned hard facts, such allegations simply do not hold water.

DING MOU-SHIH,
Director-General,
Government Information Office,
Republic of China

Washington

Editor's note: The Post stands by its story, which was reported over several weeks and confirmed by a number of authoritative sources.

NEW YORK TIMES
14 SEP 1976

'Hard Line' and Hijackings

State Department Altering Long-Held Policy, Possibly to Defer Criticism of Government Role

By RICHARD WITKIN

The weekend hijacking to Paris of a New York-to-Chicago airliner has accelerated a process of official rethinking on how to deal with terrorists while the lives of hostages are regarded to be in jeopardy.

The State Department is expressing its long-held "hard line" policy in altered terms, contending that the old way of stating the policy was often misunderstood. In the past, the policy has widely been publicized as: "We will not negotiate with terrorists."

News Analysis
A department official involved in anti-terrorist planning said yesterday that the preferred way of stating the policy was: "Do everything to effect the safe release of hostages without making any concessions."

There was speculation in the aviation community that the public change in emphasis might have been designed to head off possible criticism about the role of governments in the maneuvering that ended the melodrama with no deaths or injuries to any one aboard the plane.

Only the Hijackers Knew

It must be considered that, while the events were being played out at the Paris airport, no one but the hijackers could know whether they had the devices to make good on threats to blow up the plane if their demands had not been met.

Several questions were being asked about the role of both the United States and French Governments.

Was the response of the State Department as rapid and realistic as it might have been? Or did a misunderstood view of the "we will not negotiate" stance cause unnecessary delays that might have led to tragedy if the hijackers had had lethal devices and had been trigger-

happy?

As for the French, were authorities in Paris too quick to incapacitate the Trans World Airlines plane? Did they cause what, under different circumstances (armed hijackers with different motivations), might have been fatal delays in facilitating communications with the terrorists?

What Degree of Handling?

In short, what degree of tough governmental handling was called for if the only remaining requirement of the hijackers was to verify that their demand had been met for dissemination of their message in dooped leaflets and news columns?

The captain of the plane, Richard Carey, put it very succinctly when he asked during tower-to-cockpit radio exchanges in Paris: "Tell me, please, what are we being killed for?" A tape of the exchanges was obtained by the National Broadcasting Company.

At another point, the captain told the United States Ambassador, Kenneth Rush, who was in the control tower: "All we know is that these people had a message that they wanted to put in the papers and wanted to drop leaflets on cities, and for this you are asking that this whole ship full of innocent people can be killed to prove that you can take a stand against terrorists."

The hard-line approach to the overall problem of airline hijacking had received its greatest public acclaim after the Israeli commando raid that freed hostages at Uganda's Entebbe Airport earlier this year.

Demands Were Limited

But was any comparable governmental toughness called for in Paris? In the end, it was decided it was not, since the demands of the terrorists were limited.

They were not asking the release of fellow terrorists in Israeli and in other jails.

What then can officialdom, here and abroad, learn from the latest episode in the complex, constantly changing, and too frequently tragic history of aerial hijacking?

The dominant view among aviation experts at the moment is that there is nothing wrong in an officially proclaimed and normally implemented policy of toughness with hijackers. Anything less would only encourage other criminals.

But it is counterproductive to adopt too rigid a stand, many believe. A rigid "we will not negotiate" stand can be misinterpreted by middle-level officials to mean "we will not talk." Even a policy of "we will not make concessions" should not be absolute—how do you define "concessions"? Is the dropping of leaflets the kind of concession that warrants risking dozens of lives?

Each on Own Merits

In short, the majority view is that the government should talk and usually act though but, at the same time, should treat each case on its own merits at the time.

That is the way, in the final analysis, that the weekend T.W.A. hijacking was handled. Even while a strict reading of Secretary of State Kissinger's "we will not negotiate" posture was slowing steps overseas to gain the release of the plane's passengers and crew, other branches of the government were experiencing no such rigidities.

Both the Federal Aviation Administration and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, for instance, were urging newspapers to comply with the hijackers' demands for printing the text of their manifesto for Croatian Independence from Yugoslavia.

The policy favoring toughness with flexibility was endorsed by a spokesman for the West German United Nations delegation, which plans to propose new measures against taking hostages when the General Assembly meets later this month.

"In general, you should take a hard line," he said. "But don't say 'never.' You can always make room for special cases."

The Washington Star Thursday, September 16, 1976

U.S. Violated Policy For Croatian Terrorists

By Henry S. Bradsher

Washington Star Staff Writer

In the aftermath of last week's Croatian nationalist hijacking, the State Department has reiterated administration policy of not making any concessions to terrorists but conceded that the FBI violated that policy.

The State Department has in turn been identified by another agency involved in the weekend drama, the Federal Aviation Administration, as having been involved in making concessions.

The FBI urged some American newspapers to satisfy the five terrorists' demands for publicity for their cause. The five, who sought independence of Croatia from Yugoslavia, released their 92 hostages and surrendered in Paris and are now awaiting trial in New York.

The FAA played a role in the dropping of terrorists' leaflets from an American plane on London and Paris to publicize the Croatian cause. It also cleared a flight to drop leaflets over Chicago in

answer to the terrorists' demands.

ASKED WHETHER the FBI role had violated the government ban on concessions to terrorists, the bureau issued this statement on Tuesday:

"The decision to release this material (to the newspapers) was made solely by the FBI in view of the circumstances which existed at the time, but does not represent any change in the U.S. government's policy regarding acceding to demands of terrorists."

In reiterating that policy yesterday, a State Department spokesman agreed with a questioner that the FBI "as much as said that" it had broken the policy.

The spokesman said that "the policy, which involves a refusal on the part of the United States government to negotiate with terrorists, to comply with monetary or in kind ransom demands or to accede to any terrorist demands, has not changed and will not change."

"The maintenance of this no-negotiations, no-concessions policy is based on our firm belief that future incidents can be deterred only when it is widely understood and recognized that such acts cannot succeed and will not further the cause of the individual terrorist or international terrorist organization."

Tuesday, September 14, 1976

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

Yugoslavia blasts U.S. over hijacking

By Eric Bourne
Special correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Vienna

Yugoslav relations with the United States have taken a nosedive as a result of the hijack of an American airliner by Croatian extremists.

It is difficult to recall any time since the early 1950s when official Yugoslav attitudes have adopted so harsh a line against the U.S.

There have been periodic mutual upsets since Belgrade's break with Stalin opened the door to increasingly friendly relations with the U.S. and the West in general, but these were rarely long-lasting, and they did not approach the level of the current sharp reaction.

Now Yugoslavia has gone so far as to accuse the U.S. of tacit support for the hijackers, a charge that a U.S. Embassy spokesman in Belgrade rejected as totally without foundation.

Surprise voiced

Western diplomats who have sympathized with Yugoslav feelings about the apparently unrestricted activities of extreme emigre groups in Western countries, were surprised by the uncompromising nature of Belgrade's protest.

It is not the first time the Yugoslav Government has accused "influential reactionary circles" in America of hostility to Yugoslavia because of its nonalignment.

Six weeks ago, President Tito complaining of outside "pressures," named U.S. Ambassador in Belgrade Laurence H. Silberman as the "initiator" of an anti-Yugoslav campaign. The charge arose from the imprisonment of an American citizen and the Embassy's successful efforts to secure his release.

Escalation

In this atmosphere, angry Yugoslav reactions to the Croat hijack were predictable. The present protest, however, goes well beyond the Yugoslav leader's criticisms of an ambassador involved in a single individual case.

The indictment leveled at the U.S. included a scarcely veiled threat that "normal relations" are incompatible with the circumstances surrounding the Sept. 16 hijacking.

But, before judgment is passed on the affair and positions harden, the Yugoslav reaction needs to be seen against the current political background in that country.

Yugoslav leaders and people generally are only too well aware that the end of an era of assured stability is nearing.

Rivalries ease

The leaders who will take over when President Tito is no longer at the helm express confidence that the transition has been secured by establishment of a collective presidency.

Talks this correspondent had in all the Yugoslav republics this summer, with local leaders as well as ordinary folk, revealed that the rivalries and tensions that flared between various national groups in the early 1970s have abated. Republican equality has become a substantive thing.

Nonetheless, anxiety for the post-Tito future helps to make Belgrade doubly sensitive to anything smacking of "interference" or hostility, or tolerance of its extreme adversaries abroad.

Extremist activity

Extremist Croatian emigre groups have, in recent years:

- Infiltrated a band of 19 terrorists into Yugoslavia. They killed 13 security troops before being slain or captured themselves.
- Murdered Yugoslav diplomats in West Germany and Sweden.
- Bombed a Yugoslav train.
- Blew up a Yugoslav airliner over Czechoslovakia.
- Made a bomb attempt against President Tito only a few months ago.

These groups are largely remnants, or sons, of the notorious Ustasha who headed a Croat puppet regime under Nazi occupation in World War II and carried out widespread massacres of the Serb minority there.

In the Yugoslav view they are not ordinary political dissidents and should not be regarded as such.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
16 Sept. 1976

Japan's scrutiny of Soviet jet jars détente

By David K. Willis
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Moscow

A new setback for détente between Moscow and Washington . . . the worst diplomatic clash between Moscow and Tokyo for years . . . and an indication of how deeply the Soviets have been upset by three highly publicized defections in recent months.

This is how Western analysts in Moscow sum up the Soviet Union's long, angry blast of criticism at both Tokyo and Washington over the supersecret MIG-25 jet fighter-bomber still in Japanese hands.

The criticism intensified Sept. 15. A Tass commentator, noting reports from Tokyo that the MIG-25 was to be flown by a C-5 Galaxy transport aircraft to a military base where it is to be "carefully studied," said that Japan's position continued to be "unfriendly" toward the Soviet Union.

This attitude, commentator Viktor Zatsepin said, was "clearly undertaken with the instigation and support of a third side," and showed that Japan was disregarding international law and worsening Soviet-Japanese relations.

(This follows on the heels of a Sept. 14 warn-

ing to Japan that if Tokyo pursued its claim to four Soviet-held Pacific islands it could only "poison the spirit of good-neighborliness" between the two countries.

(Soviet authorities seized a Japanese fishing boat with a crew of six Sept. 12 just a few hours before then Japanese Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa made an inspection trip of the four islands from a patrol boat.)

Soviet pilot Viktor Belenko flew the jet, said to be the fastest of its type in the world, to Hakodate in northern Japan Sept. 6. The Japanese press reported that he told authorities he had wanted to fly directly to the United States, but lacked the fuel. President Ford decided that the pilot could have political asylum in the U.S. if he wanted. Lieutenant Belenko asked for it and is now thought to be in California.

Moscow does not want its prize aircraft on Japanese soil a moment longer. It knows that U.S. and other Western military intelligence experts have long wanted to take a close look at it — a point raised by Tass. Analysts here say that Moscow's latest harsh criticism is intended to hector Tokyo into giving the jet back before this can happen.

Judging by the reaction of the Japanese Foreign Ministry in Tokyo, the Soviet gambit might fail. A ministry spokesman said Lieutenant Belenko sought asylum of his own free will. Previously Japanese officials had said that Japan would return the jet, but only after it had made an inspection to determine if Lieutenant Belenko had broken any laws in entering Japanese air space. Privately, Japanese officials reject the Soviet version.

The Soviets have been using strong language in private exchanges since the plane landed. On the night of Sept. 14 Tass distributed a lengthy statement that gave the Soviet version of the affair, said the plane had become lost, condemned Japan for allowing the U.S. to enter the picture, blamed the White House for offering asylum before it had been sought, and suggested that "electoral considerations" had been to blame.

The Belenko defection was the third to make world headlines in recent months. The first was that of diver Sergei Nemtsanov at the Montreal Olympics. Next was chess grandmaster Viktor Korchnoi in the Netherlands

NEW YORK TIMES
16 Sept. 1976

MIG'S PENETRATION WORRYING TO JAPAN

Ability of Soviet Aircraft to Fly
Under Radar Is Said to Show
Country's Weak Defenses

By DREW MIDDLETON

The undetected final approach of the vagrant Soviet MIG-25 to Japan has brought home to Government circles in Tokyo the loopholes in the country's air defense, according to United States defense sources.

The first analysis on the high-speed, high-altitude aircraft, known to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as the Foxbat, has heightened Western concern over the regular reconnaissance flights by other MIG-25's over West Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Norway. According to NATO intelligence reports, there are 45 Foxbats in East Germany and Poland employed on such patrols.

The landing of the MIG-25 at the commuter airport of Hakodate, on Hokkaido Island on Sept. 6, supported the American argument, hitherto rejected by the Japanese, that their radar system was obsolete.

The detection of hostile aircraft approaching the Japanese islands rests on 28 warning and control units of a base defense system. Successive Japanese Governments have considered modernization of the system in view of regular Soviet reconnaissance flights over the archipelago by MIG-25s and other aircraft.

Jets Ordered to Intercept

Air defense radars picked up the Soviet aircraft shortly after 1 P.M. Japanese

July 27. In each case Moscow has reacted in strong statements, and with each defection its irritation has grown.

The MIG-25 statement says Lieutenant Belenko lost his bearings and landed in Japan because he lacked the fuel to get home. Tokyo then isolated him, "which gives grounds for believing that various methods were used to influence him."

The Soviets say Tokyo refused permission for Soviet officials to see the flyer for almost four days. The Japanese spokesman in Tokyo said Japanese officials had, in fact, persuaded Lieutenant Belenko to see Soviet officials although he had not wanted to.

time and two Japanese Air Force F-4's were ordered to intercept. The Foxbat, flown by Lieut. Victor I. Belenko, did not answer Japanese requests for identification.

Shortly after the MIG-25 entered Japanese air space it dropped from 18,000 feet to a low altitude and disappeared from Japanese radar screens. In consequence, the ground control stations were unable to direct the two F-4's toward their target.

Hakodate was Lieutenant Belenko's second choice. His first was the Japanese Air Force base at Chitose, which was covered by clouds. He then flew to Hakodate.

According to Japanese information reaching this country, Soviet aircraft appeared in the area of Hakodate five hours after the MIG-25 had touched down. Since then, the Soviet Union's Far East air force has maintained regular patrols in the area. And Soviet diplomats in Tokyo have demanded the immediate return of the aircraft.

Lieutenant Belenko left the Soviet air base at Sakharovka in Siberia on the morning of Sept. 6 in a flight of three MIG-25. Shortly after takeoff he broke away from the squadron and dropped to about 150 feet to escape Soviet radar. After he was out of the range of the Soviet radar, Lieutenant Belenko took his plane up to 18,000 feet and headed for Japan.

It was a near thing. The MIG-25 landed with about 95 percent of its fuel exhausted. The plane, according to British intelligence sources, has a normal range of about 610 nautical miles but this can be increased by reducing use of Tumansky R-266 engines' afterburners.

The initial analysis of the MIG-25 by Japanese and United States experts concentrated on the avionics system, the lookdown radar and the metals used to sheath the high-speed aircraft. American aeronautical sources believe that either titanium or boron are used for the fuselage and wings.

It is not now known whether the aircraft carried electronic countermeasures against hostile radar and surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles, which have become such an important element in aerial warfare.

WASHINGTON POST
17 SEP 1976

Navy Ready to Raise F-14; Soviets Nearby

By George C. Wilson
Washington Post Staff Writer

Navy leaders were preparing last night to retrieve the highly-secret F-14 Tomcat fighter that rolled off the deck of the U.S. carrier John F. Kennedy on Tuesday—sinking intact in international waters about 75 miles northwest of Scapa Flow, Scotland.

A Soviet cruiser kept circling the area where the Navy's F-14 sank, raising fears in the Pentagon that the Russians are marking the spot until they can haul the fighter out of the North Atlantic. This would be a diplomatic counter-punch to the current examination by the United States and Japan of the Mig-25 Foxbat that a defecting Soviet pilot flew to Japan last week.

The Navy F-14—which settled in 1,890 feet of water—would yield the Russians more secrets if they recover it than Americans expect to get from their examination of the Soviet Mig-25.

Not only did the F-14 have a top-secret, \$500,000 Phoenix missile aboard when it plunged into the Atlantic, sources said last night, but the fighter was also equipped with devices so sensitive that a friendly nation would not get them if it bought the plane.

Equipment the U.S. government is determined to keep from the Russians includes devices in the F-14 for coding

voice communications and foiling enemy jamming attempts; a computer system to put the F-14 in the best position to shoot down an enemy plane; and a data link system so sophisticated that someone on a ship could control the F-14's flight.

"We're going to get that plane before they do," said one Navy officer last night. "Or else," he added in an obvious bit of overstatement, "it's going to be World War III."

Sources said the recovery plan had been put together Wednesday and yesterday but still required a last bit of coordination with one Navy command before being implemented.

The water is not deep enough to require pressing the Hughes Glomar Explorer into service, sources said. That ship recovered pieces of a Soviet diesel submarine in 1974 in water almost 10 times as deep as that now covering the F-14.

Although Navy divers have been called to participate in the F-14 recovery effort, it could not be learned last night exactly how they will be used. One source predicted a simple seagoing crane and cable system would be able to go down the required 1,890 feet to reach the F-14.

The Navy could use a seagoing barge with a so-called "moon pool"—an opening within the barge leading directly into the sea. A hook and cable can be lowered from a crane on the deck through this opening—called a moon pool because it reflects the moon at night.

Although F-14s have crashed into the sea before, none has ever fallen into it so gently that the plane has remained intact. Navy leaders fear the plane may still be in one piece on the ocean bottom, adding to their determination to recover the plane. Another option would be to blow it to bits on the bottom, but sources said this was not contemplated at present.

The reason the F-14 went out of control on the deck of the Kennedy on Tuesday as the pilot was preparing to take off, sources said last night, was that one of its two jet engines malfunctioned. The pilot could not throttle down its thrust because of what was termed "a fuel control problem."

With one engine idling, but the other putting out a lot of thrust, sources said, the F-14 went out of control on the deck and rolled overboard—hitting three deck hands as it skidded over the side. The Navy said the three sailors were injured but did not describe how seriously.

The two-man crew of the F-14—a plane that costs \$14 million a copy and about \$18 million if the cost of developing it is included—ejected from the plane and landed on the deck of the carrier. They suffered only minor injuries, the Navy said.

Iran has ordered 80 F-14's but will not receive much of the top-secret equipment that the Navy fears the Russians might get if the F-14 is not hauled out of the depths soon.

The F-14 went overboard during a NATO exercise called Teamwork 76. A Soviet spy ship shadowing the carrier Kennedy during the exercise apparently saw the F-14 roll overboard.

Two Soviet Kresta cruisers were in the area. One of them stayed near the spot where the F-14 sank, sources said.

WASHINGTON STAR

13 SEP 1976

U.S. Asked to Help Dismantle MIG

TOKYO (UPI).— Japan will ask American military experts to help dismantle and examine a Soviet MIG25 fighter plane flown here by a defecting Russian pilot a week ago, according to Michita Sakata, defense administrator.

Sakata, director-general of the defense agency, told reporters yesterday it would be difficult for Japanese experts alone to make a thorough study of the plane, one of the world's most advanced aircraft.

Technical assistance from the United States is necessary to dismantle the MIG25 and examine secret equipment on board, Sakata said.

Defense agency officials added, however, that U.S. help would be sought on an "unofficial basis" to avoid further straining of relations between Japan and the Soviet Union.

THE PLANE, REGARDED by Western military experts as an intelligence windfall, was flown to Japan last Monday by Soviet Air Force Lt. Viktor Belenko. Belenko, 29, who said he wanted to defect to the United States, was flown to California last Thursday after the U.S. government granted him asylum.

The high-flying fighter — known by the NATO code name of Foxbat — was described in 1973 by then U.S. Secretary of the Air Force Robert Seamans as "probably the best interceptor in production in the world today."

BALTIMORE SUN

16 Sept. 1976

'Canadian intelligence' blamed for defection

Moscow (AP) — A Soviet journal accused "Canadian intelligence" yesterday of engineering the defection in Montreal of Sergei Nemtsanov, the 17-year-old diver who left his Olympic team during the Summer Games.

In linking a Canadian government agency with the case, *Literary Gazette* thus expanded earlier Soviet accusations that the young diver was forced against his will to defect July 29.

Nemtsanov later announced he wanted to return to his homeland, and was sent back to the Soviet Union. According to a newspaper article here last week, he had resumed training in Kazakhstan, and issued a statement saying he had never wanted to defect.

Literary Gazette, the weekly organ of the Soviet Writer's Union, said Skip Phoenix, the Canadian diver who befriended the young Soviet, "participated at the Montreal Olympics not only in the capacity of a sportsman but also as an agent for Canadian intelligence, being paid 'per soul' for each he recruited."

Phoenix has denied he helped engineer the defection.

The latest article on the case portrayed Nemtsanov as a total captive of Canadian officials, and said the diver was suffering from "brain paralyzing drugs" when he first met with Soviet officials in Montreal.

In his remarks published last week, Nemtsanov claimed he was in a constant "fog" during the affair.

Canadian officials said Nemtsanov had asked for asylum, but reconsidered because of concern over his grandmother's fate back home.

WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
16 SEPTEMBER 1976

The Greer/Kandel Report

Terrorists Shifting Focus to Firms

By Philip Greer
and Myron Kandel
Special to The Washington Star

Terrorist groups are shifting their focus from the U.S. government to American companies — in this country as well as overseas, according to our sources in private security organizations, who have become increasingly worried about the development.

Security at government installations has been tightened, and as a result, our sources say, terrorists are looking for easier targets. The murder of three North American Rockwell technicians in Iran last month confirmed their fears that U.S. businesses and their employees are becoming symbolic stand-ins for the U.S. government. Worldwide, 40 percent of all terrorist attacks have been aimed at Americans.

ALTHOUGH Americans overseas still are more vulnerable than those at home — and those in arms-related industries run the greatest risk — the experts tell us the danger is spreading to the U.S. The fire bombs recently placed in New York department stores underline the vulnerability of ordinary business establishments — and ordinary citizens — to terrorist activity.

Security officials also fear that parts of the huge ransom payments received by Latin American terrorists holding kidnapped businessmen may make their way to U.S. terrorist groups, enabling them to step up their activities in this country. A report on terrorism by the Central Intelligence Agency which has received only limited distribution says it is likely that terrorist activity "will be more sharply felt in the U.S. in the years just ahead." The CIA also raises the possibility of "growing contact and cooperation" between foreign and U.S. terrorist organizations.

The threat of terrorism is so real to American companies that representatives of several dozen of them are meeting in New York this week with senior officials from the State Department, CIA, FBI and other agencies at a private seminar organized under tight security.

BENJAMIN WEINER, a former foreign service officer who heads the meeting, says the attacks on defense-related technicians are a first step in the shift of terrorism away from U.S. military and diplomatic personnel. "Such an attack," he says,

"is symbolically equivalent to an attack on the government itself."

CIA officials are also worried about the security of such major installations as offshore drilling rigs, nuclear reactor sites, the computer that runs the Bay Area Rapid Transit system in San Francisco and pipelines (including the Alaska pipeline). They fear that as terrorist incidents multiply, headline-hunting groups — such as the Croatia nationalists who hijacked a TWA jet last weekend — will resort to more spectacular acts of terrorism to give them the publicity they crave.

Concern is further heightened by the fact that, for the most part, Americans don't take precautions — and, in fact, often play into the hands of would-be attackers. One official tells of an executive of a multinational corporation who, on moving to a new location in the U.S., was interviewed by his local newspaper. The story told of his practice of jogging every morning and gave the exact time he left his house, when he returned (at least partly fatigued), where he parked his car at the railroad station, and other details that would make him an easy target of an aspiring kidnapper or assassin. For good measure, he also described the club his children regularly visited.

UP TO NOW, the federal government hasn't made any strong efforts to alert the public to the dangers of terrorism at home. Therefore, the experts say, it's pretty much up to you to watch out for yourself, and they pass along some tips.

Weiner says that business executives should keep a low profile and not draw any unnecessary attention to themselves or their families. For example, he asks, why drive a car with a distinctive license plate that makes you easy to spot?

It's also advisable to vary personal schedules, instead of strictly adhering to the same routine day after day. Advice along these lines that the State Department gives to Americans working in troubled areas overseas can also apply to those at home.

"Try to avoid keeping to the same routine in the routes and times of your movements to and from work and around town," the department recommends.

"Past kidnappings indicate that the kidnappers keep the victim under surveillance for a substantial period to discover travel patterns. Unpredictability is one of your best weapons."

Western Europe

WASHINGTON POST
15 SEP 1976

Secret Swede Funds Buy Spy Devices

By Bernard D. Nossiter
Washington Post Foreign Service

STOCKHOLM, Sweden, Sept. 14—Secret payments channeled by Sweden to U.S. Air Force intelligence for a number of years are being used to purchase electronic devices that enable Stockholm to listen in on military communications in the Soviet bloc, it was learned today.

According to informed sources here, the payments were hidden because of neutral Sweden's delicate relations with its Baltic neighbors and because some Swedish opinion would be horrified by any classified deal with the Pentagon.

Diplomats here are convinced that at least some of what Sweden learns through its monitoring devices is filtered back to the Pentagon. Swedish officials decline, however, to confirm this, presumably because that would be too naked a breach of neutrality.

The effectiveness of the American-supported system was demonstrated last November, when the Defense Radio Authority, the user agency here, picked up messages sent by Moscow to

Soviet bombers pursuing a runaway Soviet frigate.

With an election here Sunday, the government is making no apologies for the affair, although it is obviously embarrassed that it came to light. Stig Synnergren, the widely respected and blunt-speaking supreme commander of the Swedish armed forces, was ordered into action today to field hostile questions from Swedish reporters.

At this press conference, the general referred only to the purchase of "electronic material for the gathering of intelligence." He and other military men maintained a discreet silence on precisely what the device was used for, nor was anything said at the press conference about the target area.

It is, he said of the deal, "a perfectly legitimate business transaction, a payment for delivered goods, and not, as has been insinuated, payment for services."

"Deliveries are still going on," the general said. "And we will use the same method of payment . . . no matter what you write today."

The secret payments were disclosed in *Folket i Bild*, a Maoist fortnightly magazine that has cracked intelligence secrets here before. The magazine detailed four payments of more than \$250,000 from 1970 to 1973. They were made by Sweden's then-defense minister, Sven Andersson, now foreign minister, through commercial banks, with the biggest slice going to Maj. Gen. Rocky Triantafellu, then chief of U.S. Air Force intelligence.

The technique bypassed Sweden's Defense Material Administration, which normally does the purchasing. Gen. Synnergren readily acknowledged that the money came from secret Defense Ministry funds.

Because the payments from Sweden went to Air Force intelligence, the U.S. producer of the electronic device was kept in the dark about his ultimate customer. He would know only that he received an order from the Pentagon, not Sweden, an arrangement that apparently suited both Washington and Stockholm.

Sidestepping the Defense Material Administration kept the Swedish Parliament and public in the dark, a disclosure that may also hurt the government party at the polls.

The reasons for all this secrecy, it was explained here, were these:

• Stockholm did not want its Baltic neighbors—the Soviet Union, Poland

and East Germany—to know that it had the capability to monitor their air, sea and ground force transmissions. Nor does it want them to know that this capability is being used.

• Even though Synnergren acknowledged in an interview with *The Washington Post* that secrecy in these matters is short-lived, there is an important diplomatic difference between covert monitoring and a blatant announcement that it is going on.

• Public disclosure of the deal would have offended many in Sweden. As early as 1968, Washington's relations with Stockholm were already strained. Olof Palme, who became prime minister a year later, had marched in an antiwar parade with the North Vietnamese ambassador and, in time, Washington recalled its envoy. The government here would have had trouble explaining how it could deal with the Pentagon for a sensitive device and damn the United States at the same time.

• As part of an arrangement of this sort, almost inevitably the using country passes on to its supplier some of the fruits of its labors. To give a NATO leader military information about the Soviets appears to be an obvious violation of Sweden's neutrality.

The story has been a bombshell for the media here, headlined on front pages in three of the four big dailies and dominating radio and television newscasts. But its political fallout is uncertain.

Palme is fighting a come-from-behind campaign to maintain the 44-year-old rule of Social Democrats. Politicians in all camps agree that Sunday's parliamentary election will be extremely close, much like the one three years ago when the government forces and their opposition ended in a tie.

The secret-payments affair has broken only five days before the voters go to the polls. If it influences enough wavering Social Democrats to stay at home, it could turn their party out of office.

[At the Pentagon, chief spokesman Alan Woods said yesterday that Air Force Secretary Thomas C. Reed had ordered an inquiry into any money sent from the Swedish government to the Air Force. Woods said he did not know when the inquiry would be completed. He declined to comment further.]

THE GUARDIAN (MANCHESTER)
2 SEPTEMBER 1976

Trouble ahead if Andreotti falls

From CHRISTOPHER MATTHEWS: Rome, September 1

The month-old government of Signor Andreotti is being threatened by a smear campaign. Material which is extremely damaging, and if true, politically fatal, to Signor Andreotti has

recently been published in the Italian press. The source has been the Italian neo-Fascist Right, whose past links with the CIA are reasonably well documented, and the Lockheed

Corporation in the US.

Some Western diplomatic sources say there can be little doubt that a campaign is afoot to discredit or even sabotage Signor Andreotti in his precarious attempt to govern Italy on the basis of a tacit alliance between the Christian Democrats and Communists.

If successful such a campaign would have extremely grave repercussions, for there is currently no alternative to the Andreotti coalition. This partly

explains why diplomats think the events of the last few days are none of the State Department's doing. The US government's view is that Signor Andreotti's government represents the lesser of a number of much worse evils as it sees Communists holding key parliamentary posts as preferable to Communists holding Cabinet portfolios. There is no apparent reason why the State Department should be trying to make life hard for

Signor Andreotti.

On Sunday, Mr Ernest Hauser, the former Lockheed executive told Turin's La Stampa that Signor Andreotti was the mysterious "antelope cobbler" who has so far managed to elude investigators looking into the corporation's Italian activities.

Antelope cobbler, according to documents made available by the Church committee, was Lockheed's code for an Italian Prime Minister who had a key part in easing the sale of 14 C130 transports to the Italian Air Force.

Stampa ran the Hauser story without naming names, merely recording that the antelope was, according to Hauser, none of the people — including President Leone himself — on whom suspicion had previously rested.

Today's issue of the political weekly, L'Espresso, runs a

cover picture of Signor Andreotti with the caption "it was him." Inside, it publishes photocopies of three documents, two of them on Lockheed notepaper, recording the payment of a total of \$43,000 to Signor Andreotti in 1968 and 1970 to ensure his "valuable assistance" and that of the Christian Democrat Party.

L'Espresso itself does not rule out that the documents, are, clever forgeries aimed at nipping the compromise between Catholics and Marxists in the bud.

Signor Andreotti denied the allegations at length in an interview published today, although it can hardly be said he confounded his accusers. His defence basically rested on his unimpeachable record and on the fact that he would never be seen dead

in Via Veneto's Excelsior hotel — named by one of the documents as a meeting place between the Prime Minister and a Lockheed executive.

One theory is that it is all a Pentagon-CIA-NATO plot hatched by rightists who oppose the idea of any sort of compromise with Communists. Another is that the manoeuvring is aimed at making it hard for the Communist leadership, rather than Andreotti himself.

The Prime Minister is clever and strong enough to survive the mud-barrage being thrown at him, but it could serve to prise apart the precarious alliance between the Communists, already under pressure from inside their own party, and the Christian Democrats.

Again, it could be argued that the revelations are aimed at slowing down the work of the parliamentary committee

investigating the existing Lockheed dossier here. The group suspended its activities on the eve of the elections just as formal charges were about to be brought against two former Defence Ministers, and just as the then Foreign Minister, Mr Mariano Rumor, was coming under increasing suspicion.

It could all turn out to be true, in which case the conspiracy theory is part of a major whitewash attempt. Things have never been simple in Italian politics, perhaps never less simple than now.

Lockheed approached two Dutch MPs to promote sales of its Orion anti-submarine aircraft to the Dutch navy, according to Lockheed documents submitted to the Dutch Parliament by Prime Minister Mr den Uyl today.

THE WASHINGTON POST

Wednesday, September 8, 1976

Aegean Dispute Seen Disrupting U.S.-Greek Ties

By Mary Anne Weaver
Special to The Washington Post

ATHENS—The long-simmering dispute between Greece and Turkey over the Aegean Sea now runs the risk of worsening already shaky Greek-American relations as negotiations on U.S. bases here enter their final phase.

Ranking diplomatic sources here say that some Greek officials are privately blaming the United States for the lack of resolution to conflicting Greek and Turkish claims on the potentially oil-rich seabed of the Aegean.

Since referring the seven-month dispute to the U.N. Security Council in August, Greece has suffered a number of diplomatic defeats and Turkey and Greece, nominally partners as NATO allies, are still at loggerheads.

"Omission is as deadly as commission," said a source close to Premier Constantine Karamanlis. "Though the Americans finally came around and gave us an assist in the Security Council, they have refused to exert their maximum diplomatic leverage on Turkey to date. On both a long- and a short-term basis, this could prove a catastrophic mistake."

Athens is disgruntled by a compromise resolution in the council, which neither chastized Turkey nor urged it to discontinue exploration in the disputed sea.

"Turkish policy appears more and more to be that of expanding their own territory," a ranking Cabinet official said in an interview. "The Americans have got to make it very clear that this would be catastrophic for NATO."

American sources here feel that the Greek criticism is unwarranted and they say that Washington's influence is limited.

Despite the growing tension, however, the last leg of the protracted Greek-American base negotiations began last week. The Karamanlis government has already agreed in principle to a four-year accord governing the six major U.S. military installations in exchange for \$700 million in aid.

Athens denies that it is using the negotiations on U.S. bases as a bargaining lever with Washington for stepped-up support on the Aegean Sea.

"We hesitate to use cards which would be construed as blackmail," said a government source. "We think it unnecessary to engage in such practices with an ally, as we firmly believe in the logic, legality and morality of our case."

But the Americans, he continued, "must realize that we cannot be brought to our knees by a dilemma: a dilemma of humiliation or war."

An American observer here describes the whole sphere of Greek-Turkish relations as "Kissinger's most glaring foreign policy failure to date."

"It endangers the position of the Karamanlis government. If Karamanlis becomes the victim of the crisis, America will have lost her only hope for a Greece totally Western-oriented, and the strongest foundation for her policy in the eastern Mediterranean," he said.

If Greece is lost to the Western alliance, he continued, the position of Turkey might become greater, but it would no longer be linked to Europe, which he said would make it impotent in the eastern Mediterranean.

"Thus, by hesitating, vacillating neglecting to act, Washington is fanning the flames of anti-Americanism in this country—and this could prove

a powerful, future threat."

Anti-Americanism in Greece has subsided markedly on the surface during the past two years, but there remains a latent feeling of bitterness toward the United States.

Bitter that the continuing dispute with Turkey has damaged the economy, impeded social and economic programs, and drained much of the government's time, Karamanlis is reportedly willing to compromise with Turkey, even at the risk of diminishing his own domestic popularity and prestige.

"But," said one of his ranking aides, "he cannot negotiate and make compromises from a position of weakness. It's got to be from a position of strength."

"If the Americans permit the crisis to deteriorate to the point of hostility, if the Turks become unreasonable in their demands, even Karamanlis will not have the force on prestige to impose a solution."

A ranking Western diplomat however, dismissed such criticism as naive. "The Greeks just expect too much from the Americans." There is a virtual chasm between Athens and Washington on how Turkey should be handled. In essence, the Greek position is that Washington's got to get tough . . . to resort to very forceful measures ranging from military and economic embargoes, to threatening a 6th Fleet intervention in the Aegean to give the Greeks iron-clad guarantees. You might say Greek-American relations have gone through a number of rhythmic changes during the present crisis. At the moment, they could go either way."

Near East

THE WASHINGTON POST

y, Sept. 15, 1976

Qaddafi Builds Welfare State in Libya, Backs Terror Abroad

By Patrick Seale
London Observer

TRIPOLI—With the prodigal hospitality of an oil billionaire, Col. Muammar Qaddafi of Libya, the enfant terrible of Arab politics, recently flew in 2,000 guests to help him celebrate the seventh anniversary of his seizure of power.

The party included French women from a splinter group well to the left of French Socialist leader Francois Mitterand, a priest from Dublin, black militants from South Africa and Rhodesia, phalanxes of unconvivial East Europeans, uniformed Soviet top brass, a special envoy of Fidel Castro, and the massive brooding figure of President-for-life Jean-Bedel Bokassa of the Central African Republic, the only head of state to accept the Libyan invitation.

Gargantuan meals were accompanied by limitless supplies of a delicious nonalcoholic cocktail. The sky was flawless and, after sunset, a cool breeze blew in from the sea. Oleander and jasmine were in bloom.

Could this be the center of world terrorism of which President Gerald Ford spoke the other week? The Soviet Union's new Middle Eastern springboard? The fief of the "madman of Tripoli," as President Anwar Sadat now describes the young Libyan leader?

There were two high points of the festivities: a midnight tea party given by Prime Minister Abdul Salam Jalloud in the gardens of the former royal palace, and Col. Qaddafi's own appearance at the anniversary parade, where he was mobbed by an adoring crowd.

The two men could be brothers. They share an unaffected manner, a plain-speaking candor that has become the hallmark of the Libyan revolution. It is striking how little they are encumbered by protocol, pomp, or even security precautions.

His trouble-making reputation abroad has perhaps blinded outsiders to what Qaddafi has achieved at home. In seven years, and at a cost of \$20 billion, he has created one of the world's most lavish welfare states, scattered schools and universities, across the land and begun to turn

some of Libya's limitless desert into an oasis. Qaddafi has put his countrymen on a seemingly endless escalator toward a bigger, better and richer future, and they love him for it.

Perhaps because Qaddafi lives relatively austere himself and sets the tone, Libyan society seems almost classless. It is also humane; since the bloodless coup in 1969, no one has been executed.

The real puzzle about Libya today is how to equate this good-natured, benevolent regime with the undoubted evidence of its machinations abroad, or with Qaddafi's political messianism. He thinks he is a man of destiny, the trustee of three essential values for the future of the Arab community at large: unity, Islam as the regulatory principle of society, and the military defeat of Zionism. As such he is a political fundamentalist if not a fanatic.

The trouble is that these ideas, to which Arabs often pay lip service, are somewhat unfashionable. Individual state-building has displaced the search for unity of the 1950s and 1960s, secularism in public life has made sweeping gains, and most Arab leaders have come to believe that the Arab-Israeli conflict should be settled by political negotiation.

Some argue that the moral and material support that Qaddafi gives to his cherished causes around the world is no more than proverbial bedouin hospitality run riot. It is said that someone with the right ideological coloring has only to seek his help to be directed to the *jihad* (holy war) fund, a sort of vast petty-cash box under religious control.

Libya's population is little more than 2 million and the country is far from the heartlands of the Middle East, but Qaddafi's ideas, underpinned by an annual oil revenue of around \$8 billion, have made him the main pole of opposition to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's Pax America.

Qaddafi is out to destroy, by every possible means, the American-sponsored peace process, which he believes is a betrayal of Arab and Palestinian interests. Sadat's Egypt, the linchpin of Kissinger's step-by-step di-

plomacy, is thus cast in the role of an agent of Zionism and imperialism.

Qaddafi could indeed undermine America's new-found influence over the area. With each passing day it becomes more obvious that American peace-making has run aground, leaving Sadat dangerously exposed. Moreover, Egypt has not received the vast financial aid she needs and the fires of social unrest burning there could well be fanned by Libyan propaganda and subversion.

The open support for Qaddafi against Sadat expressed in Pravda last week highlights the Soviet Union's recognition of the Libyan leader as a valuable anti-American instrument and sets a public seal on the growing coincidence of Soviet and Libyan interests.

Qaddafi is no puppet of the Soviet Union, and his hostility to communism is as firm as ever, if not so openly expressed. But the Soviet Union has provided him with a first-class modern arsenal of more than 2,000 tanks, Migs, surface-to-air missiles, and even the dreaded SCUD—a ground-to-ground missile with a range of 190 miles.

The Soviet Union may see Libya only as a sort of supply dump, where weapons may be stored for future use, an intermediary to arm the "progressive" side. Soviet arms have found their way via Libya to Lebanon, and they may also be reaching the Polisario in the Western Sahara.

For Qaddafi, however, the mere presence of his vast armory provides clout. The truth is that the achievements that are realistically open to him are not Sadat's overthrow, nor a great blow struck for distant Moslems or frustrated Palestinians, but rather the extension of Libya's influence in the central Mediterranean.

He has Malta in his pocket, and has guaranteed its security after Britain's planned withdrawal in 1979. He is encouraging Sicilian separatists and is meddling in Corsica, Crete and Cyprus. He has patched up his quarrel with Tunis and stayed friends with Algeria. Libya is already a Mediterranean power, if not yet decisively an Arab one.

WASHINGTON POST

3 SEP 1976

Secret Police
Of Iran Call
Image Unfair

By H. D. S. Greenway
Washington Post Foreign Service

TEHRAN, Iran Sept. 2—SAVAK is worried about its image.

SAVAK stands for Sazemani Ettelaat Va Amniyat Keshvar—the information and security organization of Iran. It is the Iranian CIA and FBI rolled into one and as such it enjoys a fearful reputation as an all-pervasive and all-powerful secret police that rules by torture and terror, and crushes all dissent.

The weekly Economist of London has estimated the number of political prisoners languishing in SAVAK jails at 20,000 to 40,000. Other estimates have put the number as high as 100,000.

SAVAK officials grant interviews relatively infrequently. But its deputy director, Parviz Sabeti, is worried about all the bad press his organization has been receiving and, in a recent interview, said it is unfair.

"These torture charges are pure fabrication and not at all true," Sabeti said. SAVAK should get credit from the Western press for fighting communism, he contended, but instead "they are sticking it to us."

"In all Iran there are only 3,200 political prisoners. We don't have enough jails to house 100,000 prisoners," Sabeti said at SAVAK headquarters, on the eastern edge of Tehran.

"Put this in your newspaper," Sabeti said. "Article 131 of the criminal code states that any government official caught torturing anybody will get six years in prison," he said.

Sabeti castigated the FBI for not keeping closer watch on Iranian exile and student groups in Amer-

ica. The CIA, he said, was "no help at all."

SAVAK has been "quite successful" in rounding up terrorists in the past, Sabeti said. He expressed confidence that the persons responsible for the murder of three American civilian technicians in Tehran last Saturday would eventually be caught.

SAVAK believes the group responsible for the killings is the Mujahidden E Khalq which began as curious mixture of Marxism and Moslem conservatism. The number of active terrorists at large in Iran may not exceed 100, Sabeti said.

The Americans were involved in "Project IBEX," a secret electronic intelligence gathering system which the U.S. firm of Rockwell International is installing for the Iranian government.

Sabeti said although there had been anti-state activity in the past, political assassinations by killers trained abroad and supplied with the latest Soviet weapons was a comparatively new phenomenon for Iran.

Before 1970, Iran had not felt it necessary to execute people for anti-state activities, he said. But the new wave of terrorism has "caused us to get a bit rougher," he said, and now terrorists frequently are executed.

THE BALTIMORE SUN
3 September 1976

Indian Parliament votes to probe Gandhi foe, ex-Harvard economist

New Delhi (AP)—The Indian Parliament voted yesterday to investigate one of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's most outspoken critics—Subramanian Swamy, a right-wing opposition leader and a former member of the Harvard University economics faculty.

The vote came amid accusations from Mrs. Gandhi's ruling Congress party and pro-Moscow Communists that the United States Central Intelligence Agency is aiding the 36-year-old Mr. Swamy.

Political sources said the unprecedented investigation could cost Mr. Swamy his seat in the upper house even though he has four years remaining in his term.

According to the government, Mr. Swamy fled to the West in January after evading arrest during the 14 months since the government proclaimed a national emergency and detained many opposition leaders.

He returned briefly to India early this month to sign the attendance roster in Parliament to keep his membership active, but then escaped abroad again, opposition sources said.

Ota Mehta, the minister of home affairs, accused Mr. Swamy of carrying out "anti-Indian propaganda calculated to bring

the Parliament, its members, the government and the nation as a whole into disrepute and contempt."

In a reference to an earlier warrant for Mr. Swamy's arrest, Mr. Mehta said the economist was guilty of "evasion of law and fleeing from justice and legal processes, flouting lawful orders and generally behaving in a manner unworthy of a member of this house."

Mr. Swamy has reportedly traveled in the United States and Canada since leaving India, often addressing meetings and giving press interviews to denounce Mrs. Gandhi's emergency rule.

Mr. Swamy taught economics at Harvard from 1962 to 1969 and was a visiting professor of economics there in 1971 and 1973 before being elected to the Indian upper house in 1974.

With Mr. Swamy's own colleagues in the right-wing Jana Sangh party absent from the chamber because of a continuing boycott by the non-Communist opposition, a leader of the Marxist Communist party was the only person to oppose the government's motion to start the investigation.

"When the democratic system is being broken down by the ruling party, we in the op-

position have every right to say in and out of this house what we want," said Vishwanatha Menon, a Marxist Communist member. "He [Mr. Swamy] must be allowed to say what he wants. We need not spare the ruling party."

Yogendra Sharma of the pro-Moscow Communists denounced Mr. Swamy for having said, according to an interview published in the Toronto Star in February, that the Communists in India might try to assassinate Mrs. Gandhi.

"We Communists will save the prime minister at the cost of our lives," Mr. Sharma said. "It is the fascist elements in the country who want to kill democracy, playing into the hands of the CIA, while putting all the blame on the Communists."

Hareesh Deo Malviya, a member of the Congress party, accused the CIA of helping Mr. Swamy operate abroad.

"I see the invisible hand of the CIA," he said. "It is the policy of the CIA to destabilize governments not in their favor, and their hostility to India is well known."

"I definitely feel Mr. Subramanian Swamy is an agent of the CIA who has infiltrated into this house. We should expell him, the earlier the better."

Tuesday, September 7, 1976

The Washington Star

Burying Indian democracy

One of the storied traits of tyrants is that, no matter how impregnable they might seem to be, they never feel safe. Is this one of the explanations for Indira Gandhi's current bid to bury Indian democracy under further layers of parliamentary and constitutional assent to her one-woman rule?

Otherwise, the Gandhi government's demand for substantial new powers would seem to be unnecessary. Under the "emergency" authority she already claims to have, Mrs. Gandhi over the last 14 months has proven herself completely capable of jailing thousands of opponents, including three dozen legislators, imposing a sweeping censorship that suppresses news even of parliamentary debate and cowing a once proudly independent judiciary. With her major critics locked up, resistance to her dictatorial course has been pathetically weak, and the world's most populous democracy lies dormant. And since Mrs. Gandhi's Congress party enjoys commanding parliamentary control, there is no question about the government getting whatever legislative backing it wants — including support for changing the constitution.

It is by the constitutional amendment route that Mrs. Gandhi seeks new legal embellishment of her boss hood as prime minister. Powers of the judiciary to review legislation and enforce civil liberties would be curtailed. Parliament would be permitted to ban "anti-national activities and associations." And the prime minister, acting through the figurehead president, could simply order further changes in the

constitution without even the need for a parliamentary rubber stamp.

Some members of the parliamentary opposition still at large were scathing in their denunciations of the Gandhi regime's constitutional proposals. "All the pillars of parliamentary democracy are being converted into pliant tools of an all-powerful executive," said H.M. Patel. "The main thrust of the bill is to establish a totalitarian rule of one-party dictatorship," said a Marxist member. Mr. Patel and his supporters walked out in a boycott of the parliamentary proceeding to avoid giving "a semblance of constitutional legitimacy to the move to throttle democracy and impose authoritarian rule."

The parliamentary give-and-take seems to have a democratic ring until you realize that only foreigners like us can read about it, and even our correspondents are hampered. Censorship prevents the Indian people from learning the substance of the criticism voiced against the Gandhi program. The opposition also accuses the government of going back on a promise to permit public debate of the changes.

As for editorial critiques of the constitutional plan by India's once-lively press, we regret to report virtually nothing along that line. The nearest an editorialist came to questioning the proposals was with reference to the plan for executive amendment of the constitution. An editorial in *The Statesman* called this "extraordinary indeed." That may be the most pregnant "indeed" ever written.

THE WASHINGTON POST

Friday, Sept. 17, 1976

Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

Saudies Suspect an Iran-U.S. Plot

In blunt, blistering language, Saudi Arabian officials have accused the United States of building up the shah of Iran for an armed invasion of Arabian oil fields.

The respected Saudi oil minister, Ahmed Zaki Yamani, warned that the shah was "highly unstable mentally." If the U.S. authorities failed to recognize this, added Yamani, they must be losing their "powers of observation."

The Saudis confided their fears last year to James E. Akins, then the U. S. ambassador, who relayed the message to Washington in startling secret letters and memos.

One "memorandum for the file" dated Aug. 28, 1975, describes the explosive conversation with Yamani. The oil minister, according to the secret memo, said "the conclusion the Saudis were reaching was that we had an agreement with Iran to let it take over the entire Arabian littoral of the Persian Gulf."

Yamani believed the United States "had urged the shah to make peace with Iraq," Akins added, "so Iran would have a freer hand in the lower

The Saudi oil minister was convinced that the United States was deliberately bolstering the shah's military power and that "Iran's extraordinary military buildup" was quite clearly aimed at occupying the Arab states across the gulf, the emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and even Saudi Arabia itself."

The Saudis had become persuaded, Akins noted, that "in the next Arab-Israeli war, Israel . . . would be encouraged to occupy Tobuk in northern Saudi Arabia, and Iran would be told to occupy the Arabian littoral."

If such a situation developed, Yamani warned Akins: "Iraq would be involved immediately and so would be the Soviet Union. But if Iran should succeed in occupying part of the Arabian coast, it would find only smoking ruins, and the Western oil consumers would face catastrophe."

Akins responded, according to his secret memo, that "such a plan would be sheer madness." Yamani agreed that Akins "was quite right" but added: "We think you may have gone mad."



NEW YORK TIMES
17 SEP 1976

Challenge to the Shuttle

Kissinger's Tested Style of Negotiating Faces A Very Different Range of Problems in Africa

By JOHN DARNTON
Special to The New York Times

DAR ES SALAAM, Tanzania, Sept. 16—So far, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's mission to bring peace to southern Africa has shown only the delicacy, complexity and immensity of the job involved.

Following his talks with President Julius K. Nyerere yesterday, two dramatically contrasting news conferences were held. In one, President Nyerere, sitting on the back porch of his state house, passionately explained his mixed feelings toward the American initiative and said, in effect, that he was less hopeful than ever.

In the other, Mr. Kissinger, braced behind a lectern at the Kilimanjaro Hotel, suggested that President Nyerere's remarks were the kind of thing that accompanies negotiations and sought to portray himself as nothing more than a conduit for relaying views between black-ruled and white-ruled countries.

But the fact remains that so far the Kissinger trip has drawn a good deal of suspicion and doubt from black Africa, some obviously for appearance sake but much of it real.

Those who traveled with Mr. Kissinger during his Middle East negotiations note that gloom is a perfect curtain-raiser for his style of diplomacy. With it, even a relatively minor advance—in this case, an agreement for a constitutional conference on South-West Africa embracing all sides—takes on the appearance of a miracle and can generate momentum.

Some Call Gloom Justified

But those who have followed events in Africa feel the gloom justified and point out the vast differences between the Middle East and southern Africa in terms of issues, multiplicity of factions and personalities.

Mr. Kissinger has said privately that President Nyerere, whom he greatly respects, is not "another Sadat." The implication is that, unlike the Egyptian President, whom Mr. Kissinger has praised for courage in negotiating with the Israelis despite Arab criticism, there is no African leader willing to run the risk of appearing moderate on the question of "liberation."

"The basic underlying obstacle," the

Secretary said, referring to both whites and blacks, is "the reluctance of anybody to admit that negotiations are possible before they know that negotiations will succeed."

His point, as far as black Africa is concerned, is not quite valid. The African leaders could retort that long before Mr. Kissinger entered the scene, at the Victoria Falls conference last year, they tried negotiating for majority rule with the Rhodesian Prime Minister, Ian D. Smith, using Prime Minister John Vorster of South Africa as an intermediary. The fact that the venture failed—because Mr. Vorster was reluctant to apply sufficient pressure on Mr. Smith, according to the Africans—has left a sense of pessimism and even betrayal.

The reputations of moderates, such as President Kenneth D. Banda of Zambia, suffered in the growing nationalist fervor of Organization of African Community gatherings, and they have changed from doves to hawks.

In the Middle East, Mr. Kissinger worked for a peace settlement after the fighting had stopped. In southern Africa, the fighting is continuing and, indeed, growing.

There is a constituency among the blacks that says the fighting should go on. It stems from the conviction that the military advantage has swung to the blacks and that negotiations undertaken later, when territory is actually won, are bound to be more advantageous. That conviction is running especially strong now that the rainy season, which will shift the tactical advantage to the guerrillas, is about to begin in Rhodesia. To negotiate, some feel, would be seen as a sign of weakness.

There is also an element of pride and a sentiment for winning the war. Of all the African nations that have won independence, only two, Algeria and Guinea-Bissau, can honestly say they have defeated colonial forces on the battlefield. The slogan of the Zimbabwe People's Army, the main fighting force of the Rhodesian blacks, is "We are our own liberators."

Mr. Kissinger has stressed that during his visits in April, every African head of state urged him to meet with Prime

Minister Vorster. But in the interim, the riots and killings have occurred in South Africa, and they have made it difficult for African Presidents to explain how they can countenance conversations with a man their own newspapers decry as a butcher of black children.

Mr. Kissinger is new to Africa, and some would say he has yet to acquire the necessary feel for the politics and special sensibilities. Days before his arrival here, he caused a flap because press reports said that he had been "invited" instead of "welcomed"—a distinction promptly corrected by the image-conscious Tanzanians.

Three Conflicts Involved

The African presidents say they fear that the United States is acting out of self-interest, to contain Soviet influence, rather than out of a sincere commitment to the concept of majority rule. If this is the case, they say, then America will drift into an alliance with South Africa, which claims to be fighting communism, if the negotiations fail.

But there is also a strong moral tone to their position. They say they want someone on their side because it is right, and not because of fear of another superpower. The level of idealism clashes somewhat with Mr. Kissinger's brand of realpolitik.

In the Middle East, the Secretary of State could identify the conflict and the parties involved. In southern Africa, there is not one conflict but three—over Rhodesia, over South-West Africa and potentially over South Africa. In the case of Rhodesia, the nationalist factions are so splintered that it would be impossible to know whom to invite to the conference table.

While the nationalist leaders are totally dependent upon the "front line" African presidents to wage their struggle, the presidents listen to their opinions. And each of the presidents—except Joshua Nkomo, the moderate who engaged in talks with Mr. Smith six months ago—is suspicious about Mr. Kissinger.

Most suspicious of all is Robert Mugabe, the Rhodesian who is emerging as the most popular politician among the guerrillas. Significantly, Mr. Mugabe has voiced reservations about a key provision of the Kissinger plan, financial guarantees for whites in Rhodesia under a black government. "Who will pay blacks for all their years of being exploited by the whites?" he said in an interview here last week.

Soviet Union, Gabon's Bongo Blast U.S. Role in Easing African Tension

From News Dispatches

The Soviet Union yesterday accused U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger of using shuttle negotiations between black and white African leaders to prop up racist governments and protest American investments.

"The ostentatious disinterestedness of the U.S.A. is nothing else but fear of a chain reaction which was started by the collapse of Portuguese colonialism and has now spread to other parts of the conti-

nent," Tass, the Soviet news agency, said.

In Paris, President Omar Bongo of Gabon dismissed Kissinger's weekend talks with South African Prime Minister John Vorster as "nonsense, a waste of time."

"Vorster will not change his policy. He is a racist through and through. Since no kind of dialogue can succeed with South Africa, we will take up arms and do as we did in Angola," Bongo said yesterday when he arrived in the French capital for a short private visit.

Bongo said he will meet French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing before flying to Mexico Saturday for an official visit.

WASHINGTON POST
10 SEP 1976

Southern African Liberationists Express Distrust of Kissinger

By Murrey Marder
Washington Post Staff Writer

Deep distrust of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's African shuttle diplomacy was expressed yesterday by black representatives of the Rhodesian and Namibian (Southwest Africa) liberation movements.

A conference of African specialists, held in the Senate Caucus Room, reverberated with suspicion that the ulterior motive of Kissinger and the Ford administration is to protect white interests and American investments in southern Africa.

Kissinger's attempt to launch new negotiations for peaceful settlement of the guerrilla warfare in Rhodesia and Namibia was assailed as out-of-date, ill-advised, a serious subversion of African aspirations and even a strategy of racism.

Warfare alone, even if protracted warfare, is the only solution now for Rhodesia, liberation spokesmen said.

The criticisms graphically illustrate the obstacles confronting Kissinger's new round of African diplomacy, which the State Department is expected to confirm officially today.

Kissinger is planning a press conference Saturday to explain his new venture, scheduled to be launched Monday and starting in black Africa.

Sen. Dick Clark (D-Iowa), a co-sponsor with Rep. Charles C. Diggs Jr. (D-Mich.) of the African panel discussion yesterday, told the group at a luncheon in the Senate Office Building that "I think the chances are one in 25, or one in 30," that Kissinger's diplomatic mission will succeed.

"But I think it is worth making the effort," Clark said.

However, while concentrating on the racial struggle in Rhodesia and Namibia, Clark said, "I hope we never forget that the most repressive regime in southern Africa is the regime in South Africa."

The Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa, which Clark heads, is conducting intensive hearings on South Africa. In South Africa, Clark said, "total U.S. investment is estimated at greater than \$1.7 billion," representing "40 per cent of the total U.S. investment in Africa."

Several hundred spectators attended the Caucus Room discussion, which was sponsored by the Fund for New Priorities in America and the Women's Division of the United Methodist Church.

To the disappointment of some of the white specialists on Africa, the liberation spokesmen for Rhodesia re-

fused to consider any alternative to expanding guerrilla war.

Callistus Ndlovu, representing the relatively more moderate wing of the Zimbabwe (Rhodesian) African National Council, led by Joshua Nkomo, who tried to negotiate with Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian D. Smith, said:

"We do not see how the talks can be resumed... We therefore believe that any attempt to resume these talks is bound to fail."

Eddison Zvobgo, a representative of the more militant wing of the Rhodesian liberation movement, led by Bishop Abel Muzorewa, said that "every time the U.S. raises the question of negotiations" it is because a liberation struggle is "about to triumph" somewhere in the world.

"The conference stage is over," Zvobgo said. "Negotiations are being carried out where they belong—on the battlefield. We should resist any Kissinger seduction."

One white panelist, Alex Boraine, from Harvard University's Center for International Affairs, a former member of the South African Parliament for the Progressive Reform Party, asked the liberation spokesmen if they saw no course "complementary to the armed struggle." He asked if there is no way to reduce "the length of the struggle" in Rhodesia, and the casualties.

Only "by politicizing our people," and "by rallying as many international forces as possible," replied Elton Razemba, another member of the Bishop Muzorewa faction of the African National Council. "Destruction will be there," he said. "What is war about? Zimbabwe will be a better society" in the end.

Zvobgo, his colleague, interjected: "The only way of shortening the [Rhodesian] war or limiting the number of people killed or injured is to get the war over as quickly as possible. It is a kind of 'quick kill' theory, to put it bluntly."

The Rhodesian liberation spokesmen insisted that what is going on in Rhodesia in the conflict between about 270,000 whites and about 6 million blacks is not a racial war. "We are not just fighting to replace a white government with black faces," Ndlovu said. "We are fighting to bring about fundamental change."

American-British plans to organize an international guarantee fund of up to \$1.5 billion to \$2 billion to compensate Rhodesia's white settlers for their property and other assets, said Ndlovu, represents "guarantees of

privilege" which the blacks will never tolerate.

This idea "is predicated on the notion that it is impossible for blacks and whites to live together peacefully," he said, and Zvobgo charged, "This really is racism."

However, Nigeria's ambassador to the United Nations, Leslie O. Harriman, while criticizing much of Kissinger's strategy, said, "I believe that the option of buying off the whites is realistic."

Harriman said afterward, "We have done it in our own country [Nigeria] for independence." But he also said that, basically, "the military struggle is the only option left" for Rhodesian independence.

Kissinger's diplomacy for Namibia equally "is bound to fail," said O.T. Emvula, deputy chief of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) mission to the United Nations.

He labeled Kissinger's approach to Namibia "a serious subversion" of commitments made by the United Nations for the independence of that territory.

Kissinger, Emvula said, "deliberately complicates" matters by meeting with Prime Minister John Vorster of South Africa, which rules Namibia under a mandate that the United Nations has ruled is illegal.

If there "will be a negotiation," said Emvula, expressing a more moderate position than his Rhodesian colleagues, "only South Africa and SWAPO shall be the parties."

However, SWAPO, he said, will not enter any talks with South Africa until South Africa withdraws its military forces from Namibia and releases all political prisoners.

Panelist Boraine said, "I think Vorster will do a great deal to get Namibia... off his back."

East Asia

Los Angeles Times

Thurs., Sept. 2, 1976

Communist Forces Grow in Thailand

Flabby Government Bureaucracy Fails to Contain Insurgents

BY GEORGE McARTHUR

Times Staff Writer

BANGKOK—For eight years the government of Thailand has entrusted its campaign against Communist insurgents to a semi-clandestine, rank-heavy bureaucracy known as ISOC—the Internal Security Operations Command.

And while ISOC grew progressively flabbier, the insurgency grew from a serious nuisance into a hard jungle army of about 9,000 guerrillas. In the estimate of an American expert, the Communist organization became "a quality product, well-trained, well-armed and largely self-sufficient." It has, the expert said, perhaps 85,000 active workers within the country's political woodwork.

Given the intrigues of the Thai military structure—where some 600 generals and admirals vie for power and its rewards—it would be unfair to blame Communist growth entirely on ISOC's failure.

The government's regular armed forces are made up of more than 200,000 men, plus a paramilitary defense corps of 49,000 and a border police force of 14,000. Their effectiveness is a matter of debate.

Gen. Saiyud Kerdphol, the ISOC commander, warned recently: "My estimate is that we have about three years to put our house in order. If not, the combination of internal and external pressures will make the future of this country very uncertain indeed."

An American military adviser feels the test will come sooner.

He expects that within the next two dry seasons—a span of about 18 months—the insurgency will grow to mobile warfare and battalion-sized attacks against the ill-organized Thai military and government structure.

"They have the troops to do it now," he said. "They could overrun any military or police post in the countryside if they wanted to."

The old-school politicians and generals who run things in Bangkok are debating what to do. There are belated plans to reorganize the army, buy more planes and enlarge "pacification" programs in the countryside.

But sources with first-hand knowledge of the Thai counter guerrilla program say that despite decades of experience, the government frequently lacks the most basic knowledge of Communist activity.

"Intelligence in the past has not been too accurate," admitted Air Marshal Siddhi Savetsila, secretary general of the National Security Council. "We have good hindsight on what has happened, but we know nothing about what is about to happen or what the insurgents are going to do the next day. But the Communists know our movements."

For years of military rule, and during the fragile period of democracy since 1973, the rulers in Bangkok indirectly have supported the domino theory by contending that the Communist Party of Thailand was almost totally dependent on outside help.

Aging Prime Minister Seni Pramoi, ill-suited to control the traditional turbulence of Thai politics, has tried to play it both ways. Until June he contended that foreign aid was making the insurgency more serious than ever. Last month he admitted before the parliament that he had little proof of direct aid from Peking, Hanoi or Moscow for Thailand's Communists.

Then he basked in the "diplomatic victory" when Foreign Minister Pichai Rattakul returned from Hanoi, where the two countries agreed to exchange ambassadors, and reported a pledge from North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong not to interfere in Thailand's domestic affairs. (The Chinese had made a similar pledge earlier).

But Seni knows better. The flow of aid from Hanoi and Peking is a fact of life along the border.

More important is the dismal fact that during the decade of heavy American involvement in Vietnam, while the Thais largely wasted \$1.7 billion in aid, the Communists were building a force needing little outside help.

A diplomatic source cited the government's record recently in the distant southern provinces, which are the least important of three major insurgency areas. In little-noted clashes, insurgents there have captured more than 300 weapons in six months.

The government is planning a \$600 million military budget this year. A Western expert figured abstractly that the insurgents could fight for roughly 130 years on that amount. It takes only 75 cents a day to feed and clothe a Communist soldier and keep him in the field. In time, the insurgents doubtless will need more ammunition and guns, but they need lit-

tle right now.

"This is not the classic domino theory. This is the Communist Party of Thailand at work," a Western diplomat said.

Still, the outside help is available now. There are three fairly well defined supply routes through Laos from Vietnam, organized and manned by North Vietnamese. The Chinese send supplies on an all-weather road extended through Laos to Pak Beng, just across the northern Thai border.

The level of this aid is indicated by the light traffic on the Chinese road. In one recent month, an official admitted, only two Chinese trucks came down with material for the insurgents.

The Thai army has done little to seriously disturb the Communists in their growing "liberated zones."

While the generals make pronouncements and schedule "suppression" drives, the actual strategy has been one of "containment." The Communist bases are largely centered around tribal peoples in jungles and mountains, but there are relatively few government soldiers in a position to bar the insurgents from moving into more populated—and ethnic Thai—districts.

Government offensives are rare. The only major battle of the year came about by accident. It started June 11 when the jet pilot son of a Maj. Gen. Yuthasorn Kaysornsuk crashed his F-5 in the rugged mountains of Petchabun province, about 300 miles north of Bangkok and midway between the insurgent areas in the north and the northeast.

An immediate operation was launched to find the plane. A para-troop unit was put in, got into a heavy battle, and called for reinforcements. For the next two weeks major fighting raged in the district, complete with jet strikes. At least 200 Communist troops, and probably more, were killed.

Although government casualties also were heavy, the few "activist" generals in Bangkok were elated over the battle. A lot of intelligence was picked up and there were signs the insurgent forces were being badly disrupted. In addition, this was a vital area where the shadowy Central Committee of the Communist Party of Thailand had been meeting recently.

In the end, the missing plane was never found and the operation was called off despite the claim of the

commanding general that "we will never stop fighting."

"They never would have started in the first place if a general's son had not been lost," said one disgusted headquarters official in Bangkok.

This attitude gradually has permitted the insurgents to enlarge their areas.

Gen. Pralong Veerapriya only this month stirred a public storm by saying that perhaps 10% of the population was under the sympathetic sway of the Communists. Western experts consider this a high estimate, but everyone admits that the Communists now control large base areas with plenty of manpower for recruitment. They long since have matured from an organization dominated at the top by Chinese or Sino-Thai leaders, with the foot soldiers recruited from tribal "buffalo boys."

Since 1952—when the first batch of 20 trainees was sent to southern China—about 2,500 military and political cadre have been sent to China, North Vietnam and camps in Laos (often supervised by Chinese), according to intelligence sources.

An efficient command structure has been built, now based around 15 "provincial" areas where the local commander corresponds roughly to a regimental or divisional commander, with attached political officers.

Unlike the Vietnamese Communists who had a proclivity toward putting

things in writing (and having them captured), the Thai Communists communicate less and enjoy wide local autonomy. Although they have captured plenty of radios, they seldom use them except to monitor government posts.

It is a force, Western experts say, already capable of considerable expansion and growing at a relatively slow but very steady pace.

The leadership—always mysterious—is the party's Central Committee, which stayed for years in the safety of southern China. Lately, it has been coming back to Thailand, according to some evidence. At any rate, the three major members of the Central Committee also are the three main regional commanders in Thailand.

Two of the regional commanders—Song Nopakun in the north and Udom Sisuwan in the northeast—are old Bolshevik Sino-Thais who attended the Party's congress three decades ago. The third, in the south, is Prasit Thiansiri, an ethnic Thai believed to be much younger. The Central Committee is now believed to number about a dozen men, several of whom are ethnic Thais, and the first among-equals is said to be Charoen Wannam, also an ethnic Thai, who is in his 50s and was trained in Hanoi and possibly China.

Whatever the makeup of the committee, analysts say it is totally Maoist. The Party radio station operating from Kunming in south China never varies from Peking's line, although it steers clear of comment on international Communist squabbles.

The domination of the Thai party's ideology by Maoists may have come as a slight shock to Hanoi in the euphoria that followed the fall of Saigon in April, 1975. Some analysts feel that Hanoi's leaders attempted at that time to enlarge their influence in the party.

"The old party hands in Thailand are not going to let the Vietnamese run their 'revolution' for them," said a European diplomat whose Asian experience dates back many years. "Vietnam gave them a tremendous lift but the CPT has been building toward the same goal for years. They are following good Maoist principles in preparing to encircle the cities from the countryside, and that continues to be their strategy."

Another Western expert feels that the Thai party will alter the strategy somewhat to take advantage of the political weaknesses in Bangkok.

"What they are after here is a collapse from within," he said. "Those guerrillas are not going to come marching into Bangkok like the North Vietnamese marched into Saigon. The way they figure it, they won't have to."

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL,
Tuesday, Sept. 14, 1976

New Significance to a China Trip

By ROBERT L. BARTLEY

PEKING—The doors to the Great Hall of the People stood open, and after 15 minutes waiting in the pleasant autumn sun, the force of the air conditioning struck the face like a cold breeze. It was a fitting sensation as one came into the presence of the remains of Mao Tse-tung, one of the most historic figures of our century.

James Schlesinger, formerly U.S. Secretary of Defense and now in Peking as a guest of the Chinese government, led the party of 12 Americans into the antechamber where they signed official registers, and into the receiving line of nine of the top officials of the People's Republic of China—headed by Premier Hua Kuo-feng, and Politburo standing committee members Wang Hung-wen and Chang Ch'un-ch'iao.

Slowly walking 30 steps beyond the receiving line, the party spread into a respectful line before the glass coffin holding the remains. Motion pictures were taken under shining light, and the party passed alongside the bier, three feet from the late chairman. Mao's face was somehow more square, more gray, and more wrinkled than one would expect from photographs. But eyes closed and expression peaceful, it radiated a sense of serenity and power.

The procession passed behind one row of wreaths as the next group of foreign visitors came through the receiving line, then down the steps past a separate line of blue and green clad Chinese workers, and finally back to its procession of autos. Twenty-five minutes after the party had left its hotel, the solemn and dignified ceremony was over. The former American Defense Secretary had paid his last respects to the

leader and saint of the People's Republic and the Chinese Communist Party.

Mr. Schlesinger, and for that matter the other 11 Americans present, had certainly not come to China with the idea of passing by Mao's bier, but for a spectacular 5,000-mile tour of the nation's most remote and fabled regions. Upon the chairman's death the trip was cancelled. The wreath-laying was something of a symbolic substitute, for clearly the invitation was intended as a great honor for Mr. Schlesinger. Now the rest of the trip has suddenly been reinstated as well, an intriguing commentary on the post-Mao regime and Chinese priorities in foreign policy.

An 'Exceptional Regard'

Obviously the Chinese government has what one of its spokesmen calls "exceptional regard" for Mr. Schlesinger, who since his dismissal as Defense Secretary by President Ford has been at the Johns Hopkins University Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research. During the mourning period, when Peking's museums were officially closed, he and his party were escorted to the Great Wall, the Ming tombs and the fantastic Summer Palace. Members of his party were told that the original invitation for the visit came at the personal direction of Mao, and that the dying chairman knew Mr. Schlesinger was in Peking.

The trip's itinerary was from the first the most spectacular ever accorded a foreign visitor. Mr. Schlesinger and those of his party who have passed the Chinese health exams for a 12,000-foot altitude will visit the Dalai Lama's old capital of Lhasa in Tibet, after spending the balance of the mourning period quietly in China's scenic

jewel of Kueilin. They will also visit the Central Asian region of Sinkiang, another fabled land which also has a sensitive border with the Soviet Union, and the almost as remote Inner Mongolia. Any one of these stops might be the highlight of a normal China tour.

Why should the People's Republic of China pay such attention to a former offi-

Mr. Schlesinger had certainly not come to China with the idea of passing by Mao's bier. Now the rest of his trip has suddenly been reinstated, an intriguing commentary on the post-Mao regime and Chinese priorities in foreign policy.

cial who is now an academic? It is true that China did entertain former President Nixon and former British Prime Minister Edward Heath with high honors after they left office. But when pressed for a reason for the "exceptional regard" for Mr. Schlesinger, an official says, "His views—it is no secret."

In other words, in being solicitous to Mr. Schlesinger, the Chinese are supporting the hard-line policies he advocated as Defense Secretary, and implicitly criticizing the policies of the administration that dismissed him. Calls for the U.S. to be

more stalwart in opposing the Russians have been a standard theme of Chinese diplomacy for some time now. Their propaganda refers to "new Munichs," particularly applied to the Helsinki agreement.

One China-watcher back in the United States viewed the then-impending Schlesinger trip as an attempt to "inject anti-detente, anti-Soviet themes into the American political campaign." The trip had in fact been originally scheduled for June, but Mr. Schlesinger postponed it until after the Republican Convention to minimize the implications for domestic politics. The same China-watcher remarks that since 1974 the Chinese have been trying to build up Mr. Schlesinger at the expense of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and in the last three or four months have started to criticize Secretary Kissinger by name in their press outlets in Hong Kong.

The trip will do little to dampen that particular tendency. Those who listened to the toasts at the going-away party for non-journalists held at the Chinese liaison office in Washington report that Chief of Office Huang Chen stressed that the invitation for Mr. Schlesinger to visit China had been first extended two years ago, while he was still Defense Secretary. Mr. Schlesinger is reported to have replied that he never received the invitation, apparently because there were "filters within the U.S. government."

The Chinese Dilemma

WASHINGTON POST
8 SEP 1973

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

The Korean Incident: An Orchestrated

Contrary to hints from the State Department that Moscow and Peking secretly helped avert a new Korean war, non-political government experts believe the recent crisis was a ploy orchestrated by North Korea with limited political goals in mind.

There is no hard intelligence of any intervention by either the Soviet Union or Communist China that prompted the North Korean expressions of regrets for the murder of two U.S. army officers. Rather, there is a strong feeling among Pyongyang-watchers here that North Korean dictator Kim Il Sung never wanted the provocation of Aug. 18 to escalate into warfare but intended it for political effects, both in Korea and the U.S.

Thus, instead of triumphantly demonstrating the value of detente, the events in Korea were part of continued Communist pressure on one of the world's most dangerous flashpoints. The reaction on Capitol Hill, combined with the overall political climate here, should encourage North Korea to keep up that pressure.

The most obvious goal of the Aug. 18 incident was to draw attention to Korea at the recently completed non-aligned nations conference in Colombo, Sri Lanka, and the forthcoming United Nations General Assembly session. For the longer range, however, Kim's targets were political opinion, at home and among his enemies.

Troubled by grave economic problems in North Korea, Kim is believed by experts to have fomented a crisis to firm up national morale.

At age 64, the Korean despot is in questionable health, troubled by a vis-

The Chinese expectations of an anti-Soviet posture from Mr. Schlesinger were not disappointed, for he expressed the theme in such events as the public toast at a banquet with Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua, with whom he held five hours of private conversations prior to Mao's death. But at other points, the exchanges caught the dilemma of Chinese relations with the U.S.

In particular, there was an exchange with Chen Shien-ta, political commissioner of the Chinese army's Third Garrison Division, visited by the group. Mr. Chen gave a long history of the division that included the elimination of 10,000 "enemy troops" while fighting "American imperialism" in Korea. Mr. Schlesinger replied that the reference to Korea "strained the historical record and the rules of hospitality."

Other American representatives visiting Chinese military units have suffered similar and even harsher lectures about Korea without responding. The problem for the Chinese is that an American who takes a tough line with the Russians is not likely to take a soft line with China's own claims. In choosing which Americans to encourage, the People's Republic has to sort out its priorities. And one thing the Schlesinger visit suggests is that it has sorted them out pretty well.

By now the visit, and particularly its reinstatement after Mao's death, may have taken on a new significance. Even before

the chairman's death, the nation was buffeted by the passing of Premier Chou En-lai. It has also suffered major earthquakes in three regions, and a huge meteor fell in a fourth—regarded in Chinese superstition as marking the loss of "the mandate of heaven" and the passing of a dynasty. There have been indications, including a heavy emphasis on law and order in the Chinese press, of a decline in social discipline.

In these circumstances, the elaborate trip for Mr. Schlesinger can be seen as a sign of continuity. It suggests business as usual. The decision to reinstate Mr. Schlesinger's trip, at a time when foreign dignitaries are explicitly not invited to China, would seem rather nicely to demonstrate that someone in the hierarchy of the People's Republic has the power and will to make decisions that are, if not exactly bold, at least unconventional.

And of course, if the trip's reinstatement suggests there will be a continuity of the regime after Mao, it also suggests continuity in its implicit foreign policy priorities. So it is perhaps well to remember that Mr. Schlesinger was invited to China to make the point that what Peking wants most from the U.S. is a military balance against the Soviet Union.

Mr. Bartley is editor of the Journal's editorial page.

Ploy?

Korea confess that it has no sanction for this type of indefensible conduct?" While the Frasers and Drinans propose ending all aid as a sanction, Jimmy Carter talks of a staged withdrawal of all U.S. ground forces from Korea (though lately he has promised to first consult Japan).

Enjoying this favorable political climate, Pyongyang-watchers believe Kim never had any intention of escalating the murder of the Americans into a war for the entire peninsula. Besides, his notions of attempting a lightning seizure of Seoul last year following the fall of Saigon were vetoed by both Communist superpowers.

Nevertheless, some close students of the Korean scene deduce that Kim, author of so much bloody mischief in East Asia for a generation, would never issue his first apology for anything without pressure from the Russians or Chinese. That deduction, however, is not backed up by facts. Officials at the highest level say there is simply no intelligence of any such intervention.

In his declining years, Kim Il Sung may have moved from sheer brute force to a mixture of brute force and political maneuver. Experts here believe his immediate goals will be to encourage sentiment inside the U.S. advocating a Korean pullout while seeking bilateral U.S.-North Korean negotiations, leaving out the South Koreans. That may prove more difficult for U.S. politicians to resist than a naked military threat.

Latin America

THE ECONOMIST AUGUST 28, 1976

Latin America's soldiers

Left, right, right, right...

Bad days for Latin American radicals. Every 10 to 20 years the continent's left wing attempts to find a new way of bridging the extremities of wealth and poverty that bedevil most Latin American countries. In the 1940s and 1950s democratically elected demagogues had their day in several of the larger states; most of them disappeared under the treads of right-wing tanks. In the 1960s insurrectionary guerrilla armies attempted to imitate Mr Fidel Castro's victory in Cuba; but efforts to export Cuba's revolution came to nothing and the guerrillas, or many of them, were hunted down by the military governments they had helped to provoke into seizing power. Next came left-wing military governments, but these too are sputtering out. The left is fading—and so, too, is democracy.

In Peru, General Velasco Alvarado, who followed the radical-soldier tradition of Ataturk and Nasser, was dropped last year, and his left-wing prime minister, General Jorge Fernandez Maldonado, was sacked last month. The more timidly reformist president of Ecuador, General Rodriguez Lara, lost his job in January. The only avowed soldier-radicals still around are the flamboyant ruler of Panama, General Omar Torrijos, and a clique of quarrelling colonels in Honduras led by Colonel Melgar Castro.

Never upset a landowner

But General Torrijos's left-wing bark has always been fiercer than his bite. Panama's liberal banking laws, for example, have made it a haven for foreign capital. And land reform, touted by the general as his main achievement, has been moving along on a tiny annual budget of £1m. The Honduran government took office last year in the wake of charges that the previous president had been bribed by an American banana company. It is already cutting back on its land reform programme for fear of upsetting the nearly independent power of the country's big landowners. The left-wing head of the country's agrarian reform institute was fired in October, and the army seems to have lost control of large areas where scores of people

have been killed in clashes between peasants and landowners.

Neither in Peru nor in Ecuador was the reform experiment a complete failure. About 20m acres of land in Peru were expropriated, and a start was made towards a crude distribution of wealth through profit-sharing schemes. The Peruvians also nationalised their fisheries, banks, mining and oil industries, although some of these are now being given back to private industry. They were careful not to frighten away foreign investment, which stayed at a high level until the economy began to get into trouble last year.

But the expectations aroused by the reforms in Peru were largely disappointed. Government overspending pushed inflation up to an annual rate of 40%, provoking riots and strikes. The agencies supervising the reform programmes were all too often corrupt and inefficient. And only about a third of Peru's people were actually affected by the changes. Three quarters of the government's budget this year continues to flow into metropolitan Lima, which contains only a fifth of the country's population. More than 1m peasants—most of them the mountain Indians whose plight had fired General Velasco's revolutionary ardour when he did a tour of duty away from Lima as a young man—remain landless.

Ecuador's more timid reforms hardly got off the ground. They were largely financed by the country's oil revenues, which are not very big. Nearly half the country's population is still unemployed or underemployed; half the land is still owned by 2% of the people.

Peru's and Ecuador's new rulers seem to have accepted the blunt fact that it is hard to have a social revolution without making money first. They are also beginning to talk about handing power back to the civilians. Ecuador's leader, Admiral Poveda, has promised to hold elections by 1977. President Morales Bermudez of Peru has taken civilians into his cabinet, and was starting to ease restrictions on the press until he was checked by a bout of rioting in July. In Honduras, the government says it will hand over power by 1979.

The South American map would

be enlivened by some patches of democratic colour. Buried in the political graveyard are long-established Latin American democracies such as Chile and Uruguay, as well as the countries that have ricocheted between democratic and authoritarian rule, such as Argentina and Bolivia. The drive by left-wing guerrillas helped to impel South America's lurch towards right-wing army rulers. Few democratic governments could enforce the authoritarianism needed to stamp out guerrillas.

Economic instability, however, was the prime cause of Latin America's drift to dictatorship. Radical governments followed each other to the scaffold, as programmes multiplying workers' wages, nationalising industries and expanding public spending generated massive rates of inflation. Brazil started the ball rolling after the short and disastrous presidency of Joao Goulart in the early 1960s. His efforts sent inflation up to 100% and brought in the generals in 1964. In Bolivia the radical military government of General Torres sank into economic chaos and was overthrown by the right-wing General Banzer in 1971. In Uruguay, government corruption and overspending brought in the army in 1973. Salvador Allende's Marxist government in Chile hit the inflation jackpot. When the rate reached about 1000% in 1973, General Pinochet launched his military coup. Chile's inflation records were reached, and possibly beaten, this year in Argentina when the soldiers stepped in to save the country from near-anarchy.

In the past, a lurch towards authoritarian government in South America



was followed by a swing back to democracy as soldiers found that they were no better able to cope with social and economic problems than the civilians were. Not this time. In Brazil and Chile, both countries where the army had previously intervened only to restore order and then bowed out, the generals have stayed put.

Professionals have their use

Western-style democracy is out of fashion. Instead the military rulers, of Brazil in particular, have been taking their cue from Mexico, Latin America's most successful one-party state. The Mexican Institutional Revolutionary party has used professionals to run its economy—the most recent of whom, the finance minister, Mr Lopez Portillo, takes over as president in December.

The soldiers running Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Bolivia and Uruguay handed the job of economic management to civilians, all of whom were largely foreign-educated and all of whom pursue broadly similar policies. Most of Brazil's successive economic managers spent long periods in the United States. José Martinez de Hoz, Argentina's finance minister, went to Eton and Harvard. Bolivia's finance minister, Carlos Calvo, was educated in Britain. Uruguay's finance minister, Vegh Villega, went to Harvard.

The old school tie has not done badly. It helps, naturally, to have soldiers in the background to shoot anyone who strikes against wages policies or price rises. The most recent example of tough confrontation was in Bolivia where the regime spent the past two months cracking the demands of strikers sitting it out in the tin mines. At least four miners and several soldiers were killed and the government cut off electricity and water supplies to some of the men underground.

But the economists have not lived by the gun alone. The Brazilians pioneered an imaginative mix of economic policies, including the encouragement of large-scale foreign investment, indexation of prices, wages and savings in line with inflation, big state investments, and a crawling-peg exchange rate. Bolivia's orthodox monetarist policies—and its self-sufficiency in oil—have brought inflation down to about 15% this year. Monetarist policies have taken longer to work in Chile, but inflation has fallen fast over the past six months. Uruguay's inflation rate has fallen slowly to about 50% a year.

The most dramatic turnabout was in Argentina. In June, three months after the military coup, monthly inflation had dropped from 38% to 2.8%.


Wages have been firmly clamped down. At the same time the government has mobilised Argentina's enormous agricultural resources by raising food prices from the unrealistic levels at which they were pegged under the Peronist governments: a 40% increase in the prices paid to producers for grain led to an extra 5m acres of wheat being planted in July.

This kind of economic management marks the newer military governments out from the older, more static and impoverished dictatorships. General Stroessner has ruled Paraguay as a personal fiefdom for 22 almost growth-free years; the Somoza dynasty has run Nicaragua, on and off, for 40 years. In other respects the soldiers, old or new, use many of the same methods. The map, a necessarily sketchy guess at political prisoners, gives one very rough idea of the levels of repression exercised by the different military governments. And political prisoners are only part of the picture of disappearances, torture and killings in many Latin American countries.

Nothing succeeds like success

Many of the economic ministers and officials claim that economic viability will pave the way for a return of the soldiers to the barracks. On the contrary. Their very success seems to strengthen the army's resolve to stay on in office. Even the most moderate of Argentina's present soldier-rulers say that the army will have to stay in office indefinitely. The half-hearted promises of Brazil's successive presidents over the past 14 years to restore democracy have never been kept. In Chile, General Pinochet's sole concession to the scattered forces of the democracy that was once the pride of Latin America has been to consider allowing local elections. The army's grip on Uruguay seems, after the dismissal of its civilian front man in June, to be tightening. Bolivia's military government has set a paper deadline for a return to civilian rule by 1980. Nobody believes it.

Nor is there much evidence that the generals and the economists working for them are trying to resolve the social problems that lie at the heart of Latin American political instability. Under President Geisel, Brazil has increased its social budget, but up to 40% of Brazilians remain outside the moneyed economy. Economic recovery in Uruguay, Bolivia and Chile has been largely achieved by depressing real wages and balancing budgets; low rates of taxation leave little room for social spending. Mr Carlos Calvo says that



now that Bolivia's economic house is in order, "we will place a high priority on social spending". But *manana* seldom comes.

Political soldiers tend after a period in government to become politicians. In Brazil the political arguments that stopped when the generals came in have simply surfaced again in the army. So too have other civilian habits, including corruption. Argentina's moderate president, General Videla, is fighting for control against his more extreme colleagues who encourage a policy of indiscriminate repression. Neither military discipline nor economic recovery is helped by the fact that several Argentine industries are owned by the armed forces. Divisions within the Chilean junta led to the dismissal in January of the relatively moderate chief of staff, General Lopez Arellano. Bolivia has been plagued by the attempted palace coups of left-wing army factions.

Most Latin American countries would be better off if their armies could be put back behind a glass window, only to be broken in case of fire. Too often democratic experiments have been stunted because they grew in the shadow of armies who acted as alternative governments instead of the final guarantors of order and democracy. The three exceptions that disprove the rule that Latin Americans are inherently incapable of democracy are Venezuela, Colombia and Costa Rica. And perhaps it is tiny Costa Rica that has the safest formula for a centre course to democratic survival. It disbanded its army in 1948.

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

Thursday, September 9, 1976

Church-state ties fray in much of Latin America

By James Nelson Goodsell
Latin America correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

The Roman Catholic Church is increasingly at odds with a number of governments in Latin America. The signs are many:

turning from a church conference in Ecuador last month, were hostilely greeted by crowds at Santiago's Pudahuel Airport, that country's Catholic hierarchy accused the government of authoring the violent demonstration. It also excommunicated four government officials.

• Earlier in August at the session in the Ecuadorian city of Riobamba, 37 churchmen from around Latin America were arrested, detained overnight, and then expelled from the country for taking part in what the government termed "a subversive plot." Ecuador's church hierarchy promptly accused the government of illegally interfering in church activities.

• Argentina in recent months has been arresting churchmen and young seminarians, including one United States priest, on charges of subversion and of possessing Marxist-Leninist literature. The U.S. clergyman was released, but the fate of 11 others is unknown and the Argentine hierarchy has issued a series of protests.

• Meanwhile, Brazil's Dom Helder Câmara, a longtime opponent of the Brazilian Government and bishop of Recife and Olinda, issued a new criticism of governments in Latin America, saying they "no longer serve the people."

Behind these and other developments is a sharp ideological dispute that has led to the most serious deterioration in church-state relations in years.

Not since Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro tangled with that country's Roman Catholic hierarchy has there been such a church-state clash.

In that struggle, which eventually resulted in a standoff, the church took a basically conservative approach, Dr. Castro a much more liberal or radical one.

Los Angeles Times

Thurs., Sept. 2, 1976.

Terrorist Aim in Argentina: Recruit Teens

Middle-Class Youths Prime Candidates for Guerrilla Subversion

BY DAVID F. BELNAP
Times Staff Writer

BUENOS AIRES—One of the most striking aspects of the war against subversion in Argentina is the kind of people in the terrorist ranks.

It has become clear that the shock troops of subversion are not the hardened guerrillas of the Latin American stereotype, but young people of the middle class. They are youths in their 20s recruited by terrorist organizations while in their teens.

They come from some of the most respected families. Among recent examples:

—The son of a former army commander in chief who was killed while fighting with a band of rural guerrillas.

The current church-state cleavage in at least six nations reverses the positions of churchmen and governments. It is not lost on observers also that the governments in question are all rightist military regimes.

The Catholic Church in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Uruguay is on the liberal side, the state on the conservative, even reactionary side — although the dispute is not being stated in such terms.

Part of the confrontation involves a new militancy on the part of the churchmen who believe they have the right, even the duty, to speak out on national issues, particularly those relating to human rights and political liberties.

This certainly is the case in Chile where the Roman Catholic hierarchy is increasingly opposed to the hard-line, conservative tactics of Gen. Augusto Pinochet Ugarte's military dominated government.

Chile's influential Raúl Cardinal Silva Henríquez, the Archbishop of Santiago and Chile's leading churchman, has frequently tangled with General Pinochet. While he has tried to keep the dispute out of public view, their disagreements are becoming common knowledge.

Excommunication of four Chileans, one of them a government official, for the airport harassment of three returning bishops was a clear sign of Cardinal Silva Henríquez's attitude. A statement, accompanying the excommunication order and issued with the Cardinal's approval, warned against the danger of abuses under the military regime and of "omnipotent police state" governments across Latin America.

That also seems the preoccupation of Dom Helder, the Brazilian bishop who has long chafed under the restraints placed on him by

fellow churchmen who did not want to rock the boat of church-state relations in Brazil. But more and more bishops and archbishops in Brazil are protesting repressive measures by their country's military-dominated government.

This repression, often aimed at leftists, has meant large-scale abridgements of civil rights in the countries with military governments.

Churchmen, meeting in Ecuador at the pastoral conference in Riobamba, were in fact discussing this issue — hence, the Ecuadorian Government charge that the conferees were engaged in subversive activities.

An Ecuadorian Government source, explaining the arrests and deportations of the foreign bishops, said that "the clergy must abide by the laws of the nation and to question government actions is a crime."

This goes along with an Interior Ministry statement in Argentina, following the arrests in Ecuador: "When priests have been detained, it has been for fully justified reasons."

But churchmen, while not disagreeing with the philosophy that they are subject to arrest, argue that repressive military governments do not have legitimate cause for many of their activities.

This increasing social and political orientation of the Roman Catholic clergymen is what arouses the ire of governments, particularly military regimes, and the outlook for the future is for increasing tension in church-state relations.

The reason is obvious. As archbishop Vicente Faustino Zazpe, of Santa Fé in Argentina said recently: "we [churchmen] have no intention of letting up on our social involvement.

—The nephew of a closely guarded, high-ranking navy officer who furnished access to his uncle for young terrorist friends. They kidnaped the officer and later killed him.

—The son of a wealthy provincial governor, doing his compulsory military service at an air force staff headquarters, who led a terrorist band that ambushed and severely wounded the air force chief of personnel and his chauffeur.

There has been a great deal of parental anguish, and teen-agers have become the subject of a spate of magazine articles, newspaper series, television documentaries and public seminars.

All seek to learn what drives young people to get involved with an extremist organization of the far Left. Neither terrorism nor its appeal to privileged youth is an exclusively Argentine phenomenon. But there are few places where the movement

has been marked by such violence.

Two groups have been operating in Argentina since 1970, the People's Revolutionary Army (called the ERP after its initials in Spanish) and the Montoneros, named for the bands of "patriotic irregulars" that roamed Argentina's pampa in the mid-19th century.

The ERP is Marxist-Leninist, formally allied with the United Secretariat of the Fourth International in Paris. The Montoneros are Peronist renegades with Marxist inclinations. The ERP, smaller, better organized and originally more effective than the Montoneros, suffered a crippling setback recently with the death of its top leaders, killed in confrontations with the authorities.

In fewer than eight months this year, the death toll of political violence has topped 850.

In the search for motives, investigators have traced the steps involved in recruiting middle-class teen-agers.

The process generally follows a pattern like this:

—Recruiters, including some teachers and student activists at high schools and universities, attempt to set potential recruits against their parents, their society and the system through ideological argument.

—Recruiters then try to separate the potential recruits from their background, to get them somehow away from home. This is not easy in Argentina, where traditionally sons and daughters live at home until marriage, even well into adulthood. But it can be done. Guerrilla bands are well supplied with loot from kidnappings and robberies and can provide housing and expense money for recruits.

—Recruits are started along the road to commitment through assignments to perform such tasks as handing out leaflets on street corners and in other public places. This is followed by hanging posters and painting slogans.

—Promising recruits are then involved in some illegal acts—shoplifting, for example, graduating to burglary.

—Assignment to an armed assault group is the final step. Once a recruit has taken part in a shooting incident, he or she is considered to have passed the point of no return.

Coercion can be a factor, too. A 16-year-old high school boy told a reporter:

"My dad switched me to a private school last year because there was Montonero indoctrination and training going on (after classes at the public school). If you didn't stay for indoctrination, you got beat up."

Why the recruiters are able to subvert youngsters is another matter. The magazine *Gente* recently sponsored a seminar on the subject, with a broad cross section of middle-class parents taking part.

The number of theories put forth was almost equal to the number of participants, but blame was placed generally on two factors: some aspect of home life and too much leisure time and money for teen-agers.

There was no agreement on just what might be wrong in the home: Some thought youngsters should be more tightly controlled; others thought controls should be loosened; some thought parents did not make enough effort to understand their children; others thought parents were trying too hard to be their children's "friends."

Moreover, it became clear that while everyone was deeply concerned and groping for answers, no single answer was likely to satisfy everyone. Some typical responses:

Maria Antonieta Ingster, manager of a motion picture distribution firm—"I think the phenomenon is caused by

'It's essential that parents know what their children are doing.'

middle-class teen-agers having absolutely everything they want, causing them to be bored and wanting to draw attention to themselves."

Enrique Wilkinson, a retired air force captain and father of four teen-agers—"I attribute the problem exclusively to the moral formation within the home, complemented to some degree within the schools. The economic factor

contributes, but it's not the most important."

Beatrice Lacoste de Vercesi, a social worker—"It's essential that parents know what their children are doing, that they speak with them and above all listen to them. Speaking to them is easy; but listening to them often is much harder."

Fernando Sabsay, an attorney and professor of law—"I believe the fundamental psychological failure in the home is pretending to be excessively 'a friend' to the children. Some fathers even accompany their sons on amorous adventures, and some psychologists say this is beneficial. I believe it creates a great vacuum for the son, for whom no one is occupying the place of father."

A 19-year-old woman told an interviewer that she agrees with the point of view expressed by Sabsay.

"My father would like to be my friend," she said, "but, being my father, he can't be a friend. He must be my father."

Regardless of how young Argentines are recruited into the guerrilla gangs, and regardless of the reasons, there is no question about what they do once committed. The case of Ricardo Omar Sapag could be typical.

Six years ago Felipe Sapag, the wealthy governor of Neuquen province in the Andean lakes region, told a magazine interviewer that one of his sons, Ricardo, then 17, "is the family hippie who smiles only when he comes to me for money."

Five years later Ricardo was serving as a conscript in a secretarial office at air force headquarters in Buenos Aires having elected to do his year of compulsory service after college.

Dec. 10, 1975, Maj. Gen. Aly L. I. Corbat, chief of air force personnel, and his 14-year-old son entered the general's car in front of their suburban home. The son was going to school, the general to his office.

Before the car could get under way it was attacked by terrorists, approaching in a station wagon and firing sub-machine guns.

The chauffeur jumped from the general's car to try to defend his charges and was struck by the station wagon, suffering a shattered leg as well as multiple bullet wounds. Corbat was seriously wounded. The general's son was not injured although, according to an air force communique, "the attackers threw a grenade against the general's car in an effort to eliminate his son."

The communique identified Ricardo Omar Sapag as "the finger man and leader of the assault." He remains at large.

Gov. Sapag offered his resignation, which the provincial legislature refused to accept.

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TURMOIL IN JAMAICA In the past six months a wave of violence has struck Jamaica, the vacation land in the Caribbean for thousands of Americans. At least 100 people, including 17 policemen, have been murdered. And in one ghastly incident, a gang of youths set fire to a tenement block in Kingston. As the tenants fled, they were gunned down. When the firemen and police arrived, they, too, were fired upon. At least 11 people were killed, while the police killed one member

of the gang, a 13-year-old boy.

What's going on in Jamaica? Michael Manley, who has been running the government for the past four years, is leader of the Peoples National Party. He is a democratic socialist. His opponents, who represent the Jamaican Labour Party, want him out. So, too, does the commercial element in Jamaica, which has always had strong ties to American business and financial interests. Manley supports Castro of Cuba, which makes him suspect in the eyes of our CIA.

It is highly doubtful

that the U.S. is going to permit another socialist regime to be established in our Caribbean sphere of influence.

In Jamaica the word is widespread that the CIA is supplying money for the purchase of armaments that go to Manley's political opponents. Manley's policy is based on redistribution of land and wealth, government control of the economy, and a restricted role for private enterprise. Castro started out with the same political tenets.