Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C01234630 7618394 E1 DEPARTMENT OF STATE ACTION MEMORANDUM 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND PARTIAL RELEASE NR B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D) CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - CIA August 30, 1976 NODIS REVIEW ENS NOD 18 Cat. A -Caption removad: Industanted to O/FADRC Tor The Secretary Cat. B - Transforred to O/FADRO with additional access Through: M ~ Mr. Eagleby controlled by 9/9 Cnt. C - Caption and custody retained by 5/S ARA - Harry W. Shlaudeman From: Renewed by: Elijan Kelly Jr. Oate: 4-10-Operation Condor You raised a number of questions about Siracusa's reactions (Tab 2) to the instructions to him on Condor (Tab 3). My comments on his cable follow. 3.3(b)(1 The CIA does not believe Siracusa's representations would unduly endanger him in light of widespread talk about Condor and the assassination aspect among officers of the security services of the southern cone./ If we take this tack, the question is: should 3.3(b)(1 Siracusa also make representations? I believe he should. Our approach as originally conceived is couched in terms of a continuing exchange of information on the ground in Montevideo. A proposal of that kind from Siracusa would offer the most constructive and effective method of handling the problem. Dealing only with the Ambassador here would foreclose establishing that kind of relationship. We agree with Siracusa that, it he does it Montevideo, he should talk both to the military and to Blanco. Cat. A. Castion samered; Intrinsient is O/FAORC Cat. B - Thesiarrad to O/ADito Visitional another with SECRET ouniralication and Cention of $X \oplus S = 2$ retained Dovlewed by

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A parallel approach here, as Sindusa suggests, is acceptable to me and would help to preserve his position with the government there. But it is not my sense that this demarche is being made for domestic U.S. political considerations. What we are trying to head off is a series of international murders that could do serious damage to the international status and reputation of the countries involved.

We agree with Siracusa that he should add that the Ondor targets have their own lists of Uruguayan Government officials targeted for assassination. It is precisely for that reason we propose to engage the Government of Uruguay in an exchange of views on the security situation so that we can demonstrate our appreciation of the problems they face.

Options:

3.3(b)(1)

We have three options in the Uruguayan case. We could do it:

-- by Siracusa to General Vadora and to Blanco, supported by a demarche to the Ambassador here

-- by me to the Ambassador here only. 3.3(b)(1)

Recommendation:

That you authorize the attached telegram to Siracusa instructing him to talk to both Blanco and Vadora, informing him of a parallel approach by me here and referring to a communication he will receive on additional protection

(Tab 1) Phil Habib has concurred in the attached suggested telegram.

ALTERNATIVELY, that we ask Siracusa to have the message if in his

judgment that can be done.

3.3(b)(1)

Approve

3.3(b)(1)

Disapprove____

SECRET

