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17 AUG 1976

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Raymond A. Warren
Chief, Latin America Division

VIA : Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Potential Political and Security
Ramifications of "Operation Condor"

Bowie
T-13-W-5.2
27 July

1. "Operation Condor" has been the subject of previous correspondence to you and other senior officials of the Agency; it has also generated considerable correspondence [redacted] in recent months and has prompted discussions with senior officials of the Department of State as to what action the U.S.G. could take in an attempt to assure that human rights were not violated by the countries involved in "Condor". The most significant of the foregoing documents are attached for your review. In addition, the following is a precis of "Condor" and an assessment [redacted] of the possible adverse political ramifications for the Agency should "Condor" engage in assassinations and other flagrant violations of human rights. [redacted]

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2. Initial reports on "Condor", the code name given to the program of cooperation among the intelligence services of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay, beginning in April 1976, indicated that the thrust of the program was to be intelligence exchange and that the target of this effort was to be the Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR). The JCR is an international revolutionary coordinating body which was formed by the Argentine Peoples Revolutionary Army (ERP) and which includes, in addition to Argentina, terrorist organizations in Chile, Uruguay, Bolivia and Paraguay.

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The JCR has received financial, logistical and training support from Cuba; in addition, it has been the recipients of millions of dollars obtained by the ERP through the ransom of executives of U.S. firms in Argentina. The JCR operates principally in the southern part of South America, but it is known to have strong representation in Europe and is suspected of having been involved in the assassinations in Paris of General Joaquin Z e n t e n o Anaya, Bolivian Ambassador to France, on 11 May 1976 and Colonel Ramon A. T r a b a l, Military Attache of the Uruguay Embassy in Paris on 19 December 1974. Zenteno was the military region commander in the area where Ernesto "Che" G u e v a r a was captured and killed in 1967. Trabal had previously been active in the successful efforts by the Uruguayan security forces to suppress the Tupamaros, a member organization of the JCR, in Uruguay.

3. [redacted] 3.3(b)(1)

[redacted] indicating that the efforts by the security services of the southern cone countries to undertake a regional approach to meet a regional terrorist threat, i.e., "Condor", would go well beyond the exchange of information -- to include plans to assassinate selected JCR leaders in [redacted]

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[redacted]

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4. In an attempt to preempt potential political ramifications for the Agency, should the "Condor" countries proceed with the European aspect of their plans, we have taken the following action. As soon as we learned of the possible

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[redacted]

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[redacted] In addition, discussions were held with senior officials

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of the Department of State relating to the steps which could be taken to dissuade the South America countries from their planned course of action. Accordingly, agreement has been reached on the text of an EXDIS message from the Department of State to the U.S. Ambassadors in Buenos Aires, Santiago and Montevideo instructing them to approach the highest levels of their host governments and express the serious concern of the U.S. Government to the alleged assassination plans envisioned within "Operation Condor." The host governments would be informed, however, that the U.S. takes no issue with "Condor" plans to collect and coordinate information to counter regional terrorism in the southern cone area.

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[Redacted]

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5. The State Department approach described above could well have some adverse impact on the security of the

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] In any case, it is our judgement that the potential repercussions must be accepted in order to counteract the negative aspects of "Condor."

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signed
Raymond A. Warren

Raymond A. Warren

Attachments, a/s

CONCUR:

William W. Wells

17 AUG 1976

Deputy Director for Operations

Date

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13 August 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Meeting at Department of State to
Discuss "Operation CONDOR"

PARTICIPANTS: Hewson A. Ryan, Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Inter-American Affairs
James Gardner, Office of Deputy Director
for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence
and Research
Robert Zimmerman, ARA/LA/BR

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[redacted] Deputy Chief, Latin
America Division

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1. At State Department request, DC/LAD and [redacted] met with Ryan, Zimmerman, and Gardner at the Department from 1000 to 1030 hours on 11 August to discuss "Operation CONDOR." Ryan opened the meeting by stating that the implications of "CONDOR" in the human rights field had reached the point where by some action was required by the U.S. Government. DC/LAD said that the Agency wished to be as helpful to the Department as possible in that regard;

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[redacted] Mr. Ryan said he understood our problem and believed our interests had been protected in their proposed representations to certain of the "CONDOR" countries regarding the assassination problem. Mr. Ryan then read the draft of a proposed EXDIS telegram to Buenos Aires, Montevideo, and Santiago. In essence, the telegram briefly outlined "CONDOR" objectives. It took no issue with "CONDOR" plans for collecting and coordinating information on terrorists and terrorist plans and activities in the Southern Cone countries. It did express the most serious concern regarding "CONDOR's" alleged assassination plans. It requested that this concern be taken up at the highest levels of the host governments, stressing that any assassinations would violate the norms of civilization and would, if they became known, generate profound adverse reactions around the world to the countries concerned.

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2. While DC/LAD approved the general thrust of the draft, certain changes were suggested and adopted. Among these were:

a. There should be separate instructions in the cable to the individual ambassadors keyed to the different situations in each of the three countries. For example, Ambassador Siracusa's demarche should be to General Vadora, rather than to the President, since the Ambassador had a recent conversation with Vadora along these general lines and information on "CONDOR" is reportedly not known above the level of Vadora in Montevideo.

b. The Charge in Buenos Aires should stress with President Videla directly, if possible; the adverse effect revelation of the assassination scheme will have on Argentine efforts to obtain loans and otherwise come up with solutions for improving its economy. (There was general agreement that Argentina is the country in which we should be able to exert the most leverage.)

c. Each ambassador should emphasize that overtures are being made in other "CONDOR" countries so that there will be no feeling on the part of any host government of being singled out for attention.

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d. Embassies in Brasilia, Asuncion, and La Paz should be information addressees.

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4. DC/LA asked that State provide us with a copy of the cable. They agreed to do so.

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Mr. Ryan agreed to add that in the outgoing cable.

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Deputy Chief
Latin America Division

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(13 Aug 76)

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24 JUL 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Raymond A. Warren
Chief, Latin America Division

VIA : Acting Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Operation Condor - Regional Co-operation
Among Latin American Intelligence Services
Against Terrorism

1. During recent months, the intelligence services of Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia, Brazil and Paraguay have embarked on a new concept of regional co-operation against terrorism which includes the mounting of offensive operations outside of their own countries against Latin American terrorist leaders. The code name of "Condor" has been assigned to this co-operative effort. The intelligence services of Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay are now organizing specially trained teams to operate [Redacted]

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[Redacted] The purpose of these teams will be to liquidate key Latin American terrorist leaders.

2. The plans of these countries to undertake offensive action outside of their own jurisdictions poses new problems for the Agency [Redacted]

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[Redacted] But more important, it raises the question of what action the Agency could effectively take to forestall illegal activity of this sort. Also, every precaution must be taken to ensure that the Agency is not wrongfully accused of being a party to this type of activity.

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[Redacted]

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**SUBJECT: Operation Condor - Regional Co-operation Among
Latin American Intelligence Services Against Terrorism**

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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signed
Raymond A. Warren

Raymond A. Warren

CONCUR:

Theodore C. Shackley

Acting Deputy Director for Operations

[Redacted]

24 JUL 1976

Date

23 July 1976

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**SUBJECT: Operation Condor - Regional Co-operation Among
Latin American Intelligence Services Against Terrorism**

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signed
Raymond A. Warren
Raymond A. Warren

CONCUR:

Frederic C. Mackley

23 JUL 1976

Acting Deputy Director for Operations

Date

23 July 1976

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